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N.A., a Utah Corporation,
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vs •
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FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, MARGARET M.
BECKER, J. LYNN DOUGAN, DIANA LADY
DOUGAN, PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.,
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT CO.,
a Utah partnership,

Case No. 890497-CA
Case No. 890597-CA
Case No. 890607-CA

Defendants and Respondents.
JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BECKERS, DOUGANS AND PARK MEADOWS

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is a consolidation of three appeals from the
Third Judicial District Court:

No. 89-0497, No. 89-0607 and No.

89-0597.
No. 89-0497:

This is an appeal from two orders.

The

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick entered an order on December 8, 1988,
denying a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by First
Interstate Bank of Utah ("FIBU")•

(R. at 1098-1100).

That Order

has never been certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Utah Supreme Court did

not have and this Court does not have jurisdiction of FIBU's appeal
from that Order.
On May 5, 1989, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick entered
summary judgment in favor of defendants/respondents, J. Lynn
Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan (the "Dougans"), Frederick G. Becker, II

and Margaret M. Becker (the "Beckers") and against the plaintiff/
appellant, FIBU.

(R. at 1414-17).

That judgment was certified as

a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
No. 89-0607:

The second consolidated matter on appeal is

taken from the summary judgment in favor of defendant/respondent
Park Meadows Investment Company ("PMD") and against the
plaintiff/appellant FIBU.
No. 89-0597:

(R. at 1514-16).

The third consolidated appeal is taken from

the denial of FIBU's objections to Beckers' and Dougans' Memorandum
of Costs and Disbursements.

(R. at 1511 and 1517-19).

The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of these consolidated appeals, except for the appeal from the Order denying FIBU's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2 and Article VIII, Section 3, Utah Constitution.

The Utah

Supreme Court poured over these consolidated appeals to the Utah
Court of Appeals for disposition.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is resolution of the PMD's appeal necessary?

2.

Was FIBU's notice to PMD defective?

3.

Was the acceleration of the Racquet Club Note

improper as to the maker due to FIBU's failure to comply with the
terms of the Note's acceleration clause?
4.

Are the Racquet Club Note and the guaranty one

instrument which should be considered together and with reference
to each other?

5.

Was FIBU required to give notice of default to the

Dougans and Beckers prior to accelerating the amount due under the
promissory note?
6.

Are Dougans and Beckers entitled to reimbursement of

costs incurred pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?
7.

Is the December 8, 1988 Order denying FIBUfs

September 26, 1988 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment a final
order?
8.

Is FIBU's appeal from the December 8, 1988 Order

9.

Assuming arguendo the December 8, 1988 Order is sub-

timely?

ject to appeal, did FIBU prove it was entitled to summary judgment?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULE
The determinative rules are:
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
The determinative statutes are:
Utah Code Ann. §§15-4-1 to -5 (1986).
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-12 (1989 Replacement).
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(a) and (b) (1980).
(The determinative rules and statutes are set out verbatim in the
Addendum at A2-6.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 15, 1986, FIBU commenced an action against
PMD, a debtor under Chapter 11, Frederick G. Becker, II, Margaret
M. Becker, Victor R. Ayers, Marion P. Ayers ("Ayers"), J. Lynn
Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan and First Security Bank.

(R. at 1-28).

FIBU, as creditor of PMD's bankruptcy estate, was granted relief
from the automatic stay to proceed.
on three causes of action:

(R. at 2). FIBU sought relief

(1) judicial foreclosure of the trust

deed; (2) putting FIBU in possession of the property or in the
alternative appointing a receiver; and (3) claim against Beckers,
Dougans and Ayers as guarantors.

(R. at 1-24).

On September 26, 1988, FIBU filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on its claims against Beckers, Ayers and Dougans.
(R. at 723-25).

More specifically, FIBU argued that Becker and

Dougan remained liable on the Racquet Club Note because:

(1) FIBU

did not release any party obligated on the Racquet Club Note; (2)
the language of paragraph 5 of the Work-Out Agreement was not a
present release of any obligation of Enoch Smith; (3) the work-out
agreement was superseded by the closing documents, none of which
contained a release of the Racquet Club Note.

FIBU additionally

argued on its motion for partial summary judgment that regardless
of whether Enoch Smith was released, Dougan and Becker were not
discharged on the Racquet Club Note because the release of a principal does not release a fully indemnified surety.

Also, the bank

argued that Becker's and Dougan's contention that the bank's
impairment of the collateral securing the Racquet Club Note was

without merit.

Finally, the bank argued that the undisputed facts

established that the Ayers were liable on the Racquet Club Note.
(R. at 730-798).
On November 28, 1988, the trial court denied FIBU's motion
for partial summary judgment.
December 8, 1988.

A written order was entered on

(R. at 1063, 1098-1100 and attached hereto in

Addendum at Alll-114.)

That order was never certified as final

pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
On February 6, 1989, Dougans and Beckers moved for summary
judgment in their favor and against FIBU, no cause of action.
(R. at 1121-23).

More specifically, Dougans and Beckers argued:

(1) the acceleration of the Racquet Club Note was improper due to
FIBU's failure to comply with the terms of the Note's acceleration
clause; (2) the Racquet Club Note and the guaranty are one instrument and must be construed together and with reference to each
other; and (3) FIBU was required to give notice of default to
Dougans and Beckers prior to acceleration of the amount due under
the Racquet Club Note.

(R. at 1124-1202).

In response, FIBU filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment on February 16, 1989.

(R. at 1214-15).

FIBU moved the

court for partial summary judgment declaring that it had properly
accelerated the promissory note from Park City Racquet Club in
favor of FIBU and that Dougan and Becker were not released from the
obligations by virtue of FIBU's conduct in relation to giving of
notice of default under the Note.

(Id.)

On May 3, 1989, the trial court granted summary judgment

in favor of Dougans and Beckers and against FIBU.
and attached hereto in Addendum at A7-11).

(R. at 1414-17,

The trial court

also denied FIBU's cross motion for partial summary judgment.
(Id.)

Furthermore, the trial court determined that there was no

just reason for delay and directed the clerk to enter it as a final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

(ld_. )

Subsequent to the trial court's judgment in favor of
Dougans and Beckers, they filed a Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements.
(R. at 1456-60).

(R. at 1421-23).

FIBU objected to that memorandum.

The trial court denied plaintiff's objections to

Beckers' and Dougans' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements and
awarded them $2,866.08.

(R. at 1517-19).

On May 22, 1989, PMD moved for summary judgment as to the
claims brought against it by FIBU.

(R. at 1446-47).

PMD's motion

was based upon a finding made by the trial court during the hearing
on Dougans' and Beckers' motion that the notice required to be
given by FIBU to PMD prior to FIBU exercising its option to accelerate was defective.

(R. at 1450-52).

PMD also moved the trial

court to direct the clerk to enter the judgment as final in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

trial court entered summary judgment in favor of PMD and against
FIBU and entered the judgment as final on July 6, 1989.

(R. at

1514-16 and attached hereto in Addendum at A12-15).
This case is a consolidation of three appeals from the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Summit County, the

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding.

The first appeal was

taken from the Order entered on December 1, 1988, denying FIBU's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Order, entered on May
5, 1989. The second appeal was taken from the trial court's denial
of plaintiff's objections to Beckers' and Dougans' Memorandum of
Costs and Disbursements.

The third appeal was taken from the trial

court's granting summary judgment in favor of PMD and against FIBU.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In December, 1978, Park City Racquet Club, Inc. ("PCRC")
obtained an $800,000 loan ("Racquet Club Note") from Walker Bank,
now known as First Interstate Bank of Utah ("FIBU").

The three-

page Note was signed by the president and secretary of PCRC, Becker
and Victor R. Ayres, respectively.

At the same time and in the

same instrument the shareholders of PCRC, Frederick G. Becker, II,
Margaret M. Becker, J. Lynn Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan, Victor R.
Ayers, and Marion P. Ayers, guaranteed payment of the Racquet Club
Note.

(R. at 1175-77 and attached hereto in Addendum at A16-19).
The officers and directors of PCRC were:

Frederick G.

Becker, II, President and Director; J. Lynn Dougan, Vice President
and Director; and Victor R. Ayers, Secretary and Director. The
registered agent for PCRC was J. Lynn Dougan.

The corporate

address of PCRC, its officers, directors and registered agent at
all times material herein was 2120 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84106.

(Id. ) .

On May 19, 1982, PCRC transferred undivided one-third
interests in Racquet Club to Becker, Dougan and Ayers and they, as

part of that conveyance assumed and agreed to pay the Racquet Club
Note.

(R. at 1266-67).

In or about August of 1982, Becker, Dougan

and Ayers sold the Racquet Club to Park Meadows Development
Company, later known as Park Meadows Investment Company ("PMD"), a
partnership consisting of Enoch Smith, Enoch Richard Smith ("Dick
Smith") and Victor R. Ayers.

(Defendant Victor Ayersf Amended

Answers to Request for Admissions, R. at 1179-80 and attached
hereto in Addendum at A20-22).

As part of the transaction, PMD and

its partners assumed and agreed to pay the Racquet Club Note and
agreed to indemnify Dougan and Becker from any liability arising
from their guarantee of the Racquet Club Note.

(I<3. See also, R.

at 1182 and attached hereto in Addendum at A23-24).
On September 2, 1982, Dougan sent a letter to FIBU informing it of those assumptions.
Addendum at A25-26).

(R. at 1522 and attached hereto in

Furthermore, FIBU consented to the exchange

of Dougan's and Becker's interests in the Racquet Club to PMD.

(R.

at 1522, Exhibit L thereto, and attached hereto in Addendum at
A29-30).

On November 11, 1982, Dougan wrote FIBU again informing

it of the Indemnity Agreement between PMD, the Smiths, Vic Ayers,
Becker and Dougan.

(R. at 1522, Exhibit L thereto, and and

attached hereto in Addendum at A27-28).
In the spring of 1985, PMD was experiencing financial difficulties including an inability to pay on the Racquet Club Note.
PMD and FIBU entered into discussions to reach an accommodation or
work-out agreement.
at A31-35).

(R. at 1184-86 and attached hereto in Addendum

In the work-out agreement FIBU released Enoch and

Margaret Smith from all obligations owed FIBU except a $500,000
loan owed by Enoch Smith Sons Company.

In exchange the Smiths

agreed to pledge an additional $4 million of personal unencumbered
assets.

The Dougans and Beckers were not consulted by FIBU with

regard to the work-out agreement and were not aware of the
delinquency or the actions of FIBU and PMD to work this out.

As a

result of the work-out agreement, the Racquet Club Note was to be
brought current immediately from additional funds provided by the
Smiths.

(Affidavit of Enoch Richard Smith, R. at 1188-91 and

attached hereto in Addendum at A36-40).
On January 24, 1986, FIBU sent a letter addressed to Dick
Smith, on behalf of Park Meadows Racquet Club, giving notice of
default on the Racquet Club Note, and giving notice that if the
default was not cured by February 7, 1986, FIBU would take legal
action.

(R. at 1193 and attached hereto in Addendum at A41-42).

At this time, FIBU did not provide notice of default to either
the Dougans, the Beckers or PCRC.

(Deposition of Frederick G.

Becker, II, R. at 1525 and relevant portions are attached hereto
in Addendum at A50-53; Deposition of J. Lynn Dougan, R. at 1526
and relevant portions are attached hereto in Addendum at A43-49).
When FIBU sent the notice to Dick Smith, $27,402.17 was required
to bring the payments on the Racquet Club Note current.

(R. at

1193 and Addendum at A42).
On or about February 10, 1986, FIBU executed the statutory
notice of default which accelerated the Note and the notice was
recorded on February 14, 1986.

(R. at 1195 and attached hereto in

Addendum at A54-55).

After FIBU accelerated the Note, and shortly

after February 21, 1986, Dougan received the statutory notice of
default pertaining to the Racquet Club Note at the corporate
office, 2010 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
(Affidavit of J, Lynn Dougan, R. at 1197-1202 and attached hereto
in Addendum at A56-63).

The Beckers have never received a copy of

the notice of default that was executed by FIBU on February 10,
1986.

(Deposition of Frederick G.

Becker, II, R. at 1252, and

Addendum at A53).
On March 13, 1986, FIBU filed an involuntary bankruptcy
petition placing PMD in bankruptcy and automatically staying further proceedings.

The filing occurred twenty-seven (27) days after

the statutory Notice of Default was recorded.
An order granting relief from the stay as to PMD was
issued on November 15, 1986.

(R. at 1-28).

Although FIBU had pre-

viously executed and recorded a statutory notice of default
electing to sell the property by private power of sale under the
deed of trust statute, it filed a complaint on December 15, 1986,
pursuing judicial foreclosure.
the statutory notice of default.

(Ic3. ) At no time did FIBU cancel
At the request and instance of

FIBU, the parties allowed FIBU to proceed to sell the Racquet Club
property at Sheriff's sale.

FIBU received all of the proceeds of

that sale in the amount of $425,000.00

(R. at 757).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Resolution of the PMD appeal is unnecessary and any judgment rendered will be ineffective.
claim against PMD.

FIBU does not seek a deficiency

The only relief sought by FIBU from PMD has

been obtained in the foreclosure of the Racquet Club.

Because

there is no actual controversy left to be resolved between FIBU and
PMD, FIBU's appeal regarding PMD is unnecessary and the judgment
below dismissing PMD should be allowed to stand.
FIBU's notice to PMD was defective.

FIBU acknowledges the

requirement to give fifteen days' notice of default as a condition
precedent to acceleration.

FIBU must strictly comply with the

requirements of the Racquet Club Note.

Although FIBU gave PMD

notice of default, it did not give PMD fifteen days' notice as
required by the terms of the Note.

Because FIBU did not give PMD

fifteen days' notice, FIBU's acceleration was improper.

The trial

court's decision that notice to PMD was defective should be
affirmed.
Acceleration of the Racquet Club Note was also improper as
to the maker PCRC due to FIBU's failure to comply with the terms of
the Note's acceleration clause.

In the lower court proceedings,

FIBU admitted that the Racquet Club Note required that notice of
default be given to the maker prior to acceleration.

PCRC, the

original maker, did not receive notice of default prior to
acceleration.

Also, no notice was sent to Dougans and Beckers in

their capacity as maker.

This Court should affirm the lower

court's finding that acceleration of the Racquet Club Note as to

T-\nr

the maker was improper.
The Racquet Club Note and the guaranty are one instrument
and should be considered together and with reference to each other.
In determining the rights and liabilities of the guarantors,
Dougans and Beckers, the Racquet Club Note and the guaranty must be
read and construed together.

Thus, where the guaranty language

specifically refers to the Racquet Club Note of which it is a part,
and the Note and guaranty language were executed in the course of
one transaction, Dougans and Beckers were entitled to the fifteenday notice of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration by the bank.
Dougans and Beckers did. not receive any notice whatsoever
with regard to the default and that FIBU intended to accelerate.
Where the contract of guaranty calls for notice, it is a condition
which must be met in order to bind the guarantors on their promise.
Dougans and Beckers should be discharged from their obligation as
guarantors because notice of default was not given to them by FIBU
as required by the terms of the parties' agreement.

This Court

should affirm the lower court's ruling that FIBU's failure to properly give notice relieves Dougans and Beckers from any liability on
their guaranty.
Dougans and Beckers are entitled to reimbursement of costs
incurred pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Dougans and Beckers were unable to develop the argu-

ments presented in their motion for summary judgment and in opposition to plaintiff's motions for partial summary judgment without

taking various depositions.

Dougans and Beckers were the prevail-

ing parties in both proceedings.

This Court should affirm the

lower court's award of costs to Dougans and Beckers.
The Order denying FIBU's September 26, 1988 Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is not a "final" judgment and is not
appealable.

The written order denying FIBU's 9-26-88 motion was

entered on December 8, 1988. Appeal can be taken only from a final
order.

The lower court did not certify the 12-8-88 Order as a

final judgment.

Even assuming the 12-8-88 Order is a final judg-

ment and appealable, FIBU's appeal is untimely.
its Notice of Appeal until May 16, 1989.

FIBU did not file

Thus, FIBU's appeal from

the 12-8-88 Order cannot be considered by this Court.
Assuming arguendo FIBU'S appeal from the 12-8-88 Order is
proper, it failed to prove it was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law in the lower court proceedings.

Genuine issues of material

fact exist and FIBU is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
I.
RESOLUTION OF THE PMD APPEAL IS UNNECESSARY.
The rule generally accepted by appellate courts is that an
appeal will be dismissed if its resolution is unnecessary.
The applicable rule is that when we have
notice of facts which have the effect of
making any determination of a question
unnecessary, or which would render any
judgment we might pronounce ineffectual,
the appeal should be dismissed.
State v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Wyo. 1983).
Court of Kansas has stated:

The Supreme

This court, under decisions so numerous
that their citation is neither necessary
nor required, has long been committed to
the rule that it will not consider and
decide questions raised on appeal when the
record makes it clearly appear that any
judgment it might render with respect
thereto would be unavailing or ineffective.
Another rule of like import, and equally
well-established, is that when a question
becomes moot, judicial action ceases.
Williams v. City of Wichita, 334 P.2d 353, 356 (Kan. 1959).

Those

general rules have been recognized and adopted by Utah, McRae v.
Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974).
Resolution of the PMD appeal is unnecessary and any judgment rendered will be ineffective.
claim against PMD.

FIBU does not seek a deficiency

FIBU has expressly stated on three separate

occasions that it does not seek a deficiency from PMD in the case
below.

In response to PMD's Motion for Summary Judgment, FIBU

asserted two objections to PMD's motion.

The one pertinent here is

that FIBU did not seek a deficiency against PMD.

It stated:

As a review of plaintiff's complaint
clearly discloses, plaintiff has not
asserted a deficiency claim against Park
Meadows in this case. . . .

The court should therefore, deny Park
Meadows' Motion for Summary Judgment
because:
1. The issue on which it seeks
summary judgment is not and never has
been before the court in this action.

(R. at 1469).

FIBU affirmed its position in its Docketing

Statement filed with this court.

Paragraph 5(g) of FIBU's

Docketing Statement identifies the following as one issue on
appeal:
Whether the District Court could properly grant summary judgment for Park
Meadows when First Interstate had never
filed suit against them [sic] for the
deficiency. (Docketing Statement at p. 7).
Finally, FIBU reaffirmed its position in response to PMD's Motion
for Summary Disposition of the Appeal.

It stated:

First Interstate, accordingly, did not even
name Park Meadows as a defendant under the
deficiency claim. (Response to Motion for
Summary Disposition).
Thus, FIBU has abandoned any pursuit of a deficiency claim against
PMD.
The only relief sought by FIBU from PMD has been obtained.
When FIBU commenced its foreclosure action, PMD possessed legal
title to the Racquet Club.

Because PMD possessed title, FIBU named

PMD in the foreclosure action.

The Trust Deed covering the Racquet

Club has now been foreclosed and the Racquet Club has been sold at
Sheriff's sale.

(R. at 757). By FIBU's own admission, it has

obtained all the relief sought from PMD.

Therefore, there is no

actual controversy left to be resolved between FIBU and PMD.
Because there is no controversy, FIBU's appeal regarding PMD is
unnecessary and the judgment below dismissing PMD should be allowed
to stand.

T-V^

II.
FIBU'S NOTICE TO PMD WAS DEFECTIVE.
A.

The Note Requires Notice of Default.
The terms of the Racquet Club Note, as drafted by FIBU,

requires as a condition precedent to acceleration a fifteen-day
Notice of Default:
In the event:
(a) Any installment provided for hereunder is not paid in full within fifteen
(15) days after its scheduled due date
. . . then, in any such events and upon
fifteen [15) days written notice given to
the undersigned by Walker or its assigns
which default or event shall not be cured
by the undersigned within fifteen (15) days
following such written notice, the entire
remaining unpaid balance of both principal
and interest owing hereunder shall, at the
option of the holder hereof and without
notice or demand, become immediately due
and payable. (R. at 1175-77 and Addendum
at A18.)
FIBU cannot and does not dispute that notice is required.

(Brief

of Appellant First Interstate Bank "Brief of Appellant," at 12; R.
at 1231).

Although FIBU acknowledges the requirement to give a

fifteen day notice, FIBU's sole argument is that it "substantially
complied" and that stricter compliance is "hypertechnical."
B.

The Facts Regarding Notice to PMD is Undisputed.
FIBU sent a letter addressed to Dick Smith on behalf of

Park Meadows Racquet Club.

That letter is dated January 24, 1986.

There is no evidence in the record regarding when the letter was
actually mailed.

For purposes of argument, the parties have

assumed it was mailed on January 24, 1986.

The letter states:

The total amount due, $27,402.17, must be
received in our office by February 7, 1986;
if not, the lender will take the legal
actions available to them under the terms
of the loan documents.
Thus, the cure period terminated on February 7, 1986.
C.

FIBU Cannot Dispute That It Gave PMD Only Fourteen Days Notice.
FIBU attempts to argue that it gave PMD fifteen days

notice.

PMD acknowledges that January 24, 1986 to February 7, 1986

is precisely fifteen days, if the first and last days of the cure
period are counted.

In support of FIBU's position, it quotes from

the Note the following provision:

"Written notice shall be effec-

tive as of the time the same is deposited in the United Sataes
[sic] mails addressed to the last known address of the undersigned
or the time of the actual receipt thereof, if earlier."

(Brief of

Appellant, p. 15). Based on that provision, FIBU counts the first
day, January 24, 1986, and the last day, February 7, 1986, and concludes that it gave PMD fifteen days notice.

Id.

Initially, the fact that the letter was deposited in the
mail does not effect the time computation.

Although written notice

was "effective" as of the time deposited in the mails, this fact
does not effect the well-established proposition that the day of
the act or event from which the time period is to run is not
counted.

Kellar v. Eighth Judicial District, 470 P.2d 434, 436

(Nev. 1970) (Notwithstanding presumption that letter duly mailed
was received in regular course of mail, addressee was entitled to
benefit of rule regarding computation of time in which day or act
of event is not counted).

The general time computation principles

also apply to contracts.

Messina v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 390

N.E.2d 758, 760 (N.Y.App. 1979); Buehner Schokbeton Company v.
Hoenfs Crane Service, 500 P.2d 140, 141 (Colo.App. 1972).
fails to present any case

FIBU

law to the contrary.

FIBU also fails to inform this Court that it agreed in the
trial court that it had only given fourteen days notice to PMD.

In

its memorandum opposing the Dougans' and Beckers' Motion for
Summary Judgment, FIBU identified several facts which it claimed
were disputed and therefore, precluded summary judgment.

None of

those facts dispute when notice was given or when the cure period
terminated.

(R. at 1232-34).

In the argument portion of its

opposing memorandum, FIBU made no reference to the Note's provision
that notice is effective on the date the notice is deposited in the
United States mail.

(R. at 1224-85).

had given PMD fifteen days notice.

Nor did FIBU argue that it

(Id.)

Furthermore, FIBU agreed in that memorandum with the principle espoused by the Dougans and Beckers that in computing time if
the first day is counted, the last day is not.

Specifically, the

bank stated:
The first 20 pages of defendant's memorandum
(D. Mem. 4-24) are devoted to developing
in extenso two propositions: (1) a creditor
must comply with the express terms of an
acceleration clause to accelerate a debt; and
(2) in computing a time period a court includes
either the first or the last day of the applicable time period, but not both. First Interstate
does not disagree with either proposition.
(R. at 1237 ) .
The first time FIBU contended that it had given PMD fifteen days' notice was during oral argument.

(Reporter's Transcript

of Proceedings Before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, April 19,
1989, p. 31, R. at 1532 and attached hereto in Addendum at A64-110).
At that time, FIBU for the first time quoted the Note's provision
that notice was effective when it was deposited in the United
States mail.

Then, FIBU half-heartedly argued it had given PMD

fifteen days' notice.

(Icl. at 3 3 and Addendum at A97).

In

rebuttal, counsel for the Dougans and Beckers quoted to the trial
court from FIBU's opposing memorandum where FIBU agreed to the general principle that if the first day of a time period is counted,
the last day is not.

(Id. at 38-39 and Addendum at A102-03).

In

rebuttal, counsel for FIBU abandoned its argument that it had given
PMD fifteen days notice and contended, as it does here, that its
failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the Note was
merely hypertechnical.
D.

FIBU Must Strictly Comply With The Requirements of the Note.
FIBU relies on four cases for the proposition that it sub-

stantially complied with the Note's requirements and that stricter
compliance is merely hypertechnical and not required.

They are:

Local #1179, Carpet, Linoleum and Resilient Floor Decorator's Union
v. Merchants Mutual Bonding, 228 Kan. 226, 613 P.2d 944 (1980);
Broward County Carpenter's Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Seygo
Construction Co., Inc., 570 F.Supp. 817 (S.D.Fla. 1983); Sykes v.
Sperow, 179 P. 488 (Or. 1919); McKegney v. Illinois Surety Company,
155 N.Y.S. 1041 (1915).

Those cases are inapposite.

Each case

involved a notice given to a "surety for hire" for payment under a
construction bond.

The notice in each case alleged a contractor's

or subcontractor's failure to properly perform under the construction contract.
None of the cases involved a "voluntary surety."

Two of

the cases expressly state that bonding companies engaged in the
business of insuring the performance of others (sureties for hire)
are not favored by the law and that any ambiguities in the bond
should be construed against the bonding company.1

Merchants

Mutual Bonding, 613 P.2d at 947; Seygo Construction Co., 570
F.Supp. at 820. None of the cases involve or address notice of
default given to the maker of a note as a condition precedent to
a lender's rights to accelerate.
Furthermore, none of the cases involve the failure to give
notice within the applicable instruments' prescribed time limits.
The dispute in each of those cases involve the method by which
notice was given or the form of the notice.

In each case, notice

of the failure to perform was given within the express time limits
of the bond.

Furthermore, in one case the court expressly stated

that notice had to be given within the specified time period.
MeKegney v. Illinois Surety Company, 155 N.Y.S. at 1043.

See

(In

rejecting the argument that the method by which notice was given
was improper, the Supreme Court of New York stated:

"Just how that

notice is given is immaterial, so long as it is given and is
received by the surety within the time specified in the contract."

1

This Court has recognized the difference between "sureties for hire" and "voluntary
sureties." The former is not favored by the law and the latter is. American Bonding Co. v.
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1988). See also, infra at 45, 52-55.

(Emphasis added)) .
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed its displeasure with
acceleration clauses.
The clause which allows for acceleration in case of default, if strictly
enforced, is a severe covenant, the invocation of which has similarity to other
forfeitures. The imposition of such severe
conditions is not favored in the law. . . .
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1147
(Utah 1976) (footnote omitted).
This Court has similarly recognized the acceleration as
a remedy is "a harsh one not favored in the law."

Stacy Properties

v. Wixon, 766 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied, 779
P.2d 688.

Like other forfeitures, acceleration clauses should be

strictly construed.

This is especially true when the acceleration

clause has been drafted by the party who seeks to impose it.
Strict compliance is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's position reflected in KIXX, Inc. v. Stallion Music, Inc.,
610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980).

In KIXX, the plaintiff and defendants

entered into a contract for the purchase of plaintiff's assets.
Id. at 1386-87. Among other things, the defendants executed a
promissory note which was to be paid in installments.

The note

contained an acceleration clause.
It is expressly understood and agreed
that if default be made in the payment of
any of the aforesaid installments as and
when the same shall become due and payable,
and after thirty days notice thereof, then
and in that event, the unpaid balance of
the aforesaid principal sum, at the option
of the holder, may become due and payable;
TIME BEING THE ESSENCE OF THIS CONTRACT.
Id. at 1387.

Defendants paid the first two installments a few days after the due
date.

Those payments were accepted.

On November 18, 1977, the

plaintiff sent a written notice to the defendants reminding them
that the third installment would become due on December 1, 1977.
That installment was not paid.

On December 29, 1977, the plaintiff

sent a notice to the defendants accelerating the entire amount due
under the Note.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the language of the
acceleration clause required the plaintiff to give defendants 30
days written notice of default.

Id. at 1389.

The Supreme Court

further held that the plaintiff failed to give the defendants the
30 days notice and therefore, the plaintiff's acceleration was
premature and improper.

The Court further held that there was no

need for the defendants to tender the delinquent payment and that
based on the plaintiff's notice it was reasonable for the defendants to believe that nothing other than full payment would be
accepted.

Id.
This case is similar to KIXX.

Although FIBU gave notice

of default to PMD, it did not give PMD 15 days notice as required
by the Note.

The notice expressly stated that any cure had to be

made on or before February 7, 1986.

It was therefore reasonable

for PMD to believe that nothing less than full payment would be
accepted after February 7, 1986.

Therefore, PMD was not required

to tender any delinquent payments to FIBU.

Because FIBU did not

give PMD fifteen days notice, FIBU's acceleration was improper.
Although FIBU argues that strict compliance is unnecessary

and that the defect presented by this appeal is hypertechnical, it
has cited no law, especially Utah law, which states that strict
compliance is not necessary.
FIBU's position.

Existing Utah law is contrary to

Liberal construction of the Note would favor

FIBU, who drafted the provision and disfavor individual makers and
would be an extremely harsh result.

As Judge Frederick in the

trial court stated:
While it may be true, for purposes of
argument, that that determination is
hypertechnical, I am persuaded that in a
matter of this magnitude, the bank must,
being the drafter of the document upon
which all the parties here must rely, is
expected as a minimum to comply with the
terms of its own documents, particularly
when it relates to something as serious as
an acceleration of an obligation of this
type. (Reporter's Transcript of
Proceedings, R. at 1563, p. 45, and
Addendum at A109).
The trial court's decision that notice to PMD was defective should
be affirmed.
III.
ACCELERATION OF THE RACQUET CLUB NOTE WAS
IMPROPER AS TO THE MAKER DUE TO FIBU'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE
NOTE'S ACCELERATION CLAUSE.
In December of 1978, PCRC obtained an $800,000.00 loan
from Walker Bank, now known as FIBU.

The three-page promissory

note was signed by the president and secretary of PCRC, Becker and
Ayers, respectively.
On or about January 24, 1986, FIBU sent a letter to Dick
Smith, for Park Meadows Racquet Club, giving notice of default on
the Racquet Club Note and giving notice that if the default was not

cured by February 7, 1986, legal action would be taken.

At this

time, FIBU did not provide notice of default to PCRC, the maker.
On February 10, 1986, FIBU executed a notice of default which
accelerated the note and the notice was recorded on February 14,
1986.

Shortly after February 21, 1986, the Dougans received the

statutory notice of default pertaining to the Racquet Club Note.
To this day, Beckers have never received a copy of the notice of
default that was executed by FIBU on February 10, 1986.
The acceleration clause contained in the Racquet Club
Note was not self-executing upon default.

Pursuant to the terms

of the acceleration clause FIBU had to give PCRC fifteen days
notice of default.

See Addendum at A18.

If PCRC did not cure the

default within fifteen days following the written notice, the
entire remaining unpaid balance of the note was to become
immediately due and payable.

Id.

The acceleration of the Racquet Club Note was improper
due to FIBU's failure to comply with the terms of the acceleration
clause in the Note.

More particularly, the acceleration was

improper because FIBU failed to give PCRC notice of default.
As previously set forth in pp. 20-23 of this brief, the
Utah courts have expressed displeasure with acceleration clauses.
Acceleration as a remedy is a harsh one, not favored in the law.
Like other forfeitures, the courts of this state have repeatedly
recognized that acceleration clauses should be strictly construed.
See Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976); KIXX, Inc. v.
Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980); Stacey Properties

v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied, 779 P.2d
688.

FIBU's acceleration of the Racquet Club Note without giving

notice to PCRC, the maker, was improper.
Other jurisdictions have likewise found that acceleration
of an entire amount of a promissory note is improper where the
holder has failed to give proper notice of its intent to
accelerate the debt.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that equity

demanded notice be given to a maker of a holder's intent to
accelerate maturity of a promissory note upon the maker's default
in Ogden v. Gibraltar Savings Association, 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.
1982).

Ogden appealed a lower court's denial of damages for

wrongful foreclosure under a deed of trust.

The Texas Supreme

Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and found that Ogden
could recover his damages established at trial.
The sole question before the court was whether the holder
gave proper notice of acceleration of an installment note prior to
foreclosing under a deed of trust.
Undisputably, Ogden was in default on his note payments.
Gibraltar sent him a letter in August which stated that "Your
failure to cure such breach on or before said date may result in
acceleration of the sums secured by the Deed of Trust and sale of
the property standing as security thereunder."

Ld.

In November,

Gibraltar posted a notice of trustee's sale and the property was
sold to a third party.

Id.

The Texas Supreme Court held that the August letter was

insufficient to give notice that Gibraltar intended to exercise
its option to accelerate the debt.

Ici. at 234. The court noted

that the acceleration clause in the deed of trust gave Gibraltar
the option to accelerate upon default.

icL

The letter gave no

clear and unequivocal notice that Gibraltar would exercise the
option to accelerate.

id.

The court found that, "the holder of a

delinquent installment note must present the note and demand
payment of the past due installments prior to exercising his right
to accelerate." Ici. at 233.

(citation omitted).

The court recognized that there are essentially two types
of notice -- notice of intent to accelerate and notice that the
debt has been accelerated.

Ic3. at 233-34.

The court found that

both types of notice are required and that "[njotice that the debt
has been accelerated . . . is ineffective unless preceded by
proper notice of intent to accelerate."
omitted).

ici. at 234.

(citation

In examining the necessity of both types of notice, the

court stated:
Notice of intent to accelerate is necessary
in order to provide the debtor an
opportunity to cure his default prior to
harsh consequences of acceleration and
foreclosure. Proper notice that the debt
has been accelerated, in the absence of a
contrary agreement or waiver, cuts off the
debtor!s right to cure his default and gives
notice that the entire debt is due and

payable.

i d . at 234.

(citation omitted).2

In the i n s t a n t a c t i o n , based upon the Utah c o u r t s ' and
c o u r t s ' of other j u r i s d i c t i o n s p o s i t i o n with regard to a c c e l e r a t i o n
c l a u s e s , FIBU failed to give notice as required under the terms of
the Racquet Club Note.

The a c c e l e r a t i o n clause contained in the

Racquet Club Note required t h a t "fifteen
[be] given to the undersigned . . . . . "

(15) days w r i t t e n notice
(R. at 1176).

At no time

did FIBU provide n o t i c e to PCRC evidencing i t s i n t e n t i o n to take
advantage of the a c c e l e r a t i o n provision contained in the Racquet
Club Note.

FIBU did not give proper n o t i c e of i t s i n t e n t to accel-

e r a t e the debt.

The attempted a c c e l e r a t i o n by FIBU as to PCRC, the

maker, was improper.
The bank, by f a i l i n g to give n o t i c e to PCRC as required by

z

Other decisions have required a holder of a promissory note to perform some clear,
unequivocal, a f f i r m a t i v e act evidencing an intent to accelerate p r i o r to acceleration, see
Bauer Development Co. v. Nu-West, I n c . , 727 P.2d 1149 (Colo.App. 1988) ( I n the case of an
acceleration provision exercisable at the option of the c r e d i t o r , the c r e d i t o r must perform
some clear, unequivocal a f f i r m a t i v e act evidencing his i n t e n t i o n to take advantage of the
acceleration p r o v i s i o n ) ; U.S. v. Rollinson, 629 F.Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1986) (Creditor must take
a f f i r m a t i v e action to make 1t known to debtor that he exercised his option to accelerate where
acceleration of installment payments in case of default is at holder's o p t i o n ) ; Leasing v.
F l i g h t America, I n c . , 537 F.Supp. 745 (D.C.Va. 1982) (Option to accelerate maturity of
promissory note must be made 1n manner so clear and unequivocal as to leave no doubt as to
holder's i n t e n t i o n and to appraise maker e f f e c t i v e l y of f a c t that option had been exercised);
Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (Acceleration clauses are not
self-executing and holder of an instrument must take some p o s i t i v e action to exercise his
option to declare payments due); Rivers v. Rivers, 404 So.2d 1300 (La.App. 1981) (A clause
allowing holder of a note to accelerate maturity at his option is not operative u n t i l the
holder takes some a f f i r m a t i v e action c l e a r l y and unequivocally evidencing t h i s i n t e n t i o n to the
maker); Oil l a r d v. Freeland, 714 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.App. 1986) ( I n order to avail himself of the
r i g h t to accelerate the note, holder must make a clear, p o s i t i v e , and unequivocal declaration
1n some manner of the exercise of that r i g h t ) ; Baldazo v. V i l l a Oldsmobile, 695 S.W.2d 815
(Tex.App. 1985) (Notice that a debt has been accelerated has no legal e f f e c t unless preceded by
notice t h a t the debt w i l l be accelerated); and Glassmaker v. Ricard, 593 P.2d 179 (Wash.App.
1979) (Acceleration of balance due on a note must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner
which e f f e c t i v e l y appraises maker that holder has exercised his r i g h t to accelerate).

the terms of the Note, effectively destroyed the right of PCRC, its
officers and shareholders to cure the default prior to
acceleration.

FIBU, by making this election, effectively waived

its right to accelerate the Note as to the maker, PCRC, its officers and shareholders.

Since notice under the Racquet Club Note is

a condition precedent to FIBU exercising its right to accelerate,
the Note was never legally accelerated as to PCRC, the maker, and
as to its guarantors Dougans and Beckers.
In its brief, appellant claims that PMD was the proper
entity to receive "any notice" required by the Racquet Club Note.
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 19-24).

First, appellant claims that

notification of PCRC was "impossible because the corporation was
dissolved."

(Id_. at 19-20).

Appellant improperly mischaracterizes

the proceedings below in claiming that the documents demonstrating
the dissolution were given to them "just prior to the summary judgment motion" and that the documents "were presented to the district
court."

(Ic3. at 20). FIBU was aware of the Racquet Club dissolu-

tion in May of 1988 at the deposition of Frederick George Becker.3
Additionally, the dissolution papers are a matter of public record
and could have been obtained by counsel at any time in the
proceedings.
FIBU secondly mischaracterizes the proceedings below by

J

In Becker's deposition he was specifically asked by counsel for FIBU what happened to the
Racquet Club and he Informed counsel that It was liquidated. At that time counsel was aware of
documents pertaining to the dissolution of the Racquet Club. (Deposition of Frederick G.
Becker, III, p. 75, lines 21-25 to p. 76, line 23, R. at 1525.)

claiming that the dissolution documents "were presented to the district court."

(Brief of Appellant, p. 20). FIBU "presented" the

issue of dissolution to the district court just hours before argument on the motion for summary judgment in the form of a supplemental memorandum.

(R. at 1388-1407).

FIBU did not cite any case law

in its supplemental memorandum to support its present argument on
appeal that the failure to notify PCRC "would have been excused
because PCRC was no longer in existence."
20).

(Brief of Appellant, p.

FIBU did not present this point to the district court in its

oral argument on this matter.

(R. at 156 3 and Addendum at

A64-110).
Despite the impropriety of FIBU's statements, its argument
that the failure to notify PCRC of its intent to accelerate would
have been excused is neither supported in fact nor in law. Factually, FIBU sent a statutory notice of default, after acceleration,
to Park City Racquet Club at two separate addresses:

(1) 1200

Little Kate Road, Park City, Utah 84060 and (2) Highway 248, Park
City, Utah 84060.

(R.

at 1280-82).

In sending the Racquet Club

these notices, FIBU recognized its obligation to do so under the
terms of the Note and obviously did not deem its actions to have
been "an idle gesture --a useless thing."

(Brief of Appellant, p.

20).
The case law cited by FIBU to this court in their brief
also does not support their argument that notice to PCRC, the
maker, would have been useless.

Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 2

P.2d 688 (Wash. 1931), is distinguishable and does not govern this

action.

Factually in Sherman, on September 10, 1926, Washington

and Idaho Theaters entered into a written conditional sales contract whereby there was a sale and purchase agreement to be paid in
monthly installments.

Will Starkey and George Turner guaranteed

the payment specified under the contract.

Starkey and Turner were

the sole incorporators of the Theaters Company and Turner acted as
one of its directors continuously thereafter.

The Theaters Company

failed to meet the installments as they fell due and an action was
brought against the Theaters Company, as principal debtor, and
against Starkey and Turner, as guarantors.

The trial court found

against Starkey and Turner, holding them liable on the written
guarantee.

The guarantors appealed from that judgment.

The court, on appeal, found that notice of default was
unnecessary.

Id. at 691.

First, the court noted that the princi-

pal debtor was insolvent at the time of the first default.

Id.

Furthermore, the court emphasized that Starkey and Turner knew that
the principal debtor defaulted in the payment which matured on
January 15, 1927. The guarantors had also paid the theater's operation costs out of their "own pockets" from January 15 to July 15
of 1927.

Id.

Thus, the court concluded that:
From an examination of the record we are
satisfied that the appellants were
acquainted with the defaults which occurred
during these six or seven months. Under
these circumstances the giving of notice to
the appellants would have been an idle gesture -- a useless thing. I<3. (Emphasis
added).

Initially it must be noted that Sherman did not deal with
notice of intent to accelerate.

Rather, the case related to notice

of default after acceleration.

Also, Sherman is distinguishable in

that in the instant action the record is clear that neither guarantors knew that payments on the Racquet Club Note were in default.
In the spring of 1985, PMD became delinquent on its payments of the
Racquet Club Note.

PMD and FIBU entered into discussions to reach

an accommodation or work out agreement.

Dougans and Beckers were

not consulted by FIBU with regard to the work-out agreement and
were not aware of the delinquency of the Note.

Shortly after

February 21, 1986, Dougan learned that the Note was in default upon
receiving the statutory notice of default after the entire balance
on the Note had been accelerated.

To this date, the Beckers have

not received the statutory notice of default.

Clearly, under the

circumstances of this action, notice of default to the guarantors,
Dougans and Beckers, was necessary despite the dissolution of PCRC.
Appellant also improperly asserts in its brief that PCRC,
Dougans and Beckers were not entitled to notice of default prior to
acceleration of the Note because Dougan instructed FIBU "to send
further notices regarding the loan to Park Meadows."
Appellant, pp. 20-21).

(Brief of

FIBU relies on Lynn Dougan?s deposition

testimony to argue that the notices to which Dougan referred were
notices of default required as a condition precedent to acceleration by the Racquet Club Note.

However, the testimony of Lynn

Dougan, examined in context, clearly referred to payment notices or
coupons which were provided by the bank to accompany payments. The
complete testimony was as follows:
Q. After the exchange, did you
continue to receive payment notices on the

Racquet Club for a period of time?
A. No, not to my recollection. I
think -- we very clearly noticed the bank
not only were we exchanging our interest
but that the Smiths and Park Meadows -Smiths and Ayers and Park Meadows
Development were assuming and paying the
loan and they would do so after a date
certain. And my recollection is that we
didn't receive any further notices.
Q. You directed the bank to send the
notices some place else?
A.

I would -- yes.

Q.

You remember who you told --

A.

No.

Q.

--At the bank?

A.

No.

Q. You just remember you told the bank
to send the notices elsewhere?
A. (Witness indicates by nodding head
up and down.)
Q.

That was a "yes?"

A. Yes. That was a "yes."
(Deposition of Lynn Dougan, p. 26, lines
6-25 and Addendum at A43-49).
When Lynn Dougan's testimony is taken in context, it is
clear that he was merely referring to "payment notices" or coupons.
The relevant question directed to Dougan was as to whether he
received "payment notices on the Racquet Club for a period of
time."
at A45).

(Deposition of Lynn Dougan, p. 26, lines 6-7 and Addendum
Dougan did not mention the 15-day notice of default any-

where in his deposition.

Clearly, when he stated he directed the

bank to send "the notices" to PMD, he was referring to the "payment

notices."
Additionally, evidencing the fact that Dougan was merely
referring to "payment notices" or coupons, is his testimony later
in the deposition which reads:
Q. Okay. You have no remembrance of
calling up the bank and saying, "Hey, send
the notices now on to the Smiths"?
A. No. I can't say that I do. But I
certainly can understand that I might have
done that if they were still being sent to
our offices. (Deposition of Lynn Dougan,
p. 49, lines 9-13 and Addendum at A47).
Clearly, the "notices" referred to in Dougan's deposition were
"monthly payment notices" or the coupons which were provided by the
bank to accompany payments on the Racquet Club Note.

Dougan did

not testify that he directed FIBU to send "notice of default" prior
to acceleration to PMD.

FIBU was required to send the fifteen-day

notice of default prior to acceleration to PCRC, Dougans and
Beckers under the terms'of the parties' agreement.
Respondents did not waive their right to the fifteen-day
notice of default prior to acceleration by directing the bank to
send the "payment notices" elsewhere.

FIBU concedes in its brief

that finding of a waiver requires the conduct of the actor to demonstrate "an intentional relinquishment of a known right."
of Appellant, p. 21). Dougans and Beckers agree.

(Brief

The party's

actions or conduct must evince unequivocally an intent to waive, or
must be inconsistent with any other intent.

Barros v. Wood, 750

P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988).
Additionally, the doctrine of waiver is an equitable doc-
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trine based upon fairness and justice.

Riverside Development Co.

v. Ritche, 650 P.2d 657, 662 (Idaho 1982).

Waiver is primarily a

question of intent and the best policy is to judge each situation
on a case-by-case basis.
decided against waiver.

idL at 663.

Doubtful cases will be

A. J. Bayless Markets v. Industrial Comm.,

655 P.2d 363, 365 (Ariz.App. 1982).
The record is clear that Dougan did not direct the bank to
send the fifteen-day notice of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration to PMD.

In the lower court proceedings, FIBU

failed to prove that PCRC, Dougans or Beckers "unequivocally" and
"intentionally" relinquished their rights to the fifteen-day notice
of default as required under the terms of the Racquet Club Note.
No evidence was presented that Dougan knowingly and intentionally
waived his right to notice of default when he directed the bank to
send payment notices elsewhere.

Dougan's request that FIBU send

payment notices (coupons) to PMD and the Smiths did not relieve
FIBU of its obligation to send the fifteen-day notice of default as
required by the terms of the Racquet Club Note.

Moreover, the bank

does not assert or claim that Mrs. Dougan, the Beckers or PCRC
waived the notice requirements.

The waiver argument is directed at

Lynn Dougan only.
Finally, with respect to its claim that PMD was the proper
entity to receive any notice required by the Note, the bank also
erroneously asserts it was relieved of Its duty to notify PCRC,
Dougans and Beckers of its intent to accelerate prior to acceleration because to do so "defies common sense and commercial reality."
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(Brief of Appellant, p. 21). Furthermore, the bank also improperly
claims that PMD was the only proper entity to receive notice of
default as assignee and primary obligor.

(Icl. at 22-23).

In the lower court proceedings, FIBU claimed that the
assumption agreement operated as "an assignment of the assignor's
[e.g., Beckers' and Dougans'] rights and a delegation of [their]
unperformed duties under the contract."

(R. at 1240).

The bank

further contended that "to the extent PCRC had a right to notice
under the note, it assigned this right to Park Meadows . . . ."
Id.

Additionally, FIBU claimed that "Dougans and Beckers remain

liable to First Interstate under their assumption agreement."
at 1255).

(Id.

Taken as a whole, FIBU argued that as assignees, Dougans

and Beckers were subject to the unperformed duties under the Note
yet as assignees, were not entitled to the right of the fifteen-day
notice of default prior to acceleration of the Note.
FIBU's assertions are contrary to the Restatement law
cited in their brief and the case law of this and other
jurisdictions.

The general rule is that assignees of contracts

stand in the shoes of the assignor and receive all the rights under
the contract and are subject to all the duties of the contract.
First Investment Co. v. Anderson, 621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980).
In the lower court proceedings, FIBU admitted that the
Racquet Club Note required that notice of default be given to the
maker prior to acceleration of the Note.

(R. at 1242).

Undisput-

edly, PCRC did not receive notice of default prior to acceleration.
FIBU admits that it sent the fifeen-day notice of default to PMD.
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No notice was sent to Dougans and Beckers as "assignees" of the
Racquet Club Note.

Dougans and Beckers took the Racquet Club Note

subject to all of the defenses and equities under the Note.

In

their capacity as assignees, Dougans and Beckers were entitled to
the fifteen-day notice of default which was a condition precedent
to acceleration.

Acceleration of the Racquet Club Note was

improper due to FIBU's failure to comply with the terms of the
Note's acceleration clause.
Additionally, PCRC conveyed its interest in the Racquet
Club to Becker, Dougan and Ayers.

As a part of that transaction,

Becker, Dougan and Ayers assumed and agreed to pay the Racquet Club
Note and thus stepped into the shoes of the maker, PCRC, and
thereby became the maker.

In their capacity as maker (as distin-

guished from their role as guarantors), Dougan and Becker became
entitled to receive the fifteen-day notice of default as a condition precedent to the bank accelerating the Note.

In their capac-

ity as maker, Dougan and Becker also did not receive notice in
accordance with the terms of the Note.
This Court should affirm the lower court's finding that
acceleration of the Racquet Club Note as to the maker was improper.
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IV.
THE RACQUET CLUB NOTE AND THE GUARANTY ARE
ONE INSTRUMENT WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
TOGETHER AND WITH REFERENCE TO EACH OTHER.
In December of 1978, shareholders of PCRC guaranteed payment of the $800,000 promissory note.
A19).

(R. at 1177 and Addendum at

The one-paragraph guaranty is located on page 3 of the

Racquet Club Note immediately following the signatures of PCRC's
secretary and president.
The guaranty reads, in its entirety, as follows:
For good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and
severally guarantee payment of this
promissory note (Secured by Deed of Trust)
and further guarantee payment of the entire
indebtedness evidenced thereby and the Deed
of Trust securing the same. (emphasis
added).
It is clear that the promissory note is expressly incorporated into
the guaranty.

The Racquet Club Note and the guaranty are one

instrument which should be read together and construed with reference to each other.
Moreover, the guaranty and the Racquet Club Note were
executed by the president, secretary, and shareholders of PCRC
contemporaneously in the course of the same transaction.
instruments concern the same subject matter.

The two

In determining the

respective rights and interest of the parties, the Racquet Club
Note and the guaranty must be read and construed together.
The Utah courts on numerous occasions, have been faced
with the interpretation of two documents that were executed
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contemporaneously as far as determining the respective rights and
interests of the parties.

In Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d

1080 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688, this Court construed the provisions contained in a promissory note along with
those contained in a letter agreement and gave effect to each in
light of the parties' intent.
The background of Stacey Properties has been previously
set forth in Point II of this brief.

However, for purposes of this

argument, the following facts are essential.

The promissory note

and letter agreement were executed by plaintiff and defendant on
the same day.

The record was clear that Golwix bargained for and

received a contractual right to offsets.

The operative provision

of the promissory note stated:
[Golwix] shall have the right to offset
against any amounts due or to become due to
[Stacey] under this Note any such
reimbursement due to [Golwix] under Section
17 of said letter agreement or under any
other provision thereof or of any document
executed in conjunction therewith, provided,
however, that [Golwix] give[s] [Stacey]
written notice of the amount to be offset
and the specific reasons therefor. _ldL at
1083. (emphasis is original).
The trial court considered the above-cited provision in the
promissory note along with the following provision of the letter
agreement:
The properties have been inspected by
[Golwix] and are purchased "as is" . . . .
We represent and warrant to you that all
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and
sewer systems at the properties are in
working order . . . Id.
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Based upon the two provisions the trial court determined
that when Golwix incurred a $22,758.00 expense to replace an air
conditioner, it referred to the warranty provision in the letter
agreement and exercised its contractual offset right under the
promissory note.

This Court agreed with the trial court's con-

struction of the promissory note and the letter agreement.

This

Court stated:
These two instruments could be reasonably
construed together. Verhoef v. Aston, 740
P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987) (agreements
which are related and executed
contemporaneously must be construed as a
whole and harmonized). The trial court
could also properly balance the acceleration
and offset terms of the note, giving effect
to each of the provisions of the entire
agreement. Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 575
P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978) (contractual
provisions must be interpreted in light of
the entire agreement, giving effect to every
other provision). Stacey Properties, 766
P.2d at 1083.
Accordingly, this Court harmonized and construed the
promissory note and letter agreement as a whole.

In doing so this

Court concluded that the trial court was correct in holding that
the acceleration was unwarranted because the offset exceeded the
total payments due on the promissory note.

Id.

This Court was also faced with the interpretation of two
documents that were executed contemporaneously in Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Company v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357 (Utah App.
1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277.

In Big Cottonwood, Big

Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company ("Big Cottonwood") appealed from a
declaratory judgment granted in favor of Salt Lake City ("Salt

D7

-39-

Lake") interpreting two agreements.
On January 2, 1920, Big Cottonwood and Salt Lake entered
into an agreement which purported to delineate responsibility for
the maintenance and repair of the pipeline system between the
parties.

Id. at 1358.

Several years later disputes arose as to

the responsibilities of the parties and Big Cottonwood filed suit
against Salt Lake which resulted in the execution of a settlement
agreement on July 27, 1965.

Id.

The 1965 agreement attempted to

clarify the parties' responsibilities and expressly ratified and
declared to be in full force and effect the 1920 agreement except
as it was "specifically changed, modified or amended by the
express terms of this agreement."

Id.

In 1983, Salt Lake notified a Big Cottonwood shareholder
that she had to pay the costs for the repair of her service line
or the city would turn off her water pursuant to the 1965
agreement.

The shareholder refused to pay and Salt Lake shut off

her water.

id.

Action was then brought for a declaratory

judgment as to the interpretation of the two agreements.

Id.

This Court considered both agreements in determining the
intent and obligation of the parties.

In doing so, this Court

relied upon the reasoning of Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28
Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972), which held:
[W]here two or more instruments are executed
by the same parties contemporaneously, or at
different times in the course of the same
transaction, and concern the same subject
matter, they will be read and construed
together so far as determining the
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respective rights and interests of the
parties. . . . Big Cottonwood, 740 P.2d at
1359.
See also, First Security Bank of Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078,
1080 (Utah 1983) .
Another Utah decision providing guidance to the instant
action is Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342 (Utah App. 1987).

In

Verhoef, plaintiffs appealed a ruling that the contract they
entered into with defendants to purchase a house was binding and
that they breached the contract.
a house from defendants Astons.

.Ed. at 1343.

Plaintiffs bought

The parties executed a uniform

real estate contract which provided for $78,000.00 purchase price,
with $10,163.32 as down payment.

id.

In addition to the down

payment, plaintiffs also paid $9,836.68.

Id.

The central dispute involved the $9,836.68 payment.
Plaintiffs argued the money was an additional down payment and
should have reduced the balance on the house.

icL

Defendants

asserted that the funds were held in escrow and were used to pay a
part of the monthly payments on the house.

IcL

The dispute

surfaced when plaintiffs failed to pay the unpaid balance of the
loan as required by the uniform real estate contract.

Id.

The uniform real estate contract was executed in
conjunction with execution of escrow instructions.

.Id. at 1344.

This Court found that the trial court was correct after examining
the two documents as a whole and finding that the $9,836.68 was not
a down payment but was placed in escrow to help fund plaintiff's
monthly obligation.
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Contracts should be construed so as to give
effect to the parties' intentions, and such
intent should be determined, if possible, by
examining the written agreement executed by
the parties. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). When
agreements are executed "substantially
contemporaneously and are clearly
interrelated, they must be construed as a
whole and harmonized if possible." Id. at
229; Verhoef, 740 P.2d at 1344.
The reasoning espoused by the Utah courts in the
aforementioned cases is directly applicable to the instant action.
In determining the rights and liabilities of the guarantors,
Dougans and Beckers, the Racquet Club Note and the guaranty must be
read and construed together.

The Racquet Club Note and the guar-

anty were executed by PCRC, its officers and shareholders
contemporaneously in the course of one transaction.
guaranty refers specifically to the Note.

Moreover, the

The guaranty is physi-

cally a part of the Note and is on the same piece of paper.
Note and guaranty were prepared by the bank.
Addendum at A109).

(R. at 15 32 and

The decisions of the Utah courts require the

two instruments be construed as a whole.
Other jurisdictions examining the construction of a
guaranty contract have generally found that:
Where the guaranty consists of separate
instruments, or other instruments
constituting parts of the same transaction
are either by annexation or reference or
otherwise constituted a part of the
guaranty, such instruments should be read
together and each construed with reference
to the other. Thus a writing referred to
in a contract of guaranty becomes a part of
the guaranty contract by virtue of the
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reference, and the two must be considered
together in determining the construction and
v a l i d i t y of the guaranty c o n4t r a c t . 38
C.J.S. Guaranty, §38 (1943).
F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e "does not dispute" t h a t as a general rul
t h a t where two or more instruments are executed by the same p a r t i e
contemporaneously or at different times in the course of the same
t r a n s a c t i o n and concern the same subject matter, they will be construed and read together.

(Brief of Appellant, pp. 28-29).

Clearly, case law holds t h a t where the guaranty refers to a note,
separate instrument, and the two c o n s t i t u t e p a r t s of the same
t r a n s a c t i o n , the instrument should be read together and each construed with reference to the other.

A writing referred to in a

contract of guaranty becomes part of the guaranty contract by v i r tue of the reference and the two must be construed together.
In i t s brief FIBU claims that courts have "repeatedly
refused" to accept the argument propounded.
p. 30).

(Brief of Appellant,

FIBU c i t e s Western States Leasing Co. v. Adturn, I n c . , 50

P.2d 1190, 1191 (Colo.App. 1972), in support of i t s broad proposi-

See also, General M i l l s , Inc. v. Wallner, 628 F.Supp. 1573 (D.Minn. 1986) (Where c o l l a t e r a l
security agreement was expressly or impliedly incorporated into the guarantee the instruments
should be read together and construed with reference to each other); Paul Revere Protective
L i f e Ins. Co. v. We1s, 535 F.Supp. 379 (E.D.Penn. 1981) (Lease agreement referred to i n
contract of guaranty was part of guaranty by v i r t u e of references and the two were construed
together 1n determining the construction and v a l i d i t y of the guaranty contract); Davenport v.
Stratton, 149 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1944) (Three instruments for the purpose of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r
meaning were considered as one instrument where the contract of guaranty was executed in
consideration of the execution of a lease): Berg Meadows Corp. v. Wilson, 339 P.2d 869
(Cal.App. 1959) (Main agreement and guaranty were to be construed as one agreement where they
were but parts of a single transaction); and Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks, 172
N.E.2d 899 (Ind.App. 1961) (Agreement drawn and executed at same time of signing of promissory
note was a contemporaneous instrument and was considered together with the note as one
instrument).
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tion that guarantors cannot create an express right to notice by
inference.

Initially it must be brought to this court's attention

that the defendant guarantor in Western States defaulted and did
not enter an appearance before the Colorado Court of Appeals.

FIBU

urges this court to rely on a default judgment where the case was
not briefed or argued as persuasive authority.

FIBU cannot base

its arguments on a case which is entirely factually dissimilar from
the instant action.
Western States is additionally distinguishable in that
guaranty and lease involved in that case were not executed within
the course of one transaction.

The guaranty was executed as a sep-

arate instrument and was executed on the following day.

In the

instant action, the terms of the guaranty specifically refer to the
Racquet Club Note and the two were executed in the course of one
transaction.

Dougans and Beckers did not ask the lower court to

create an express notice provision by inference:

Clearly, the

terms of the entire Racquet Club Note, including the guaranty language required notice of default prior to acceleration.
In its brief the bank also relies upon Corporation of
the President v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 95 P.2d 736,
745 (Utah 1939).

Corporation of the President likewise does not

provide any guidance to the resolution of the issues involved in
this action.

Corporation of the President is clearly distinguisha-

ble in that it involved Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, a
corporate surety for hire, which gave a bond in the amount of the
contract price.
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sureties for hire.

It is well established that the rule of law

with respect to sureties for hire is markedly different than the
rule of law with respect to individual sureties who do not charge a
premium.

(See Id. at 741:

"Those cases cited by respondent were a

personal accommodation surety was held fully released are not in
point.")
This Court recently recognized the difference between a
corporate surety for hire and a voluntary surety in American
Bonding Co. v. Nelson, 763 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1988).

The facts of

American Bonding are set forth in more detail in pages 51 to 54 of
this brief.

However, for purposes of this argument, it is impor-

tant to note that this Court required notice be given to the
indemnitor pursuant to the Indemnity Agreement although the terms
of the bond only implicitly required notice.

Although the bond did

not expressly require notice, this Court implicitly required notice
based on the fact that "the contract of a surety, for hire, is to
be strictly construed against the surety."

Id. at 816, citing

Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, 688 P.2d 577, 560
(Utah 1983) (Quoting J. F. Toplin Investment Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 77 Utah 226, 230, 293 P. 611, 612 (1930)).

See also,

Western States Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237 (Utah App.
1988).

This Court continued:
The modern authorities seem to be almost a
unit upon the proposition that a different
rule of construction applies to different
classes of sureties. In the case of a private or voluntary surety without compensation the surety is held to be a favorite of
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the law, and the contract, the performance
of which he guarantees, is construed
strictly in favor of the surety.
Strictissimi Juris is the term used to
express the rule by which his liability
shall be determined.
In the case of a surety who makes
insurance a business for compensation, the
rule is exactly the reverse. Doubtful provisions of the contract, the performance of
which the surety guarantees, are construed
in favor of the insured. American Bonding
Co., 763 P.2d at 816. (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
Under Utah law sureties for hire and voluntary sureties
are treated quite differently.

The strict construction of con-

tracts against sureties for hire is not applicable to the instant
action.

Dougans and Beckers, as guarantors, are favorites of the

law and the Racquet Club Note, the performance of which they
guaranteed, is to be construed in their favor.

Thus, where the

guaranty language specifically refers to the Racquet Club Note of
which it is a part, and the Note and guaranty language were executed in the course of one transaction, Dougans and Beckers were
entitled to the fifteen-day notice of default as a condition precedent to acceleration by the bank.
Finally, appellant argues that even if this Court were to
refer to the Note in construing the guaranty, then the fifteen-day
cure period applies to the maker of the Note.

(Brief of Appellant,

p. 34). More specifically, appellant argues that "the only express
note [sic] provision that applies to 'guarantors' provides that the
'guarantors . . . severally waived . . . notice of nonpayment.'"
Id,
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provides:
The makers . . . guarantors, and endorsers
hereof severally waive presentment for
payment, protest, demand, notice of
protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of
nonpayment, and expressly agree that this
Note, or any payment hereunder, may be
extended from time to time by the holder
hereof without in any way affecting the
liability of such parties. (Record at 1177
and Addendum at A19). (emphasis added).
The Racquet Club Note's waiver provision does not apply to
notice of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration.
The provision by its terms pertains to notice of protest, notice of
dishonor and notice of non-payment.

The waiver provision does not

specifically waive the fifteen-day notice of default, a right given
to the parties in a preceding paragraph.

While the aforementioned

difference may seem semantic in nature, the difference is of great
import.
The court in Bowyer v. Clark Equipment Co., 357 N.E.2d 290
(Ind.App. 1976), recognized the distinction between waivers contained in a guaranty contract.

Defendant Bowyer, a guarantor,

appealed from a trial court judgment in favor of plaintiffs on an
action for indebtedness.

Defendant claimed that the creditor Clark

was required to give him timely notice of his principal's delinquency and default before his liability accrued.
Clark maintained that the language found in the guaranty
agreement constituted an express waiver of Bowyer's right to notice
of the principal's default.

The relevant portions of the guaranty

provided:
The undersigned hereby waive:
D7
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(1) Notice

of (and acknowledge due notice of) acceptance of this Guaranty by you or of the
creation, renewal or accrual of any liability of BORROWER present or future, or of
your reliance upon this Guaranty (it being
understood that any and every liability
and obligation of BORROWER to you shall
conclusively be presumed to have been
created, contracted or incurred in reliance
upon this Guaranty); (2) Demand of payment
from any person indebted in any manner on
or for any of the liabilities or obligations hereby guaranteed; (3) Presentment
for payment of any instrument of BORROWER
or any other person, protest thereof, and
notice of its dishonor to any party thereto
and to the undersigned; (4) Any right of
contribution from guarantors other than
ourselves. Ld. at 29 3. (emphasis in
original).
In interpreting the language of the guaranty, the courts
construed the contract like any other contract according to the
intention of the parties.

Ic3. at 294.

The court recognized that:

[T]he instrument should receive a fair and
reasonable interpretation to attain the
parties1 objectives. 1(3. (citations
omitted).
The court was unable to find that the language in the guaranty conveyed an express intention of waiving the right to notice of
default.

More specifically, the court stated:
[T]he waiver clause does not specifically
state that the guarantor waives notice of
default of any liability but rather states
that the guarantor waives notice of dishonor on any instrument.
While the aforementioned difference may
seem to be somewhat semantic in nature, we
are of the opinion that the difference is
of great import. As previously stated, we
are bound by the words of the guaranty contract and the reasonable intention of the
parties. Id.
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Naum v. Naum Bros., Inc., 456 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y.App.Div.
1982), is another case in which a court recognized the distinction
between types of waivers contained in a waiver provision of a promissory note.

Defendants appealed from a judgment for plaintiff in

an action on a promissory note.
Defendant questioned plaintiff's compliance with the
requirement of a written demand prior to acceleration.

Plaintiff

claimed the waiver provision in the note relieved it of the notice
requirement.

In examining the note's waiver provision, the court

stated:
The purpose of the waiver provision in the
two promissory notes sued upon was to
excuse presentment, and notice and protest
of dishonor which otherwise would be necessary to charge secondary parties,
(citations omitted). That provision was
not intended to waive the specific requirement of a written demand as a condition
precedent to acceleration of the note's
for default in the payments of interest.
Id. at 551. (emphasis added).
The New York Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling upon a
finding that plaintiff complied with the written demand requirement
before defendants made any tender of payments of the past due
interest.

Id.
In the instant action, the waiver clause pertains to

notice of protest, notice of dishonor and notice of non-payment.
Notice of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration is
not specifically waived.

The Racquet Club Note expressly grants

the right to the fifteen-day notice of default in a preceding
paragraph.
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of the parties, it is clear that the waiver provision in the
Racquet Club Note did not waive notice of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration.
Rules of construction applicable to contracts in Utah
require that an agreement be construed to achieve harmony between
various provisions and language is construed against the drafting
party.

In Re Estate of Orris, 662 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1980); Park

Enters, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah
1982); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rightway Concrete, 742 P.2d 105,
110 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277; Metropolitan
Property & Liability Ins. Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah
App. 1988)-

In this case one must construe the agreement, "Racquet

Club Note," to make sense and the construction, in case of ambiguity or difficulty is against the interest of FIBU, the drafter.
Since one paragraph specifically grants a right to notice of
default and a cure period prior to acceleration, a following
paragraph's reference to waiver of notice of non-payment must be
construed to apply to something else.

This is particularly so,

when one considers that FIBU drafted the document.

FIBU cannot now

be allowed to argue that the agreement it drafted expressly
provided a benefit then caused the other party to waive the
benefit.

Such an argument is entirely contrary to Utah's rules of

construction.
FIBU also erroneously relies upon Waikiki Seaside, Inc. v.
Comito, 641 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Hawaii App. 1982), to support its
waiver argument.
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guishable from the instant action in that the specific language of
the guaranty waived any right to notice of default.

Idl. at 1365.

Hence, the court determined that there is no requirement to give
such notice.

Id.

In the instant action, the right to the fifteen-day notice
of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration has not
been waived by the language of the Racquet Club Note.

To the

contrary, the Racquet Club Note expressly grants the right to
notice of default as a condition precedent to acceleration of the
Note.

Thus where the parties' contract expressly covered the sub-

ject of the notice, that provision is controlling.
v.
FIBU WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE NOTICE OF DEFAULT
TO THE DOUGANS AND BECKERS PRIOR TO
ACCELERATING THE AMOUNT DUE UNDER THE
PROMISSORY NOTE.
The Racquet Club Note and the guaranty are one instrument
which must be read together and construed with reference to each
other.

In determining the rights of the Dougans and Beckers as

guarantors concerning notice of default, the terms of the Racquet
Club Note govern.
In the instant action, the Racquet Club Note specifically
provides that notice of default must be given to the undersigned.
Indeed appellant recognizes in its brief that:

"All courts agree

that if the contract of guaranty affirmatively calls for notice, it
is a condition which must be met in order to bind the guarantor on
his promise."

(Brief of Appellant, pp. 24-25) (citations omitted).

A recent decision by this Court is very similar factually
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to the case before this court.

In American Bonding Co. v. Nelson,

763 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1988), this Court affirmed the dismissal of
plaintiff's claims under a blanket indemnity agreement.

The trial

court granted a motion to dismiss as to Maureen Nelson ("Maureen"),
an indemnitor.

In September, 197 3, defendant Keith R. Nelson

("Keith") was doing business as AAA Electric Service.
time Keith was married to Maureen.

IcL

At that

As part of his work with the

United States Government, Keith was required to obtain surety bonds
for his contracts.

IcL

Keith and Maureen executed a "Blanket

Indemnity Agreement" with plaintiff, American Bonding Company
("American") in order to obtain surety bonds.

Id_. at 815.

Keith,

doing business as AAA, was listed as principal, while both Keith
and Maureen were identified as indemnitors.

IcL

Based on the

agreement, American issued performance bonds for Keith's contract
jobs.

Id.
American, as one of two sureties, executed a performance

bond in favor of the United States Government listing Keith doing
business as AAA as a principal.

IcL

American was subsequently

notified of the claims against the bond and discovered that AAA's
contracts in Denver had been placed in default by the contracting
officer.

IcL

American's attorney spoke to Keith concerning the

contract situation and sent individual letters to Keith and Maureen
which notified them of claims against the bond.

Ic3.

Subsequently

American and the other surety entered into a takeover agreement
with Keith in which the sureties agreed to complete the contracts
and AAA assigned its rights and duties to the sureties.
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Id.

Subsequently, American filed a complaint against Keith and Maureen
to recover all costs of enforcing the agreement.

Id.

The trial court concluded that Maureen should not be
bound as an indemnitor based on the finding that notice of default
was vague and insufficient.

The conclusion that Maureen should

not be bound as an indemnitor was based on the following findings
of the trial court:
1. Timely notice of default was given to
both Keith and Maureen Nelson as prescribed
by the Agreement of Indemnity (General) to
which they were indemnitors.
2. Notice to Maureen Nelson was vague and
insufficient and therefore did not afford
reasonable notice to her so as to
intelligently form any rational basis for
deciding whether she should exercise her
right under paragraph 13 of the Agreement of
Indemnity (General) to defend or prosecute
any particular claims that AAA Electric
might have had against the United States
Government in order to avoid or reduce
liability against her as an indemnitor.
*

*

*

*

4. The record is silent as to efforts made
by American Bonding Company and [the other
surety] to ascertain how to keep Maureen
Nelson informed or to ascertain what
information, if any, she was receiving. The
record is also silent as to any opportunity
she was given to be a party to the take-over
agreement, and Maureen Nelson was not a
party to the take-over agreements nor was it
submitted to her for approval or was she
advised of the terms thereof by American
Bonding Company. Ic[. at 815-16.
This Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
Maureen's liability under the blanket indemnity agreement.

In

reaching this determination, this Court recognized that two para-
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graphs in the agreement demonstrated an ambiguity since one paragraph stated all notices were waived whereas another paragraph gave
the indemnitors the right to request American to litigate claims or
demands against the bond-

icL at 816.

In order to exercise those

rights, the indemnitors must have been given notice.

Id.

Therefore, while notice was waived by one paragraph, it was a
necessity in the other.

Id.

This Court found that the two paragraphs appeared to be in
irreconcilable conflict with each other and were therefore
ambiguous.

IcL

This Court concluded that the conflicting para-

graph had to be "construed to require adequate notice to Maureen
concerning the claims against the surety."
original).

idL (emphasis in

Because of Maureen's lack of involvement in the affairs

of AAA, it was found the notice was "substantially defective."

Id.

Specifically, this Court found that the trial court record
was silent as to any efforts made by American to ascertain how to
keep Maureen informed or to ascertain what information, if any, she
was receiving.

Id. at 817. Moreover, there was no evidence that

she was advised of the terms of the settlement agreement as was her
husband.

Thus, based upon the record, this Court affirmed the

judgment of the trial court dismissing all claims as to Maureen.
American Bonding provides guidance in the instant action.
The Dougans and Beckers were in a position similar to that of the
indemnitor Maureen Nelson.

Like Maureen, the Dougans and Beckers

were not informed of the work-out agreement entered between FIBU
and the Smiths. Also, similar is the fact that the Dougans and
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Beckers did not receive notice concerning the default and that the
bank intended to accelerate the note.
The Racquet Club Note/guaranty specifically provided that
notice of any default must be given "to the undersigned" and
Dougans and Beckers were "the undersigned" guarantors.

In

addition, when Dougan and Becker assumed the Racquet Club Note at
the time the Club was conveyed to them, they became makers of the
Note and as a maker became the "undersigned."

It is undisputed

that Dougans and Beckers did not receive any notice whatsoever with
regard to the default and that the bank intended to accelerate.

As

held in American Bonding, Dougans and Beckers should be discharged
from their obligation as makers and as guarantors because notice of
default was not given to them by FIBU as required by the terms of
the parties' agreement.
Other jurisdictions have examined the identical issue
involved in the case at bar wherein the guaranty contract
specifically required written notice of default.

In Fife v.

Anderson Realty Brokers, Inc., 271 S.E.2d 9 (Ga.App. 1980), the
Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's overruling of
a guarantor's motion to dismiss and grant of summary judgment as
to the payee.

The Court of Appeals found that the payee did not

have a cause of action under the note and it was error to overrule
the guarantor's motion to dismiss.
In Fife, the payee Anderson Realty Brokers ("Anderson")
sent a notice of default and demand to the maker of a note of
which Fife was the guarantor.
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The notice provided:

"Pursuant to the terms specified in said note, relative to default
in payment, Anderson Realty Brokers, Inc. hereby declares the full
balance on said note due and payable now. . . . "
in original).

icL (emphasis

No other notice was given either to the maker or

the guarantor.

I_d.

Nearly three months later, Anderson filed

suit on the note against Fife, the guarantor.
Fife urged that it was error to find that the notice
given to him, as guarantor, was in sufficient compliance with all
the terms and conditions of the note.

id.

The terms of the note

provided that:
In the event of default. . . [the] payee may
not accelerate subsequent payments until
first giving maker notice of such default,
following which notice maker shall have
thirty (30) days. . .to cure such default
following which, absent the curing of
default by maker, payee may accelerate and
declare due, payable and in default all
remaining obligations. Id. (emphasis in
original).
The Georgia Court of Appeals found that it "was very
clear that by the terms of the note, the payee could not
accelerate and declare due and payable and in default the entire
obligation until the maker was notified of the particular default
and was given the required 30 days' grace to cure the default."
Id.

The "notice of default" did not give the required 30 days in

which to cure the default-

IcL

Instead, it accelerated the debt

obligation and declared due and payable the full note balance.
The Court of Appeals determined that Anderson did not
have a cause of action against Fife, the guarantor, because there
was no notice as the note required.
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IcL at 11. The court stated,

"The notice which was given accelerated and declared due and
payable the entire debt, which could not be done without first
giving notice of default and 30 days' grace to cure it."

Id.

Thus, the court found it was error to overrule Fife's motion to
dismiss.
The Arkansas Supreme Court likewise examined a situation
directly analogous to the case at bar in Lee v. Vaughn, 534
S.W.2d 221 (Ark. 1976).

In Lee, the trial court rendered a

judgment for the assignee of the note and against the guarantor.
The guarantor Lee appealed the decision contending that lack of
notice by the assignee "constituted failure of consideration" with
a resultant release of the guarantor from liability under the
guaranty.

1x3. at 222.

Lee guaranteed payment of the first

$3,000.00 of a $4,000.00 note from Norville & Rofena Akin, which
he assigned to appellee, B. J. Vaughn.

Id.

The guaranty

agreement provided that "if any monthly installment is past due
more than 15 days, B. J. Vaughn shall promptly mail notice of that
fact to the said Lee . . . ."

Id.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
held that the assignee could not recover from the guarantor
because the guarantor was not notified according to the terms of
the guaranty agreement upon default of the maker of the note.

The

court recognized that no Arkansas case had construed a guaranty
contract that contained an express requirement of notice of the
principal's default.

icL at 223.

However, the court recognized

that "the great majority of states" that have considered a similar
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situation have concluded in conformity with the Restatement of
Security, §136 where it is stated:
Subject to the rules pertaining to
negotiable instruments, the surety's
obligation to the creditor is not affected
by the creditor's failure to notify him of
the principal's default unless such
notification is required by the terms of the
surety's contract. Id. (emphasis in original).
The Arkansas court recognized the leading decision on
point to be Yama v. Sigman, 165 P.2d 191 (Colo, 1945), in which
the debtor was obligated to make bi-weekly payments and the
guaranty was conditioned upon immediate notice of default.
534 S.W.2d at 224.

Lee,

In Yama, the Colorado Supreme Court held that

under such an agreement, the guarantor could not be held liable
after the debtor's default, when the creditor failed to prove that
he had given the necessary notice.

id.

The Colorado court stated

that their failure in this respect relieved the defendant of all
liability under his guaranty.

Id.

The Arkansas court also recognized a New York decision,
Pergament v. Herrick Credit Corp., 200 N.Y.S.2d 535 (New York
1960), where the rule was summarized as follows:
Where a contract of guarantee [sic]
specifically provides for notice of default,
the failure to give such notice discharges
the guarantor's obligations. (citations
omitted). The guarantor may limit his
liability as such by whatever conditions he
may see fit to impose, and non-compliance
with them will preclude recourse to him. As
stated above, his undertaking is
strictissimi juris and cannot be extended
beyond the fair import of its language.
Lee, 524 S.W.2d at 224.
The Arkansas court also recognized the Ohio court's adherD7
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ence to the same principle in the case of Lakemore Plaza, Inc. v.
Shoenterprise, 188 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1962), where the court stated:
Where a guarantor attaches a certain
condition or conditions to his agreement,
such condition or conditions must be
construed in favor of the guarantor, and the
failure of a creditor to strictly comply
with any condition or conditions invalidates
the guaranty. Lee, 534 S.W.2d at 224.
Another decision recognized in Lee as adopting the above
analysis was the opinion issued by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in United States Plywood Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Corp., 157 A.2d 286 (D.C.App. 1960), where the court said:
Since the foundation of any rights of the
donee or creditor is the promisor's
contract, it follows that his rights are
restricted by the terms of the promise and
any conditions, express or implied,
affecting them. A stipulation for notice of
default is a condition of liability which
may always be imposed. The weight of
authority holds that where the notice
provision is reasonable and is stated as a
condition precedent to the right of
instituting legal action, failure to observe
it will discharge the surety. Lee, 534
S.W.2d at 224.
Based upon the foregoing case law enunciated in other
jurisdictions, the Arkansas Supreme Court found in Lee that the
guarantor "was entitled to the protection that he had insisted
upon in guaranteeing the note; after all, the note contains an
acceleration clause under which the entire indebtedness could have
become immediately due and payable following the . . . default."
Id.

The court determined that the assignee of the note could not

recover from the guarantor because he was not notified according to
the terms of the guaranty agreement upon default of the maker of
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the n o t e . 5
The reasoning set forth in these cases i s d i r e c t l y a p p l i cable to the case at bar.

The Racquet Club Note/Guaranty contained

a specific provision regarding notice of d e f a u l t .

No notice of

default was given to e i t h e r the Dougans or Beckers as guarantors.
In accordance with the reasoning espoused in the decided cases, the
Dougans and Beckers cannot be held l i a b l e on the Racquet Club Note
when FIBU failed to provide them with the necessary notice which
was a condition to t h e i r entering into the agreement.

Based upon

the foregoing, t h i s Court should affirm the lower c o u r t ' s ruling
t h a t the Dougans and Beckers are released from a l l l i a b i l i t y under
the Racquet Club Note/guaranty because FIBU failed to comply with a
condition precedent to acceleration of the Note and l i a b i l i t y on
the guaranty.
In i t s brief, FIBU claims t h a t even if Beckers and Dougans
were e n t i t l e d to n o t i c e , they should not be released from a l l
l i a b i l i t y under the Racquet Club Note/Guaranty.

(Brief of

See also, American Bankers L i f e Assurance Company of Florida v. United States, 12 CL.Ct.
166 (1987)(Government's maritime guarantee obligations terminated under guarantee contract when
lender's assignee f a i l e d to demand payment on guarantee w i t h i n 60 days of borrower's I n i t i a l
payment of d e f a u l t ) ; Walter Heller & Co. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 262 S.E.2d 151
(Ga.App. 1979) (When a guaranty is a c o l l a t e r a l continuing one general rule is that the
guarantor 1s e n t i t l e d to reasonable notice of default of the c r e d i t o r ) ; Qrkin Exterminating Co.
v. Stevens, 203 S.E.2d 587 (Ga.App. 1973) (Failure to give notice was a bar to maintenance of a
successful cause of action on the contract where the contract provided for w r i t t e n notice of
claim for breach of guaranty); Waikiki Seaside, Inc. v. Comito, 641 P.2d 1363 (Hawaii App.
1982) (Where the contract of guaranty expressly covers the subject of notice, those provisions
are c o n t r o l l i n g . Thus where guaranty provides that notice of the default of the principal
debtor must be given to the guarantor, f a i l u r e to give notice is a defense f o r the guarantor);
and Bowyer v. Clark Equipment Co., 357 N.E.2d 290 (Ind.App. 1976) (Guarantor was released from
l i a b i l i t y where guaranty was c o l l a t e r a l and creditor f a i l e d to give notice of p r i n c i p a l ' s
default).
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Appellant, pp. 34-38).

The bank claims that Beckers and Dougans

could have been injured by lack of notice "only if they would have
cured PMD's default within the fifteen-day cure period provided by
the Note." (Ic3. at 36). Further, the bank argues that "even if
First Interstate somehow wrongfully deprived them [Dougans and
Beckers] of the 15-day cure period established by the Note -- the
Beckers and Dougans nevertheless failed to take advantage of a subsequent three-month statutory cure period."

(Id.)

The bank states

that Beckers' and Dougans' failure to cure PMD's default during the
statutory cure period "established beyond peradventure that their
'loss' of the 15-day contractural cure period did not result in any
actual prejudice . . . the guarantors obviously lacked either the
will or the ability to cure Park Meadow's [sic] default at any time
'during the first months of 1986.'"

(Brief of Appellant, pp.

37-38).
The bank's argument as to whether Dougans and Beckers
could have cured under the statute is misplaced.

The question is

what were the terms and conditions of the guaranty?

What did FIBU

have to do as a condition precedent to accelerating the Note and
seeking to enforce liability of the guarantors?
The answer to those questions is clear.

The bank had to:

(1) give fifteen days' notice of default to the guarantors because
the guaranty and Note should be construed together; or (2) as a
bare minimum, give fifteen days' notice of default to PCRC, the
maker of the Note, as a condition precedent to the right to accelerate the Note and to call on the guarantors to perform on their
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guaranty.

This admittedly the bank did not do; or (3) give notice

to Becker and Dougan as makers of the Note which they became when
PCRC conveyed the Racquet Club to them and they assumed and agreed
to pay the Note thereby stepping into the shoes of PCRC as the
maker of the Note, which the bank again admittedly failed to do.
It is not a question of whether Beckers and Dougans had an
opportunity to cure the default under the statute.

The question is

what were the terms of the Note that Beckers and Dougans guaranteed?
Again, the answer is clear—Beckers and Dougans are not sureties
for hire and thus are entitled to the benefit of the rules requiring strict construction of the contract and strict compliance of
the bank with the terms of the Note and guaranty.
FIBU was duty bound as a condition precedent to accelerating the Note and calling on the guarantors to make good on their
guaranty to give the fifteen-day notice of default as set forth in
(1) or (2) or (3) above.

As this Court held in American Bonding,

763 P.2d at 817, FIBU's failure to properly give notice relieves
Dougans and Beckers from any liability on their guaranty.

This

Court should affirm the lower court's ruling that Dougans and
Beckers are released from all liability because FIBU failed to
provide them notice as required by the terms of the parties'
agreement.
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VI.
DOUGANS AND BECKERS ARE ENTITLED TO
REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS INCURRED PURSUANT TO
RULE 54(d) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
Beckers and Dougans are entitled to reimbursement of costs
incurred pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that:
The costs of depositions are taxable
"subject to the limitation that the trial
court is persuaded that they were taken in
good faith, and, in light of the
circumstances, appear to be a center for
the development and presentation of the
case. Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1984); Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771,
774 (Utah 1980), and cases cited therein;
Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden,
12 Utah 2d 235, 239, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961).

The complexity of issues presented in Dougans' and Beckers' motion
for summary judgment and in FIBU's motions for partial summary
judgment made it virtually impossible to obtain sufficient information for preparation without deposing various individuals with
knowledge of the transactions at issue in the motions.

The

depositions were taken in good faith and were essential for the
development of the issues which were subject of the motions.
FIBU attempts to understate the complexity of issues presented in the lower court on Dougans' and Beckers' motion for summary judgment.

The district court's order with respect to the

motion for summary judgment was that the fifteen-day notice
required by the loan documents to be given prior to accelerating
the Racquet Club Note was not given by FIBU to the original maker,
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Park City Racquet Club, to Dougans, Beckers and Ayers who assumed
the Racquet Club Note and thereby became makers, nor to Dougans,
Beckers and Ayers in their capacity as guarantors.

Moreover, the

lower court ruled that the notice required to be given by FIBU to
PMD prior to FIBU's exercising its option to accelerate was
defective.

Finally, the lower court ruled that the giving of a

proper fifteen-day notice was a condition precedent to the right of
FIBU to exercise its option to accelerate the Racquet Club Note.
Dougans and Beckers were unable to develop the arguments
presented in their motion for summary judgment and in opposition to
FIBU's motions for partial summary judgment without taking various
depositions.

The depositions were essential for the development

and presentation of the Dougans' and Beckers' motion for summary
judgment and arguments in opposition to FIBU's motions for partial
summary judgment.

Dougans and Beckers seek the deposition costs of

individuals who had knowledge of the transactions at issue in these
motions.

A brief description of the individuals deposed clearly

demonstrates Dougans1 and Beckers' need to obtain the testimony of
the individuals to develop the issues which were the subject of the
respective motions:
(a) Robert Owens -- bank official who made decisions
regarding the Racquet Club Note, acceleration and
foreclosure;
(b) Robert ward -- bank official who made decisions
regarding the Racquet Club Mote, acceleration and
foreclosure;
(c) Hardin A. Whitney -- attorney with knowledge of
the loan history from the assumption through acceleration;
(d)
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ments regarding the Racquet Club Note;
(e) Larry Whitney -- bank official who had a diary
of events relative to the Racquet Club Note;
(f) Wayne Gray Petty -- attorney involved in the
negotiation and execution of the work-out documents;
(g) Dougas Matsumori -- attorney involved in negotiation and execution of work-out documents;
(h) Mark D. Howell -- bank official involved with
the work-out documents;
(i) Ross Varoz -- bank official responsible for the
Racquet Club Note after the work-out;
(j) Ralph Nielsen -- bank official familiar with the
assumption agreement, notice of default, and foreclosure
action;
(k) Lynn Dougan -- guarantor of the Racquet Club
Note; and
(1) Frederick Becker -- guarantor of the Racquet
Club Note.
In light of the circumstances of Dougans1 and Beckers'
motion for summary judgment and FIBU's motions for partial summary
judgment, it is clear that the depositions of the individuals set
forth above were essential for the development of the issues.

The

lower court denied FIBU's motions for partial summary judgment and
granted Dougans' and Beckers' motion for summary judgment.

Dougans

and Beckers were the prevailing parties in both proceedings.
Dougans' and Beckers' Memorandum of Costs is therefore proper pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This

Court should affirm the lower court's award of costs to Dougans and
Beckers.
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VII.
THE ORDER DENYING FIBU'S SEPTEMBER 26, 19 88
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT
A "FINAL" JUDGMENT AND IS NOT APPEALABLE.
FIBU filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
September 26, 1988 (the "9-26-88 Motion").

(R. at 723-25).

Oral

argument on the 9-26-88 Motion was heard on November 28, 1988
(November 28, 1988 Transcript, at 1; R. at 1533).

The written

order denying the 9-26-88 Motion was entered on December 8, 1988
(the "12-8-88 Order").

(R. at 1098-1100 and attached hereto in

Addendum at Alll-114.)

FIBU filed a Notice of Appeal from the

12-8-88 Order on May 16., 1989.
An appeal can be taken only from a final order.

Ahlstrom

v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979, 979 (Utah 1986); Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, 3.

"A final judgment generally 'ends the litigation on

the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.'"

Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631, 632 (Utah 1987).

cannot claim that the 12-8-88 Order is final.

The 12-8-88 Order

denied FIBU's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
merits of the action were not determined.

FIBU

Obviously, the

All claims remained to

be tried and judgment could not be entered by the trial court.
FIBU admits that certain claims are pending.
p. 12). They include:

(Brief of Appellant,

FIBU's claim against Vic and Marion Ayers,

the Beckers' and Dougans' third-party claim against the Smiths and
the Smiths' fraud claim against FIBU.

Thus, the 12-8-88 Order is

not final, but only interlocutory.
The trial court may certify an interlocutory order as
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final, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 54(b) states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the Court may direct the entry of
a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the
Court that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. Any absence of such
determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however, designated
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all claims
and the rights and liabilities of all of
the parties. (Emphasis added).
FIBU has never requested that the 12-8-88 Order be certified pursuant to Rule 54(b).

The 12-8-88 Order does not reflect any certifi-

cation by the trial court.
Alll-114).

(R. at 1098-1100; Addendum at

No determination has ever been made by the Court that

there was no reason for delay.

Some confusion may exist because of

FIBU's May 16, 1989 Notice of Appeal,

That notice attempted to

appeal from the May 3, 1989 Judgment granting Dougans' and Beckers'
Motion for Summary Judgment and the 12-8-88 Order.
and attached hereto in Addendum at A115-118).

(R. at 1426-28

Although the trial

court certified the May 3, 1989 Judgment as a final judgment,
(R. at 1416), it did not, and never has, certified the 12-8-88
Order as a final judgment.

FIBU's own brief implicitly acknowl-

edges that the December 8, 1988 order has not been certified.
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Although FIBU states that the May 5, 1989 judgment regarding the
Beckers1 and Dougansf motion for summary judgment has been
certified, it fails to state, nor could it, any jurisdictional
basis for its appeal from the December 8, 1988 Order.

(Brief of

Appellant at 1)• FIBU's appeal from the 12-8-88 Order cannot be
considered by this Court.

Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631, 632

(Utah 1987) .
VIII.
FIBU'S APPEAL FROM THE DECEMBER 8, 1988
ORDER IS UNTIMELY.
Assuming arguendo that the December 8, 1988 Order is a
final judgment and appealable, FIBU's appeal is untimely.

An

appeal from a final judgment or order must be filed within thirty
days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
the Utah Court of Appeals, 4.
Appeal until May 16, 1989.

Rules of

FIBU did not file its Notice of

Thus, FIBU's appeal is untimely.
IX.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO FIBU'S APPEAL FROM THE
12-8-88 ORDER IS PROPER, IT FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THE ABSENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUES
OF MATERIAL FACT AND THAT IT WAS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

Standard of Review.
When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment,

this Court applies the same standard used by the trial court.
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App.
1988).

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a

party is entitled to summary judgment if (1) there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to
D7
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judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56.

This Court must

"construe the facts and view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion."
752.

Lucky Seven Corp,, 755 P.2d at

Because summary judgment deprives a party of a full trial on

the merits, courts are reluctant to grant it.

Brandt v.

Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460, 462 (1960).
We are cognizant of the desirability of
permitting litigants to fully present their
case to the court and that a summary judgment prevents this. For that reason courts
are, and should be, reluctant to invoke
this remedy. icL (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, "[i]f there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
opposing party."

Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387,

389 (Utah 1984) .
B.

FIBU Possesses the Burden of Proof.
In general, a party moving for summary judgment has the

burden of proving the absence of disputed material facts.

Amjacs

Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981).
On appeal, the trial court's actions are presumed valid and
correct.

Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah

1981) .
This Court indulges the findings and
judgment of the trial court with a presumption of validity and correctness and
reviews the record in the light favorable
to them, and will not disturb them if they
find substantial support in the evidence.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, FIBU bears the burden of demonstrating the trial
court's error to this Court.
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establish on appeal what facts were material to its 9-26-88 Motion
and that those facts were undisputed.

FIBU failed to meet its bur-

den in the trial court, and on appeal.
C.

Assuming FIBU's Appeal is Proper, Genuine Issues of Material
Fact Exist and FIBU is Not Entitled to Judgment as a Matter
of Law.
For purposes of argument only and to respond to FIBU's

brief, respondents address the reasons why FIBU is not entitled to
summary judgment.
1.

Disputed Material Facts - FIBU's 9-26-88 Motion sought

to have the trial court decide summarily that the Beckers, Dougans
and Ayers were liable to it on their guaranty.

(R. at 739). The

following material facts were, and are, disputed by FIBU:6
A. Did Park Meadows, Enoch Smith, Dick Smith and Vic
Ayers assume the Racquet Club Note?
B. Did FIBU release Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers from
the Racquet Club Note?
C. If no written release of Enoch Smith from the
Racquet Club Note exists, should FIBU have executed a
release of Enoch Smith from the Racquet Club Note?
D. Does the term "FIUT's PMD . . . loan" include the
Racquet Club Note?
E. Did the parties intend to integrate the closing
documents?
F.

Has the collateral been impaired?

G. What was the fair market value of the collateral
when it was sold?
(November 28, 1988 Transcript, at 35-37; R. at 1533).

D

Those dis-

FIBU cannot, produce evidence to dispute these facts. However, for purposes of argument,
respondents will assume FIBU can support its dispute to the facts with evidence.

D7

-70-

puted material facts precluded the trial court from granting FIBU
summary judgment.
2.

Release of a Principal Obligor Releases a Guarantor -

For purposes of argument, FIBU conceded that PMD assumed the
Racquet Club Note.
1533).

(November 28, 1988 Transcript, at 38; R. at

FIBU argues that PMD's assumption of the Racquet Club Note

is immaterial because "the release of a partner does not release
either the partnership or the guarantors of the partnership's
debt."

(Brief of Appellant, at 40). FIBU then argues that because

the release of a partner does not release the partnership, the
entire basis for the guarantors' release is eliminated.

Id.

FIBU's position is fraught with error.
FIBU cannot dispute that a guarantor is released if the
principal obligor is released.
1352-54 (Utah App. 1987).

Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346,

In so holding, this Court quoted

Restatement of Security §122 (1941):

"'Where the creditor releases

a principal, the surety is discharged, unless (a) the surety consents to remain liable notwithstanding the release, or (b) the
creditor in the release reserves his rights against the surety.'"
Id. at 1354.

That principle's rationale is explained in comment b

to Section 122:
[I]f the surety could be compelled to pay
after the principal's release, he would be
entitled to reimbursement if he had become
a surety at the principal's request or with
his consent. Such an outcome would be
unfair to the principal after release
because it would afford the creditor a means
of attacking the principal indirectly through
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the surety. Restatement of Security §122,
comment b (1941) (emphasis added),
"Another reason for the rule . . . i s , that it would be a fraud on
the principal debtor to profess to release him, and then to sue the
surety, who would in turn sue him.'"

Continental Bank & Trust Co,

v. AKWA, 206 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. 1973) (emphasis added).
Enoch Smith, Dick Smith and Vic Ayers individually assumed
the Racquet Club Note.

(Affidavit of Enoch Richard Smith, R, at

1188-91 and Addendum at A36-40; Deposition of Enoch Richard Smith,
at 57; R. at 1527).

Although FIBU has not produced any evidence to

the contrary, FIBU hotly disputes those individual assumptions.
The individual assumptions by Enoch Smith, Dick Smith and Vic Ayers
are significant.

When the Smiths and Ayers assumed the Racquet

Club Note, they became principal obligors and the Dougans and
Beckers became secondarily liable, as sureties.

FIBU's release of

Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers discharged the Beckers and the Dougans
under, Horman v. Gordon.
In Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App.

1987),

J. 0. Kingston ("Kingston") purchased a shopping center from
Ecotek.

1x3. at 1348.

As part of the purchase, Kingston assumed

primary liability to repay three promissory notes owed by Rodney
Gordon ("Gordon") to Sidney Horman ("Horman").

IcL at 1348, 1352.

Although Horman knew about the assumption, Horman did not agree to
it.

Id_. at 1348, 1353.

Furthermore, Gordon did not ask Horman to

release him from the obligation to repay the notes and Horman did
not release Gordon.

1x3.

In an attempt to work out payment of

these notes and others, Kingston paid certain funds to Horman.
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Id.

at 1349.

In exchange, Horman released all claims against Kingston

without reserving his rights against Gordon.

ixL

Horman later

sued Gordon on the notes which Kingston had assumed.

Id!.

Gordon

argued that Horman's release of Kingston also released him.
1352.

This Court agreed and reversed the trial court.

icL at

1(3. at

1352-54.
In reversing the trial court, this Court held that
Kingston became the primary obligor when he assumed the three
notes, and Gordon became secondarily liable to Horman, as a surety.
Id. at 1352-53.

This Court relied on Restatement of Security §83

(1941) which states:
The suretyship relation is created where
the surety . . . (c) having been a principal obligor, his obligation, without a
novation, has been assumed by another or
his property has been transferred under
such circumstances as to place the property
under the primary burden of the obligation.
Next, this Court held that Horman was affected by the incidents of
Gordon's suretyship when he obtained knowledge of Kingston's
assumption.
at 1353.
(1941).

It was not necessary that Horman consent to it.

Id.

Then, this Court adopted Restatement of Security §122
Id. at 1354.

Finally, this Court held that because Gordon

did not consent to Kingston's release and because Horman did not
expressly reserve his rights against Gordon, his release of
Kingston also discharged Gordon.

Id.

Horman v. Gordon is directly applicable to this case.

The

Dougans and Beckers were guarantors and principal obligors on the
Racquet Club Note.
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agreed individually to pay the Racquet Club Note.

The Dougans and

Beckers intended that PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers should have
primary liability for the Racquet Club Note.

Horman v. Gordon

makes it clear that the Smiths and Vic Ayers thereby became principal obligors.

The Beckers and Dougans, who transferred the obliga-

tion to the Smiths and Ayers, became sureties.

The Dougans and

Beckers were also sureties in their capacity as guarantors.
Section 82 of the Restatement of Security treats "guaranty"
synonymously with "surety."

Dougan notified FIBU of the assumption

by PMD,'the Smith and Vic Ayers.

FIBU knew of those assumptions

before it released Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers.
Absent their consent to remain liable or a reservation of
FIBU's rights against them, the Dougans and Beckers were released
when Enoch Smith or Vic Ayers were released.

FIBU produced no evi-

dence that the Beckers and Dougans consented to remain liable or
that it reserved its rights against them.

Resolution of the fac-

tual issue of whether or not the Smiths and Vic Ayers individually
assumed the Racquet Club Note which is strongly disputed by FIBU is
vital.
3.

Release of One Partner Releases the Partnership - When

FIBU released Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers without reserving its
rights against PMD, it released the partnership as well.

The Utah

Supreme Court stated in Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co. v. Lunt, 151
P. 521, 527 (Utah 1915) :
It is a well-recognized rule of law that,
in ordinary partnership, a release by a
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creditor of one or more members from partnership liability operates as a release of
all the members from such liability. Id.
In Palle v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 7 P.2d 284 (Utah 1932),
the Utah Supreme Court's holding implied that to collect on a partnership obligation, a plaintiff could sue either the
or all members of the partnership.

lcL at 288.

partnership

The holding also

implies that if a plaintiff brings suit against the partner for a
partnership debt, the plaintiff must join all parties.

Id.•

Because a plaintiff can bring an action on a partnership obligation
against all partners, and the release of one partner releases all
partners, it is axiomatic that the release of and failure to join a
partner on a partnership obligation releases the partnership.
Furthermore, partnership liability in Utah is joint.

Utah

Code Ann. §48-1-12 (1989 Replacement) states:
All partners are liable . . .
2. Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership, but any partner
may enter into a separate obligation to
perform a partnership contract. Id.
Judge Winder recently relied on Utah Code Ann. §48-1-12 in holding
that a general partner is personally liable for a partnership
obligation.

First Security Bank v. Felger, 658 F.Supp.

178-79 (D. Utah 1987).

175,

Accordingly, partnerships are governed by

the Utah Joint Obligations Act, Utah Code Ann. §§15-4-1 to -5
(1986).

Under that act, if an obligee releases one or more joint

obligors without a reservation of rights against the remaining
obligors, he releases the remaining co-obligors.

Under Utah law,

the release of any partner in PMD by FIBU on the Racquet Club Note,
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discharged all partners and PMD by operation of law.

Such a

release also discharges the Dougans' and Beckers' obligations on
the Racquet Club Note.
4.

The Beckers and Dougans are discharged under Utah Code

Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(a) (1981) - The Uniform Commercial Code, Utah
Code Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(a) (1981) states:
(1) The holder discharges any party to the
instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of
rights releases or agrees not to sue
any person against whom the party has
to the knowledge of the holder a right
of recourse or agrees to suspend the
right to enforce against such person
the instrument or collateral or otherwise discharges such person . . . .
Id.
The Utah Supreme Court applied §70A-3-606(1)(a) in Utah
Farm Production Credit Association v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154 (Utah
1987).

Although the Supreme Court held that there were issues of

fact regarding the Watts' status as accommodation parties, it
addressed the question of discharge under §70A-3-606(1)(a) to give
guidance to the trial court on remand.

Id_. at 158.

The Supreme

Court held that §70A-3-606(1)(a) is a "suretyship defense."
160.

rd. at

The Supreme Court further held that the release of a primary

obligor discharges the surety absent an express reservation of
rights against the surety.

Id_. at 160-61.

Finally, the Supreme

Court held that because the plaintiff had released the primary
obligor from "all" liability, the surety had been completely discharged and not just from the deficiency determined in the
foreclosure.
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have been discharged.
The original maker of the Racquet Club Note was PCRC.
position was assumed by PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers.

Its

FIBU was

notified of their assumption and agreement to pay the Racquet Club
Note.

The Racquet Club Note states that it "shall be binding upon

their respective . . . successors and assigns." Dougans and Beckers
therefore have recourse against PCRCfs assignees, including PMD,
the Smiths and Vic Ayers.

It has been held that the recourse

rights of accommodation parties are not affected by the transfer
and assumption of the obligation to pay a note.
410 A.2d 569 (Md. 1979).

Fithian v. Jamar,

The Dougans' and Beckers' right of

recourse against PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers is further supported
by common law principles set forth in Restatement of Security
§83(c).

Section 70A-3-606(1)(a) discharged the Dougans and

Beckers, when FIBU released Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers, unless FIBU
expressly reserved its rights against the Dougans and Beckers.
5.

FIBU Released Vic Ayers - Vic Ayers was one of the

original guarantors on the Racquet Club Note.

As stated

previously, Vic Ayers individually assumed the Racquet Club Note.
In 1983, Vic Ayers entered into a workout arrangement with his
creditors, including FIBU.

In that workout, Vic Ayers was released

from personal liability on PMD's obligations to FIBU, including the
Racquet Club Note.

As a primary obligor, that release discharged

the Dougans and Beckers.
1987).

As a guarantor, that release also discharged the Beckers

and Dougans.
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966, 968 (Wash.App. 1984).
6.

FIBU Released Enoch Smith - The most fundamental fac-

tual dispute concerns the release of Enoch Smith,
PMD experienced financial difficulties.

In early 1985,

First Security Bank

("FSB") had filed suit to foreclose on some of PMD's properties.
PMD entered into negotiations with FSB and FIBU to work out its
financial problems.
During those negotiations various proposals were offered
and discussed.
13, 1985.

The critical negotiations occurred on June 12 and

Two key issues were discussed:

(1)

the release of

Enoch Smith; and (2) additional collateral to be given by the
Smiths.

Ultimately, the Smiths agreed to give the banks approxi-

mately $4,000,000.00 of additional personal unencumbered
collateral, including the Smith's family ranch.

In exchange, the

banks agreed to release Enoch Smith from all loans except a
$500,000.00 FIBU loan to Enoch Smith Sons Company.
A Workout Agreement was prepared, reviewed and executed.
(R. at 1184-86 and Addendum at A31-35).

Paragraph 5 of the

Workout Agreement states:
5. Enoch and Margaret Smith will be
released from whatever personal liability
may exist on the FSB debt, FIUT's PMD,
Enoch Smith Company and Smith Park Acres
loans and the "Ayers" loan. Enoch Smith
will retain whatever liability he now has
on the $500,000 Enoch Smith Sons Company
loan. Dick Smith will not have personal
liability on the "Ayers" debt. Id.
Dick Smith understood that paragraph 5 of the Workout Agreement
released Enoch Smith from all PMD loans owed to FIBU, including the
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Racquet Club Note.
R. at 1527-28).

(Deposition of Enoch Richard Smith, at 130-131;

Absent that release, the Smiths would not have

given the banks $4,000,000.00 of additional unencumbered
collateral.
Furthermore, FiBU believed Enoch Smith had been released.
On August 14, 1986, Larry V. Whitney, an assistant vice president
of FIBU, drafted a credit authorization report after the workout
had been implemented.

(R. at 1522, Exhibit F thereto).

The report

states at page 4:
For the consideration of pledging personal assets, including the 280 acre Park
Acre Ranch, Enoch and Margaret Smith have
been released from all personal liability
to FIUT except the $500,000 unsecured loan
to ESSCO which is guaranteed by Enoch and
Dick. Id_. (emphasis added).
Whitney admitted he prepared this report after reviewing the workout documents on behalf of FIBU.

(Deposition of Larry V. Whitney,

at 33-34, R. at 1521) .
Whether or not the Workout Agreement released Enoch Smith
is a factual question.

A court construing a document must, if

possible, first attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions
as determined from the document itself.

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis

National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).

If there is uncer-

tainty or ambiguity, parol evidence can be relied upon.
Butte Ranch v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977).

1(3. Big

The facts establish

that all parties, including FIBU representatives, understood that
the Workout Agreement released Enoch Smith.

Any uncertainty should

be resolved against the party who drew the agreement.
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Sears v.

Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982)-

The Workout Agreement

was drafted by the banks, primarily by FIBU.
Furthermore, when the Workout Agreement was executed, it
constituted an executory accord:

"An executory accord is an agree-

ment that an existing claim shall be discharged in the future by
the rendition of a substituted performance.

If agreed to, it does

not discharge the existing claim, but rather the existing claim is
discharged by the substituted performance."

Golden Kay Realty,

Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985).

The Smiths agreed

to convey and encumber personal assets valued at approximately
$4,000,000.00 to FIBU.

As consideration, FIBU agreed to release

Enoch and Margaret Smith from all personal liability they had on
then existing PMD loans owed to FIBU except one.
was not the Racquet Club Note.

The loan excepted

Thus, the Workout Agreement

released the Smiths when they subsequently performed the acts
required by the Workout Agreement.

FIBU has never claimed that the

Smiths failed to perform.
Assuming arguendo that the workout documents do not contain a release of Enoch Smith, FIBU cannot dispute that Enoch and
Margaret Smith are entitled to a release.

The Smiths have fully

complied with the requirements of the workout.

The Smiths have

given up $4,000,000.00 of personal unencumbered assets.
assets cannot now be recovered by the Smiths.

Those

The Smiths have sub-

stantially changed their position relying on what they were led to
believe was a release.

If a jury were to find that a release has

not been given, FIBU would be in breach of its contract.
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In fact,

the Smiths have filed a Complaint against FIBU alleging such a
breach.

Substantial issues of fact regarding the extent of that

release remain to be resolved.

Those issues include whether or not

a release has been given, whether or not the release includes the
Racquet Club Note and whether or not that release should have been
included in the Workout Agreement.
7.

The Indemnity Agreement Does Not Preclude the Dougans

and Beckers from being discharged. - FIBU contends that the Beckers
and Dougans cannot be discharged because they have been fully
indemnified by PMD's partners.

FIBU quotes from L. Simpson,

Handbook of the Law of Suretyship, (1950) and F. Childs, Law of
Surety and Guarantee (1907).

FIBU's quote from Simpson fails to

include the following statement:

"The rule more in accord with

logic and with the actualities of the situation is the Restatement
rule that the release of the principal discharges the surety from
his personal obligation, but leaves him liable to account to the
creditor for the security."
Suretyship, 306 (1950).

L. Simpson, Handbook of the Law of

The very authority FIBU relies upon to

support its argument disagrees with its position.
Simpson goes on to favorably comment on the restatement
position.

Restatement of Security § 122, comment C states:
C. Secured Surety. Where the surety has
received security from or for the benefit
of the principal, the creditor has an
interest in the security (See § 140).
Since the creditor is entitled to an interest in such security, the release of the
principal by the creditor, where the surety
is secured by the principal, is presumably
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an indication that the creditor intends to
rely upon the security. The release of the
principal has the effect, therefore, of
releasing the surety from his personal
obligation, subject to his duty to account
to the creditor for The security.
Section 122 was adopted by Utah in Horman v. Gordon, supra.

The

specific issue of the indemnified surety was addressed in
Continental Bank & Trust v. AKWA, 206 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. 1973) when
the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited Simpson's treaties and followed
the restatement approach.

The "security" referred to is any secu-

rity given by the principal to protect the surety.

There was no

security given to Becker and Dougan and thus, they need not account
to FIBU for anything.

The indemnity Dougan and Becker obtained

from PMD and its partners does not affect the release because the
law does not so provide, and as indicated, they have received no
security.

Furthermore, PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers did not agree

to indemnify Mrs. Dougan and Mrs. Becker.
8.

Subsequent Closing Documents Did Not Supersede the

Work-Out Agreement - FIBU argues that the Workout Agreement was
merged with and superseded by the additional closing documents.
The three cases cited by FIBU are inapposite.
at 41-42).

(Brief of Appellant,

FIBU cites National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen

Brothers, Inc,, 511 P.2d 731 (Utah 1973), Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232
P.2d 769 (Utah 1951) and Beck, v. Meqli, 114 P.2d 305 (Kan* 1941)
for the general proposition that the subsequent closing documents
superseded the Workout Agreement.

(Brief of Appellant, at 41-42).

In each of those cases, the final contract either expressly stated
that the parties intended the document to be final or a preliminary
D7
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document expressly stated the need to reduce the agreement to a
final contract.

Those are not the facts here.

Furthermore, FIBU

ignores the Utah Supreme Court's statement in Mawhinney that:
[W]here it may be shown that the terms used in
the latter instrument did not correctly embody
the prior intention of the parties because of
inadvertence, ambiguity or fraud, evidence as
to what was really intended by the terms of the
instrument or what was inadvertently omitted or
added may be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
The Workout Agreement was not a preliminary draft. The
Smiths intended that the Workout Agreement be the final agreement.
Only the Workout Agreement is supported by consideration.

No sin-

gle subsequent document entirely covers the terms of the Workout
Agreement.

Each subsequent document effectuates only one of the

terms of the Workout Agreement.

The consideration for each is dis-

cerned by reference to the Workout Agreement.

None of the docu-

ments indicate that the parties intended the closing documents to
supersede the Workout Agreement.

Under the analysis of Horman v.

Gordon, there is no merger.
FIBU argues that in a subsequent closing document, it limited its recourse against Enoch and Margaret Smith on certain
loans, but not the Racquet Club Note.

(Brief of Appellant, at 41-

42).

PMD had obtained certain

FIBU's statement is misleading.

commercial loans which had become due prior to the workout. They
were not amortized loans. As part of the workout, those loans were
to be extended.

The Amendment and Extension Agreement was intended

to extend those commercial loans only.

It was not meant to be the

exclusive agreement or to alter the terms of the Workout Agreement.
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It merely implemented one term of the Workout Agreement. The
Racquet Club Note, however, was an amortized real estate loan which
was brought current from additional funds loaned by FSB in the
workout, and it did not need to be extended.
that interpretation.
9.

FIBU disagrees with

That dispute precluded summary judgment.

The Term "FIUT'S PMD . . . loans" Includes the Racquet

Club Note. - The second, most fundamental factual dispute is
whether or not the release included the Racquet Club Note.
disputes that it did.

FIBU

"The only wording in this paragraph that

even arguably relates to release under the note is the language
referring to 'FIUT's PMD . . . loan [sic] . ' . . . First Interstate
contends that this language does not refer to the note."
(Brief of Appellant, at 39-40.)

(citations and footnotes omitted

and emphasis added).
There is substantial evidence that the Racquet Club Note
is included in the release.

FIBU knew that PMD, the Smiths and Vic

Ayers had assumed the Racquet Club Note.

On September 2, 1982,

Dougan sent a letter to FIBU informing it of those assumptions.
Furthermore, FIBU consented to the exchange of Dougan!s and
Becker's interests in the Racquet Club to PMD.

On November 11,

1982, Dougan wrote FIBU again informing it of the Indemnity
Agreement between PMD, the Smiths, Vic Ayers, Becker and Dougan.
In late 1984, Larry v. Whitney, an assistant vice president of FIBU, was assigned by top FIBU management to review the
overall PMD indebtedness and report on the extent of and security
for the debt.
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negotiated, it was Whitney's perception that the Smiths or PMD
owned the Racquet Club.
During the workout negotiations, PMD submitted two written
proposals to the banks.

(R. at 1522, Exhibit 0 thereto).

The

Smiths' initial objective was to give the banks a deed in lieu of
foreclosure.

PMD's proposals included the Racquet Club as one

asset to be conveyed to the banks.

(Id.)

The Smiths' accountant

prepared a list of all loans the Smith entities owed to the banks. .
(R. at 1522, Exhibit T thereto).

During the workout negotiations,

that list was circulated and considered by the parties.

The list

includes the Racquet Club Note, and identifies it as a "Park
Meadows" loan owed to FIBU.

(Id.)

After PMD received title to the Racquet Club in 1982, all
payment notices were sent to PMD.

On June 11, 1985, First

Interstate Mortgage, FIBU's subsidiary that was servicing the
Racquet Club Note, sent letters to Dick Smith for PMD reminding Mr.
Smith that the Racquet Club Note was in default for the May and
June 1985 payments, and demanding payment.

Linda Franke, a vice

president in FIBU's real estate department, was aware in June 1985,
that the Racquet Club Note was delinquent.
During the negotiations through May and June 1985, the
term "Park Meadows Project" was used generally by all participants
to refer to the land, the Racquet Club and the golf course.

The

Smiths understood that "FIUT's PMD . . . loans" included the Racquet
Club Note.

Dick Smith testified he recalled specific discussions

regarding the Racquet Club Note during the workout negotiations.
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The Racquet Club was included in the blanket mortgages
given to FIBU and FSB.

After the Workout Agreement had been

negotiated, funds from an additional $1,000,000 extended by FSB,
were used to bring the Racquet Club Note current, pursuant to the
FIBU's express approval.

Finally, as indicated previously, Larry

Whitney wrote on August 14, 1985, after reviewing all the workout
documents for FIBU, that Enoch and Margaret Smith had been released
from "all" personal liability to FIBU except the $500,000 unsecured
loan to Enoch Smith Sons Company which was guaranteed by Enoch and
Dick.
At the very least, those facts create a substantial ambiguity regarding what was meant by the parties in using the term
"FIUT's PMD . . . loans."

Because of that ambiguity, the parties'

intent must be considered.

The resolution of that ambiguity is a

material question of fact.
10.

Whether or Not the Collateral was Impaired Is a

Question of Fact - The Beckers and Dougans agreed to guarantee the
Racquet Club Note with certain understandings of the risk.

The

Dougans and Beckers were cognizant of that risk when they sold the
Racquet Club to PMD, including PMD's, the Smiths' and Vic Ayers'
agreement to assume and pay the Racquet Club Note.

The Dougans and

Beckers believed that their exposure was adequately protected.
When we entered into this transaction with the
Smiths, we did so knowing full well that these
were substantial, responsible people. By
"substantial" and "responsible," I mean they
had a reputation in this community and in Park
City for discharging their obligations, and
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they generally had the reputation of being
people of means with the financial wherewithal
to discharge their obligations. (Deposition
of J. Lynn Dougan, p. 18, lines 13-19, R. at
1526) .
On February 21, 1986, FIBU sent to Lynn Dougan the statutory notice of default.
tacted Rick Becker.
and was surprised.
report.

When Dougan received the notice, he con-

Becker had not received a copy of the notice,
Dougan and Becker decided to get a title

Just before Dougan contacted Becker, Dick Smith called

Becker, and told him that Bob Ward, FIBU's executive vice
president, instructed him to stop making payments on the Racquet
Club Note.

Dougan had not received prior notice of the default and

was surprised by the Smiths' inability to respond on the note and
the indemnity.
The title report, effective March 20, 1986, disclosed certain liens of which Dougan previously had no knowledge.
of J. Lynn Dougan, R. at 1197, Addendum at A56-65).

(Affidavit

Item 12

reflects the FSB blanket mortgage from the workout and its amendment which added the Racquet Club as collateral.

That blanket

mortgage secured the $1.0 million FSB loan provided in the workout,
and approximately $4.0 million previously loaned by FSB to PMD, a
total of $5.0 million.
line 23; R. at 1529).

(Deposition of Hardin A. Whitney, p. 30,
Item 13 reflected the FIBU blanket mortgage

from the workout, and it encumbered the Racquet Club to secure
$9,787,275.25, plus interest. The total debt encumbering the
Racquet Club was approximately $15 million.

Item 15 disclosed the

involuntary bankruptcy proceeding commenced against PMD by FIBU.
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Although not listed in the title report, the parties to
the workout executed a Subordination Agreement on June 28, 1985,
which was amended in July 1985.

(R. at 1522, Exhibit U thereto).

The Subordination Agreement and its amendment subordinated certain
of FIBU's first lien positions to certain liens of FSB.
(Deposition of Robert J. Ward, Exhibit 33 thereto, R. at 1524).
Dick Smith understood that the Racquet Club Note and FIBU's blanket
mortgage were subordinated to FSB's loans, so that FSB had first
lien position on the Racquet Club.

(Deposition of E. R. Smith, pp.

100-104, R. at 1527-28) .
Paragraph 2 implements the subordination.

The first sen-

tence generally states FIBU's liens in the collateral are subordinated to FSB's liens in the collateral.

The third sentence

provides "that all security interests and liens in any property or
asset, securing

the Junior Debt, .

.

.

shall be subordinate to

all security interest and liens in the same property or assets,
securing the Senior Debt."

(Emphasis added).

The Junior Debt consists of FIBU notes totalling
$4,411,000.00," "all other existing obligations of Debtors" (PMD,
Smiths and related companies) to FIBU listed and all future obligations of Debtors to FIBU.
approximately $9.7 million.

Certain Smith/PMD debts listed totalled
The FIBU blanket mortgage was to

secure $9,787,275.25 debt of PMD, Smiths and their related
companies, and the collateral includes the Racquet Club.
1522, Exhibit R thereto).

(R. at

Therefore, the Racquet Club is property

securing the Junior Debt and the Racquet Club Note is a subordi-
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nated lien.

The Senior Debt consists of the $1,000,000.00 workout

loan and FSB's approximately $4.0 million previous loan to PMD.
The $5.0 million FSB loans were given priority over the Junior
Debt, which includes the Racquet Club and the Racquet Club Note.
The amendment to the Subordination Agreement clarified
that the FSB blanket mortgage and its amendment were part of the
liens securing the Senior Debt.

The amendment to FSB's blanket

mortgage modified the collateral description which would be subject
to the lien, to add the Racquet Club among other things.
1522, Exhibit V thereto).

(R. at

The recorded documents therefore estab-

lish that the FIBU deed of trust (blanket mortgage) and the FSB
amended deed of trust (blanket mortgage) both are liens upon the
Racquet Club, and that the FIBU lien on the Racquet Club was subordinated to the FSB lien as Dick Smith understood in the negotiations.
This Court held in Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Rite Way
Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied,
765 P.2d 1277, that a guarantor is discharged when a creditor
impairs the collateral securing the debt.

Ic3. at 108-09.

In Rite

Way, Valley Bank extended a loan to Rite Way which was guaranteed
by Peter Lowe, Jr. and Richard H. Lowe (the "Lowes").
The loan was secured by certain collateral.

id.

1(3. at 106.

Briefly, the loan

became delinquent, Valley Bank released its interest in some of the
collateral and it sued the Lowes. _£d. at 107. The Lowes argued
that Valley Bank impaired the collateral and thus, they were
discharged.

The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment

to Valley Bank.
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material facts and reversed.

icL at 110.

In reaching that conclusion, this Court first analyzed the
nature of the Lowes' guaranty.

id. at 107-08.

Holding that the

guaranty was absolute, this Court turned to the question of
impairment.

Id. at 108-09. This Court held that a guarantor,

absolute or conditional, "has a right of subrogation to any collateral pledged as security."

Ic3. at 108. This Court then held that

the creditor is in a trustee relationship with the guarantor, and
that if it breaches that trust duty, the guarantor is discharged.
The rationale is that the creditor,
having elected to proceed against security
for payment of the debt, is deemed to be in
a trustee relationship with the guarantor.
The creditor may liquidate the security and
apply the proceeds to the obligation, or he
may forego recourse to the security and
proceed against the guarantor of payment,
provided he does not subvert the
guarantor's subrogation rights against collateral pledged by the principal obligor.
If he breaches that trust duty by
destroying, losing, or otherwise
improvidently dissipating the collateral,
he may not hold the guarantor wholly liable
because the guarantor would have been
subrogated to the creditor's right of
resort to that security.7
Id.

This Court recognized that that general rule had been codified

in Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(b) (1981).
There is one exception to the rule articulated by this
Court in Rite Way.

A guarantor may explicitly waive or consent to

1

Other cases which discuss and follow the trust relationship principle Include: Industrial
Investment Corp. v. C M . Rocca, 596 P.2d 100 (Idaho 1979); Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d
481 (5th C1r. 1967); Behlen v. Manufacturing Co. v. First National Bank of Englewood, 472 P.2d
703 (Colo.App. 1970).
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the creditor's impairment of the collateral.
109.

Rite Way, 742 P.2d at

That waiver or consent must be unequivocal and explicit.

Id.

Impairment of collateral is not limited to physical damage
to the collateral.

It is broadly construed to include conduct of

the creditor which diminishes the value of the collateral, or which
makes the collateral unavailable to the surety and thus increases
the surety's risks.

Beneficial Financial Co. of Norman v. Marshall,

551 P.2d 315, 319-20 (Okla.App. 1976).

Subordination of a mortgage

has specifically been held to be an impairment of collateral.
Poynot v. J & T Developments, Inc,, 355 So.2d 1052 (La.App. 1978).
Like the guarantors in Rite Way, the Dougans and Beckers
had a right of subrogation to the Racquet Club which secured the
Note.

FIBU elected to proceed against the Racquet Club and

therefore, owed a duty of trust to the Dougans and Beckers. FIBU's
imposition of a blanket mortgage of $9,787,275.25 against the
Racquet Club, allowance of FSB to obtain a blanket mortgage of
approximately $5.0 million against the Racquet Club, subordination
of its Racquet Club lien and note to FSB's blanket mortgage, initiation of the involuntary bankruptcy against PMD and its dealings
with PMD from 1983 to 1986 constitute an impairment of the value of
the Racquet Club.

The Dougans and Beckers did not consent to or

waive FIBU's actions.
or consent.

FIBU presented no evidence of such a waiver

Thus, issues of fact regarding FIBU's impairment and

any claimed consent or waiver precluded summary judgment.
The common law also discharges a guarantor to the extent
the collateral has been impaired, or the creditor has increased the
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guarantor's risks.

The discharge is based on the trust

relationship, and the fact that the guarantor is subrogated to the
creditor's rights against the principal and the collateral.
Restatement of Security, §141,
discharge are:

Circumstances giving rise to the

modification of the principal's duties to the

creditor, Restatement of Security, §128; extending time for
principal's performance, Restatement of Security, §129; and surrendering or impairing security on the obligation, Restatement of
Security, §132.
11.

FIBU Produced No Evidence of the Racquet Club's Fair

Market Value. - FIBU alleged in its supporting memorandum in the
trial court that there was due and owing to FIBU principal of
$719,517.54 together with accrued interest of $97,435.00.
738).

(R. at

The only evidence produced in support of that allegation was

the Affidavit of Ross Varoz.

FIBU produced no evidence regarding

the fair market value of the Racquet Club at the time of the sale.
In the order entered by Judge Wilkinson, on October 16, 1987, among
the issues reserved to defendants were, the amount owed to FIBU by
any of the defendants and the fair market value on the date of the
sale.

(R. at 353-60).

The order further provided that the parties

had stipulated that the determination of any deficiency shall be
reserved by the court, and that any deficiency shall not exceed the
difference between the fair market value at the time of the foreclosure sale or the bid price at the sale, whichever is more, and
such amount as shall subsequently be determined by the Court to go
to FIBU.
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that material issues of fact exist and FIBU is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
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ADDENDUM I
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

DETEFHJ.NA! i ^

L<ULES

"t^h Rules o f Civil P r o c e d u r e , R u l e 5 4 . J u d g m e n t s ; costs ,
i)
D e f i n i t i o n ; form,, "Judgment" as used in these rules
includes a decree and any order from w h i c h an appeal lies. A
judgment need n o t contain a recital o f p l e a d i n g s , t h e report of a
m a s t e r , or the record of prior p r o c e e d i n g s .
(b) J udgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, tr\e court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more butfewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer r;han a ; i the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabi ] ities of all the parties.
(c)

Demand for judgment.

(1) Gener a] 1 y» Except as to a par ty against whom a judgment is entered by d e f a u l t , every final judgment shall grant t h e
relief to w h i c h t h e party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if t h e party h a s n o t demanded such relief in is
p l e a d i n g s . If m a y be given for or against o n e or m o r e of several
c l a i m a n t s ; and it m a y , when t h e justice of t h e case requires i t , '
determine the ultimate rights o f t h e parties on each side as
• -.o, > W a a r , > •• ^m.,,-.,, them.se] ves ,
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default si lall 1 10 1 :
be different in kind from, or exceed In amount, that specifically
prayed for in the demand for judgment,
,il" ,1

C

Ill C

[j wriom awarded, Except when express provision
therercr u mdue eithei in a statute o f this state or in these
r u l e s , costs shall be a L Lowed as of course to t h e prevail, irig party
unless t h e court otherwise d i r e c t s ; provided, h o w e v e r , where an
anneal or other proceeding for review is t a k e n , costs of t h e action,
otner than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding
1
fov" H '-*
ihide the final determination o f t h e cause.

Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be
imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse
party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the
items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and
file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that
the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may,
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a
motion to have the bill of costs taxes by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict,
or at the time of subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on
the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4)

[Deleted.]

(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The
clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on
the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the
costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk
must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert
the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that
purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of
actions and in the judgment docket. (Amended effective January 1,
1985) .
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 4(a). Appeal as of Right:
When Taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the district
court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the Court of Appeals,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken within 30 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
15-4-1.

Definitions•

In this chapter, unless otherwise expressly stated,
"obligation" includes a liability in tort; "obligor" includes a

person liable for a tort; "obxiye^
. J U U C ^ a ^ L O ^ H U - J V I M M -.
right based on a t o r t ; "several obligors" means obligors severally
bound for the same performance.
15 4 • 2 .

Discharge of co-obJ igors by ji idgment.

A judgment agai i ist one c r i i tore of several obligors., or against
one or m o r e of joint or of joint and several o b l i g o r s , shall not
discharge a co-obligor who was not a party to the proceed,.] ng
wherein the judgment was rendered,

The amount ;r value or any consideration received by the
obligee from one or more of several o b l i g o r s , or from one or more
of joint and several o b l i g o r s , in whole or in partial satisfaction
of their obLigations shall be credited to the extent of the amount
received on the obligation of all co-obligors to whom the obligor
or obligors Turing the consideration did not stand in the relation
of a suret
15-4-4,

Release of co-obligor

• • Reservation of rights*

Subject to the provisioi is of §15-4 -3, the obligee's release or
discharge of one or more of several obi igors, or of one or more of
joint or of joint and several o b l i g o r s , shall not discharge c o obligors against whom the obligee in writing and as part of the
same transaction as the release of discharge expressly reserves hi s
rights; and in the absence of such a reservation of rights shal 1
d i s ch a r g e co • o b1 i g o rs o n 1 y t o t he e x t e n t p r o v ided i n §15-4-5.
l

•,

* . _ ' - * • aee,

_r an obiigee reLeasing or discharging an obligor withe
express reservation of rights against a co-obligor then k n o w j or
has reason to know that the obligor released or discharged did not
pay as much of the claim as he was bound by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the obligee's claim against that
co-obligor shall be satisfied to the amount which the obligee knew
or had reason to know that the releasee -r discharged obligor was
bound f o su u
•-> *•::'•'•: :jor to pay,
obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not
then sucn knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim against
the co-obligor shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of
two a m o u n t s , name! y: (a) the ai nount c:; the fractional share of the

obligor released or discharged, or (b) the amount that such obligor
was bound by his contract or relation with the co-obligor to pay.
48-1-12,

Nature of partner's liability.

All partners are liable:
(1) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to
the partnership under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11.
(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the
partnership; but any partner may enter into a separate obligation
to perform a partnership contract.
70A-3-606.
(1)

(2)

Impairment of recourse or of collateral*

The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the
extent that without such party's consent the holder
(a)

without express reservation of rights releases or
agrees not to sue any person against whom the party
has to the knowledge of the holder a right of
recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce
against such person the instrument or collateral or
otherwise discharges such person, except that failure
or delay in effecting any required presentment, protest or notice of dishonor with respect to any such
person does not discharge any party as to whom
presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or

(b)

unjustifably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of the party or any person
against whom he has a right of recourse.

By express reservation of rights against a party with a
right of recourse.the holder preserves
(a)

all his rights against such party as of the time when
the instrument was originally due; and

(b)

the right of the party to pay the instrument as of
that time; and

(c)

all rights of such party to recourse against others.

ADDENDUM II
JUDGMENT MAY 3, 1989

GLENN C. HANNI #A1327
MARK J- TAYLOR #4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Becker and Dougan
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
•MO.

SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FILED-

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a Utah corporation,

1

^'erx jj ±u

Plaintiff,

.

i

v
mmir <
~ounty

. ^ < - ^

vs
J U D G M E N T

PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.,
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT
CO., a Utah partnership, et al.

C i v i l No. 9159

Defendants.

J u d g e J . Dennis
FREDERICK G. BECKER II, et al.
Third Party Plaintiffs
vs.
ENOCH SMITH, JR., et al.,
Third Party Defendants
ENOCH SMITH JR., et al.,
Third Party Defendants,
vs.
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff

j .

A8

j.i.'-Ji

Frederick

The motion of defendants, J. Lynn Dougan, Diana Lady
Dougan, Frederick G. Becker II and Margaret M. Becker, for summary
judgment and plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment came
on for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on
April 19, 1989.

Plaintiff was represented by Mary Anne Q. Wood

of the firm of Holme, Roberts & Owen.

Defendants Beckers and

Dougans were represented by Glenn C. Hanni and Victoria Kidman
of the firm of Strong & Hanni.

On motion of defendants, all

depositions were ordered opened and published.

After hearing

arguments of counsel and being fully advised, the court determines:
1.

The 15 day notice required by the loan documents to

be given prior to accelerating the Racquet Club note was not given
by plaintiff to the original maker, Park City Racquet Club, to
defendants Dougans, Beckers and Ayers, who assumed the Racquet
Club note and thereby became makers, nor to defendants Dougans,
Beckers and Ayers in their capacity as guarantors.
2.

The notice required to be given by plaintiff to defendant

Park Meadows Development prior to plaintiff exercising its option
to accelerate was defective.
3.

The giving of a proper 15 day notice was a condition

precedent to the right of plaintiff to exercise its option to
accelerate the Racquet Club note.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The motion of defendants, J. Lynn Dougan, Diana Lady

Dougan, Frederick G. Becker II and Margaret M. Becker, for
summary judgment is hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered

in favor of defendants, J. Lynn Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan, Frederick
G. Becker II and Margaret M. Becker, and against plaintiff, no
cause of action,
2.

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is

hereby denied.
3.

The court determines there is no just reason for

delay in entering this judgment as a final judgment, and the
clerk of the court is directed to enter it as a final judgment
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 54(b), URCP.
Dated this

ffij>^

f - ^ 2 4 , i<
day o
of-t&Pf/L.
1989,
BY THE COURT:

rederick, Judge

1 -'j. I O
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this QU

day of

April, 1989, to:
Mary Anne Q. Wood
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN
Suite 900
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Hardin A. Whitney
Jeff Robinson
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901
Attorneys for Defendant Park Meadows
Investment Co., a/k/a Park Meadows
Development Co.,
J. Michael Kelly
Kent H. Murdock
Enid Greene
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0358
Attorneys for Defendant
First Security Bank of Utah
Victor Ayers
50 Thayne Canyon Drive
Park City, Utah 84060

Ce X^dJT,

All 1 ,. ; 7

ADDENDUM III
ORDER GRANTING PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A12

NO

FILED

Hardin A. Whitney (#3456) and
Jeffrey Robinson (#4129), of
MOYLE & DRAPER, P. C.
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915
Telephone (801) 521-0250

;*
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BY.
Deputy &•<*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING PARK
MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.,
)
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT CO.,
a Utah Partnership; FREDERICK G.
BECKER, II; MARGARET M. BECKER;
VICTOR R. AYERS; MARION P. AYERS;
J. LYNN DOUGAN; DIANA LADY DOUGAN;
and FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a banking corporation with
its principal place of business in
Utah,
Defendants.

Civil No. 9159
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

FREDERICK G. BECKER II; MARGARET
M. BECKER; J. LYNN DOUGAN and
DIANA LADY DOUGAN,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH
RICHARD SMITH,
Third-Party Defendants,
w_L'i

ENOCH SMITH JR and ENOCH RICHARD
SMITH,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A.
Third-Party Defendant.

Upon the motion of Defendant Park Meadows Investment Company
and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The Motion of defendant Park Meadows Investment Company

is granted as prayed.
2.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant Park

Meadows Investment Co. a/k/a Park Meadows Development Co. and
against plaintiff, no cause of action.
3.

The court determines there is no just reason for delay

in entering this judgment as a final judgment and the clerk of
the court is directed to enter it as a final judgment in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 54 (W , URCP.

/
DATED this

h

V"^
day of^Iun€7 1989.
BY T:

/ Dennis Frpdcriclc-, Judge

1' '
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

_ £?%C

day of

5^^-^r

'

1989
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a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER,, was mailed, first- J vna&ej*.
class postage prepaid, to:
Mary Anne Q. Wood
Richie D. Haddock
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
50 South Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Hardin A. Whitney
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
No, 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1901
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants Smith
Kent H. Murdock
Enid Greene
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for First Security Bank
Victor Ayers
50 Thayne Canyon Drive
Park City, Utah 84060
David R. Olsen
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1680
Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327
Mark J. Taylor, #4455
Victoria K. Kidman, #5302
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants Becker
and Dougan
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 532-7080

loio
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6 1989

Cier* ot bummit County
BY

-••
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ADDENDUM IV
PROMISSORY NOTE

A16

PROMISSORY NOTE
(SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST)
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises and agrees to
pay to the order of WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY {hereinafter termed
"Walker") or its assigns, at the main office of Walker, Salt Lake
City, Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof may
designate in writing, the principal sum of Eight Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($800,000.00) in lawful money of the United States of
America, together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof at
the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum until paid. Principal
and interest shall be paid in equal monthly installments of Seven
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-One Dollars ($7,341.00) each commencing with a payment on the 1st day of January, 1979, and
continuing with a like payment on the first day of each succeeding
calendar month thereafter until the entire remaining unpaid balance
of principal and interest has been paid in full; provided, however,
that the final payment hereunder shall be in an amount equal to
the then remaining unpaid balance. Installments shall be
applied
first toward the payment and satisfaction of accrued and unpaid
interest and the remainder shall be applied toward the reduction
of principal. Interest for each monthly payment and period snail
be computed on a 3 60-day year basis. Interest, if any, which
accrues during the period commencing with the date of this Note
and ending prior to the date of the first installment due hereunder shall be deducted from the proceeds of the loan evidenced
hereby.
The undersigned shall have the option to prepay all or any
portion of the unpaid principal balance of the Note in any one
(1) year without penalty. In the event the undersigned shall
exercise such option, the same shall not relieve the undersigned
nor waive any obligation of the undersigned to make timely monthly
installment payments thereafter maturing. Walker or its assigns
shall, at any time following the expiration of ten (10) years
from and after the date cf execution hereof, at any time during
the remainder of the term hereof have the sole and exclusive cpticr.
to declare the entire unpaid balance due and payable upon giving
to the undersigned sixty (60) days notice in writing of its intent
to declare the same due and payable.
The undersigned further agrees to pay to Walker or its assigns,
at the sole and exclusive option of Walker or its assigns, budget
payments on a monthly basis in addition to principal ar.d interest
as hereinabove set forth. Such budget payments snali be in an
amount equal to one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual real property
taxes and casualty insurance premiums on the real property ar.d
improvements described in the Deed of Trust securing tr.is ::cte
and with respect thereto, the undersigned further ackr.cwledges and
agrees that neither Walker nor its assigns is obligated to pay and
the undersigned specifically waives any claim to the payment of
interest, earnings or other sums or amounts by Walker or its
assigns on such budget payments. Neither Walker nor its assigns
shall pay interest or earnings on any ether sums or amounts
held for the benefit cf or deposited by the undersigned in
connection with this Note or the Deed of Trust securing the same.

2£
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In the event of the exercise of said option, Walker or its
assigns shall give to the undersigned thirty (30) days notice
in writing of its intent to require payment by the undersigned
of said budget payments.
In the event any installment or payment (including an installment or payment with respect to which the late charge provided for
in this Paragraph has previously been imposed) provided to be made
hereunder, or under any instrument given to secure the payment of
the obligation evidenced hereby, has not been paid in full on or
before the fifteenth (15th) day of any month the same is due as
provided herein, the holder hereof shall have the right to demand
of and receive from the undersigned a late charge equal to four
percent (4%) of the entirety of such installment or payment.
In the event: (a) any installment provided for hereunder is
not paid in full within fifteen (15) days after its scheduled due
date; or (b) the undersigned defaults in the performance of any
covenant or promise contained herein or in any instrument given
to secure the payment of the obligations evidenced hereby; or (c)
a petition is filed seeking that any of the undersigned or any
general partner in any of the undersigned be adjudged a bankrupt;
or (d) any of the undersigned or any general partner in any of the
undersigned makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors;
or (e) any of the undersigned or any general partner in any of the
undersigned suffers the appointment of a receiver; or (f) any of
the undersigned or any general partner in any of the undersigned
becomes insolvent; or (g) any of the undersigned or any general
partner in any of the undersigned undergoes liquidation, termination, or dissolution, then, in any of such events and upon
fifteen (15) days written notice given to the undersigned by
Walker or its assigns which default or event shall not be cured
by the undersigned within fifteen (15) days following such written
notice, the entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal
and interest owing hereunder shall, at the option of the holder
hereof and without notice or demand, become immediately due and
payable. Thereafter, said unpaid balance, including interest,
shall, until paid and both before and after judgment, earn interest
at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum. As used herein,
written notice shall be effective as of the tine the same is deposited in the United Sataes Mails addressed to the last known
address of the undersigned or the tine of the actual receipt
thereof, if earlier. The acceptance of any installment or payment after the occurrence of a default or event giving rise to
the right of acceleration provided for in this Paragraph shall
not constitute a waiver of such right of acceleration with respect
to such default or event or any subsequent default or event.
In the event any payment under this Note is not made, or any
obligation provided to be satisfied or performed under any instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is not satisfied or performed, at the time and in the manner required, the
undersigned agrees to pay any and ail costs and expenses 'regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether cr net incurred
in conjunction with litigation, before or after judgment, cr m
connection with exercise of power of sale provided for m the
Deed of Trust securing this Note) which may be incurred by the
holder hereof in connection with the enforcement of any of its
rights under this Note or under any such other instrument, including
court costs and reasonable Trustee's and Attorney's fees.
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Note
or in any instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby
(i) the rates of interest, charges and penalties provided for
herein and therein shall in no event exceed the rates, charges,
and penalties which result in interest being charged at a rate
equaling the maximum allowed by law; and (ii) if, for any reason

-2-
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whatsoever, th_ holder hereof ever received as interest in connection with the transaction of which this Note is a Dart an amount
which would result in interest being charged at a rate exceeding
the maximum allowed by law, such amount or portion thereof as
would otherwise be excessive interest shall automatically be apolied
toward reduction of the unpaid principal balance then outstanding
hereunder and not toward payment of interest.
The makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof
severally waive presentment for payment, protest, demand, notice
of protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of nonpayment, and expressly agree that this Note, or any payment hereunder, may be
extended from time to time by the holder hereof without in any
way affecting the liability of such parties. This Mote shall'be
the joint and several obligation of all makers, sureties,
guarantors and endorsers and shall be binding upon their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns.
In the event any of the undersigned is a partnership or
corporation, each person executing this instrument on behalf of
such entity individually and personally represents and warrants
that this Note and each instrument signed in the name of such
entity and delivered to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is
in all respects binding upon such entity as an act and obligation
of said partnership or corporation.
This Note and the Deed of Trust securing the same shall be
fully and freely assignable in whole or in part by Walker or its
assigns as they shall deem advisable without notice to the undersigned.
This Note is given in consideration of a loan made by Walker
to the undersigned for business purposes and not personal, faruiy,
household, or agricultural purposes and is principally secured by
a Deed of Trust covering real property situated in Surjnit County",
State of Utah. This Note shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
DATED this

day of

, 1978.
PARK CITY RACQUET CLU3, a Utah
corooration

ATTEST:

3y
Secretary

President

For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and suificie:
of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and
severally guarantee payment of this Promissory Note (Secured by
Deed of Trust) and further guarantee payment of the entire ir.cebte:
r.ess evidenced therebv zr.d the Deed of Trust securir.c the sar.e.

FREDERICK G. 3ECXER II,

MARGARET M. 3ZCZZZ,

Individual:

VICTOR R. AVERS, Individually

MARION ?. AVERS, Individually

015731
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ADDENDUM V
DEFENDANT VICTOR R. AYERS'
AMENDED ANSWERS TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

A20

DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. #2458
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendants Victor R.
and Marion P. Ayers
700 Clark Learning Office Center
17S South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a Utah corporation,

)
)
)

DEFENDANT VICTOR R. AYERS'
AMENDED ANSWERS TO REQUEST
FOR ADMISSIONS

I

Civil No. 9159

Plaintiff,
vs.
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO. ,
et al.,
Defendants.
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, et al.,

|

Third-partv Plaintiffs,
vs.

;

ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH
RICHARD SMITH,

j
]

Third-party Defendants. ]
Defendant, Victor R. Ayers, by and through his counsel
of record, David R. Olsen, Esq., of and for Suitter Axland Armstrong
& Hanson, hereby responds to Requests for Admissions as follows:
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that the Promissory Note, which
is attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's Complaint, was transferred

from Park City Racquet Club, Inc. to Park Meadows Development Company.
ANSWER:

Admit.

REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit that the obligations of the Promis-

sory Note, which is attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's complaint, were assumed by Park Meadows Development Company, and by
Victor R. Ayers, one of its partners.
ANSWER:

Admit.

REQUEST NO. 3:

Admit that the transfer and assumption

of the Promissory Note, referred to in Request No. 1 and 2 supra,
occurred in August, 1982.
ANSWER:

Admit.

DATED this ^L ^ day of November, 1988.

%

DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant Ayers

DR07.15
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INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
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INVESTMENTS b CONSULTANTS
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2 September 1982

FI rsc Interstate Bank of Utah
L75 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Gentlemen:
As y ou are aware, Frederick G Becker, 11 and J I .yixn
Dougan recently obtained your consent and the consent of
those lenders who participate with you to the exchange » of
our two-thirds interest in the Park City 'Racquet Club
A copy of this executed Consent to Exchange I s enclosed
herewith for your files.
Please be advised that this exchange has been consummated
and Park Meadows Development Company, a Utah partnership
composed of Enoch Smith, Dick Smith and Victor Ayers, have
assumed ownership and responsibility for the operation of
the Club and, specifically, assume full responsibility and
liability for the Promissory Mote dated December 11, 1978 in
the amount of $800,000 secured by Deed of Trust cover: ng che
property known as the Park City Racquet Club.
If you need anything further to complete y our fi 1 • is
in connection with this transaction please notify me.
Sincerely,
)
- ^-;

J. Lynn Dougan
J .5

End.

I 1

ADDENDUM
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1 I. , 1.98 2 DOUGAN LETTER

DOUGAN
i

Ill 'ill T

S.

ASSOCIATES

II f "f" 9

11 November 1932

2 1 20 SOU TW 1300 E AST. SU (T6 303
SALT I A K . 6 C 1 T i , UTAH 3 4100
(801) 406 2M9

M r s . Linda Franke •
Real Estate Department
First Interstate Bank of Utah
175 South M a i n
Salt Lake CI cy, Utah 8 4111
Dear Lindai
I a m enclosing a Indemnity in connection with the trans
action whereby Becker arid 1 exchanged our .interests in the
Park City Racquet Club for other properties.
In connection
w i t h this transaction Park Meadows Development Company and the
individual partners of Park Meadows Development Company
indemnified u s with regard to the Promissory Note described
in the indemnification.
I thought that y o u and your participating
banks should have a copy of this indemnity for your files a n d
for your i nformacion
Park Meadows Development Company also furnished us with a
certification as to the nature and ownership of Park Meadows
Development Company which I a m also enclosing.
n i,Je' 1 "ji Kc; e 1,1 en r ,service
As a I w a y s , thank '" i i tot y Jui ". on';;
and accommodation in LJiiniie matters,

Lynn Dougan
Jin

J,

l£nc 1 s
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CONSENT TO EXCHANGE

THE UNDERSIGNED, Walker Bank and Trust Company now
known as First Interstate Bank, Surety Life Insurance Company
and First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Salt Lake
City, being holders of mortgages covering certain property
located in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, described
on Exhibit "A9 attached hereto and Incorporated herein and commonly known as the Park City Racquet Club do hereby consent to
the exchange by J. Lynn Dougan and Frederick G. Becker II of an
undivided two-third1s interest in the subject property to Park
Meadows Development Company, a Utah partnership*
The undersigned each acknowledges that the completion of the transaction
above-described shall not' of itself result in the exercise by
the undersigned of any rights to accelerate the indebtedness

secured

by the applicable

mortgages,

nothing

In this

document

waives the right to acceleration of the mortgages for other
reasons other than the accomplishment of the transaction herein
described, or with regard to the accomplishing of any later
sales or exchanges of the subject property.
DATED this

17th day of

, 1982.

August

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK

ay.

its

/U<U/A*

\dl4it£t

&4U&++ /& Marked

SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

Its

iofrn *W~. Schuizrann
Vice P r e s i d e n t

By
^
Its

f^^J^^X^^
-^Izabedi
Assistant

J. Harris
Secr-e^arv

—

riRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION

sy_
Its

ADDENDUM X
WORKOUT AGREEMENT
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v^vt j ^ u
PARS MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED ENTITIES:
WORKOUT ARRANGEMENT WITH FIUT AND FSB
At the contemplated closing, Interest in the approximate sum
of $600,000, will be brought current on all loans of both
Banks to Park Meadows Development and related entities. The
source of funds will be $200,000 .from the Smiths and loans
proceeds from FSB, if approved.
Mark Howell will geek FSB approval of § loan to PMD in the
maximum sum of $1,000,000 to be utilised to pay the balance
of accrued interest, general claimants ($164,000), and Jack
•icklaus ($13,900), and to provide working capital needs in
the future. Such future draws will be permitted only after
submission and approval of detailed budgets and/or invoices
to both banks. PMD will provide notification of actual
expenditures to both banks. Such loan shall be secured by
a first priority lien (by reason of subordination) on all
properties subject to the blanket mortgage mentioned in
paragraph 4 hereafter (except for First Federal's trust deeds).
PMD will be allowed to pay the $300,000 debt to Enoch Smith
Sons Company out of lot sale proceeds at the rate of 5 percent
of such proceeds. This will require total sales of
$6,000,000.
A blanket mortgage for the benefit of FSB and FIUT will be
placed on all of Park Meadows properties (exclusive of Park
Meadows Mountain), and the assets of Enoch and Dick Smith.
This mortgage will not disturb the first trust deeds of First
Federal or FSB as to Gleneagles and Lot 1765, but will cover
any equity in those properties. Said mortgage will exclude
the following assets of Enoch and Margaret Smith: Their home,
two cars, Country Club membership, $250,000 in cash, $184,000
worth of securities to be identified, two stud horses, life
insurance, and Enoch Smith Sons Company and its assets. Also
excluded are the real property where Enoch Smith Sons Company
is located and all other stock in that company. Enoch Smith
Sons Company will remain liable to FIUT on the $500,000 loan.
The blanket mortgage will secure all debt of PMD to FSB and
FIUT, and also the debts to FIUT of Smith Park Acres Ranch,
Enoch Smith Company, Weaver Quality Welding, and the #Ayersloan. The *Ayers" loan will cease to be an obligation of
.__ \
Enoch "Smith Sons Co.
7^'
Enoch and Margaret Smith will be released from whatever
personal liability may exist on the FSB debt, FIUT's PMD,
Enoch Smith Co, and Smith Park Acres loans and the *Ayersw
loan. Enoch Smith will retain whatever liability he now has

f/^^EXHiBtrJj£j£
FOR U>.

b'Z'Xl
KELLY BROWK, NP, CSR. RPR

WITNESS

.

PnUi r^Ar^/y^ce.'

on the $500,000 Enoch Smith Sons Company loan. Dick Smith
will not have personal liability on the "Ayers' debt.
6.

The Enoch Smith Sons Company $500,000 loan will be repayable
by quarterly interest only payments for one year with a due
date in one year at a rate of FIUT's prime rate plus K\ and
prime rate plus 2%\ after default. It will be renewable on
the same terms for an additional year if no default exists.

7.

Smiths to provide Banks with budgets acceptable to banks and
schedule of price listings for lots, including variables for
bulk sales, for Banks' approval. If parties can't agree with
respect to prices, the parties agree to select a mutually
acceptable third party to set prices, considering current
market and need to sell within a relatively short period of
time.

B.

Sales proceeds to be allocated as follows after payment of
commissions: Allowed first trust deeds release prices where
applicable (First Federal and First Security's Gleneagles, and
lot 1765); some allowance for working capital needs; balance
to FZUT and FSB for their agreed pro rata distribution.

9.

Pro 1-afra distribution with FIUT and FSB: Straight pro rata
based on relative total debt for accrued interest (exclusive
of "Ayers" debt): ixincipjil reductions to pay off FSB first,
including the loan under paragraph 2 above, then remainder to
FIUT. Essentially, FIUT subordinates to FSB. The order of
payment of FIUT's loans secured by the blanket mortgage will
be as follows: $100,000 loan to Enoch Smith Co.; $250,000
loan to Smith Park Acres Ranch; $150,000 loan to Weavers
Quality Welding; loans to Park Meadows Investments; "Ayers"
loan. In the event that the Kentucky ranch is sold, the
proceeds will be applied to the extent necessary to pay the
Smith Park Acres loan, with any excess to be considered
proceeds of the blanket mortgage. If assets of Weavers
Quality Welding are sold, the net proceeds will be applied to
that company's loan.

L0. Require retention of professional sales or project manager
either initially or if performance falters.
LI. Banks to be informed of any and all offers, firm or tentative,
to purchase lots, parcels, the whole project, etc.
L2. Banks-will use best efforts to satisfy obligations out of
collateral other than Park City ranch.

-2-

Dismissal of FSB's pending foreclosure action and press
release of game.
Enoch and Dick Smith will subordinate their right as partners
of Park Meadows Investment to receive proceeds from Park
Meadows Mountain to FIUT's "Ayers- loan.
All of the loans to be secured by the blanket mortgage and the
new loan which is provided in paragragh 2 above shall be 18
saonth term loans, with interest payable on a quarterly basis
commencing September 1, 1985, interest accruing at the rate of
%\ above the prime rate of the respective banks. Interest on
"Ayers* loan to be deferred to maturity date. Loan
documentation shall include the agreement and obligation of
Park Meadows Development and the Borrowers to meet agreed
upon dollar volumes of property sales from the Park Meadows
project by agreed upon guideline dates. A failure to meet
those goals will constitute a default under the terms of the
loan documentation, provided however, that a reasonable period
(to be hereafter determined in the reasonable discretion of
the Banks) will be allowed for cure and reinstatement. Cure
end reinstatement will be conditioned upon evidence,
satisfactory to FSB and FIUT that the sales required for
satisfaction of the goals are immediately forthcoming or that
they, in fact, have occurred; and, further, upon reasonable
satisfaction of FSB and FIUT that the reasons for the failure
to meet the goals are not to continue or result in any
substantial likelihood of further defaults and failures. FSB
end FIUT will agree that an additional 18 month term will be
granted so long as the aforesaid sales goals are being met and
no other defaults exist under the loan documents. In this
connection, it is agreed that, net of amounts due to First
Federal on properties on which it maintains 1st priority
encumbrances, all sale proceeds shall be applied as set forth
in the paragraphs above.
If default occurs and is not cured §s provided in paragraph 15
above, interest will accrue at the rate of 2%\ above the
respective prime rates of the respective banks.
Agreed to this 19th day of June, 1985.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A.

By: . ^^T>^ft%^

Richard Smith - fo~r
Park Meadows Investment
fka Park Meadows Development
Enoch Smith Sons Company
Enoch Smith Co.
Smith Park Acres Sane)
Weavers Qualj<r\Weld/ng,

FIRST IWTERSTA
UTAH,

Enoch Smith

0354M

-4^
V
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ADDENDUM XI
AFFIDAVIT OF ENOCH RICHARD SMITH
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Hardin A. Whitney (#3456) and
Jeffrey Robinson (#4129), of
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901
Telephone (801) 521-0250
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vsPARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.,
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT
CO., a Utah partnership,
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II,
MARGARET M. BECKER, VICTOR R.
AYERS, MARION P. AYERS, J. LYNN
DOUGAN, DIANA LADY DOUGAN, and
FIRST SECURETY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a banking corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH

Defendants.
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II,
MARGARET M. BECKER, J. LYNN
DOUGAN and DIANA LADY DOUGAN,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
-vs-

Civil No. 9159
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

ENOCH SMITH, J R . ,
RICHARD SMITH,

and ENOCH

Third-Party

Defendants.

118

ENOCH SMITH, J R . ,
RICHARD SMITH,

and ENOCH

Third-Party Defendants,
-vs-

)
)

)
)

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N-A-, a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff.

)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, having first been duly sworn on his
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

He makes this affidavit on his own personal knowl-

edge and in opposition to plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment.
2.

During the negotiations between Smiths, First

Interstate Bank of Utah (FIBU), and First Security Bank (FSB) in
May and June, 1985, he participated as a representative of
himself, Enoch and Margaret Smith, Park Meadows Development a/k/a
Park Meadows Investment, Enoch Smith Sons Company, and Enoch
Smith Company, Weaver's Quality Welding, and Smith's Park Acres
Ranch.

It was his initial intent to obtain a solution based on

giving FIBU and FSB a deed in lieu of foreclosure for the assets
already having liens to the banks.
Racquet Club.

One of those assets was the

During the negotiations, the banks accepted a

"qualified deed in lieu'1 approach.
3.

In early June, 1985, the focus of the workout

negotiation shifted from "deed in lieu" to discussing the extent
to which FIBU and FSB would release Enoch and Margaret Smith from
the personal liability they had to the banks, so that Enoch and
Margaret Smith could peaceably live out their few remaining years.
4.

As a result of the negotiations in June, 1985, it

was determined that Enoch Smith would only remain liable to FIBU
on his guarantee of the $500,000 loan to Enoch Smith Sons Company.
None of the discussions or negotiations mentioned Enoch Smith
remaining liable on the Racquet Club note.

Enoch Smith was to be

released from all PMD obligations to FIBU and FSB.
5.

It was his understanding that the release and the

workout agreement included the Racquet Club loan, and he understood the phrase "FIUT'S PMD . . . loans" to include the Racquet
Club Note.
6.

Smiths and their related companies performed all the

requirements of the Workout Agreement and no one from FIBU has
requested further performance.

Smiths and their related compa-

nies conveyed 33,641,000 additional collateral, and executed all
documents required of them by FIBU.
7.

In about November or December, 1985, Robert Ward,

Executive Vice President of FIBU, told him not to make any further payments on the Racquet Club Note.
8.

As a partner in PMD, and therefore as an owner of

the Racquet Club, and as one familiar with the Park City real
estate market, Dick Smith formed the opinion that in January,

D6

1i JU
-3-

1986, the Racquet Club had a fair market value in excess of the
unpaid balance on the Racquet Club Note, and if the blanket mortgage had been released, it would have sold for enough to pay off
the unpaid balance of the Racquet Club note; and further that the
value of the Racquet Club on November 9, 1987, was substantially
in excess of the $425,000 bid price received at the sheriff's
sale.
DATED this

/

day of November, 1988.

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
/UlLt^^*^

"Z7-

v^

day of

, 1988.

&

&

•

NOTfiRV PUBLIC > /
Residing a t 2 ^ "

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that on this

/

day of November,

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Enoch

ADDENDUM XII
FIBU JANUARY 24, 1986, LETTER
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Q

First
I Interstate
Mortgage

55 Madison, Suite 5W
P.O. Box 65001
Denver. CO 80206
(303) 399-6699
A subsidiary of
First interstate Bancorp

January 24, 1986

L.iX
J

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Mr. Dick Smith
Park Meadows Racquet Club
1200 Little Kate Road
Park City, UT 84060

RE:

Loan Nos.
Property:

910333, 910343 and 910344
1200 Little Kate Road
Park City, Utah

Dear Mr. Smith:
These loans are in default for failure to pay the December 1, 1985
and the January 1, 1986 mortgage payments. The following amounts
are due in order to bring these loans current.
910333

Loan No.

910343

910344

Dec. Pmt. & late chg.
Jan. Pmt. & late chg.
February payment

$ 4,,665.,74
$ 4,,665.,74
$ ,486. 29

$ 2,038.65
$ 2,038.65
$ 1,960.24

$ 2,548.,29
$ 2,548. 29
$ 2,450. 28

Total

$13,817.77

$ 6,037.54

$ 7,546.86

±

The total amount due, $27,402.17, must be received in our office by
February 7, 1986; if not, the lender vill take the legal actions
available to them under the terms of the loan documents.
Sincerely,

Michael J. Sell
Vice President
Commercial Loan Administration
lvo
cc:

First Interstate Bank of Utah

iLlo

ADDENDUM XIII
SELECTED PAGES FROM J. LYNN DOUGAN DEPOSITION
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8 9 - 1 3

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A. , a Utah corporation,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

^.rf.&fte&T
C i v i l No.

9159

VS.
NO.

PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.,
)
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT
)
CO., a Utah partnership, et al., )
Defendants.

FILED"

)
Clerk of iummiT *~ounry

FREDERICK G. BECKER II, et al.f

)

BY.
Deputy Car*

Thirdl-Party Plaintiffs,

.idV

)

vs• •
ENOCH SMITH, JR., ana
ENOCH RICHART) SMITH,

)
)

Third -Party Defendants.

)

DEPOSITION OF J. LYNN DOUGAN
May 10, 1988

Reported by SUSAN WILCOX KINGSBURY, CSR, RPR
Utah CSR Uc«nta 66. California CSR License 2758

CttlHtod Shorthand Reporters

r*r£s

1

A

No, he did not.

2

Q

Or Enoch or Vic?

3

A

No.

4

Q

So any information you have is simply by rumor?

5

A

Right.

6

Q

After the exchange, did you continue to receive

7

payment notices on the racquet club for a period of time?

8
9

A

No, not to my recollection.

I think — We very

clearly noticed the bank not only were we exchanging our

10

interest but that the Smiths and Park Meadows —

11

Ayers and Park Meadows Development were assuming and paying

12

the loan and they would do so after a date certain.

13

recollection is that we didn't receive any further notices.

14
15

Q

Smiths and

And my

You directed the bank to send the notices someplace

else?

16

A

I would — Yes.

17

Q

Do you remember who you told —

18

A

No.

19

Q

20

A

No.

21

Q

You just remember you told the bank to send the

22

at the bank?

notices elsewhere?

23

A

(Witness indicates by nodding head up and down.)

24

Q

That was a "yes"?

25

A

Yes.

f

That was a "yes."

s£Z^?tC..**;

~-J~C1O*S-;SI<IAC

Never.
2
3

We would have done it in a minute, in a New York
minute.
I just don't understand that.

4
5

Q

You say that neither you nor Lynn, to your

6

knowledge, ever received a call from the bank saying that

7

payments had been missed?

8

A

Never.

9

Q

So you had no knowledge that there was any

10

difficulty there until December of '86 when you had this

11

conversation with Dick Smith; is that correct?

12

A

When the bank said —

When he reported to me that

13

the bank told him to stop making payments on the racquet club.

14

My assumption at the time was the whole deal's gotten worked

15

out, everything is fine, whatever is going to be done is going

16

to be done.

17
18
19

Then the next thing I know is
MR. HANNI:
of '86.

Mr. Becker, you keep talking about December

I think you're off a year.

20

MR. HANNI:

21

Q

—

December of '85?

December of '85.

(By Ms. Wood)

So this conversation occurred in

22

December of '85.

23

was in financial difficulty was that phone call you got in

24

December of '85?

25

A

No.

And the first you understood that Dick Smith

What I said was I didn't think there was

•r

-

yrVi/^

• n ,-.

1

I don't —

2

subsequent to?

Subsequent to the ent- —

The entire period

Is that what your question is?

3

Q

Yes.

4

A

No, I don't have any recollection of any subsequent

5

Subsequent to the consummation of this transaction and the

6

writing of these letters I don't recall any other

7

conversations or correspondence with any of the bankers in

8

connection with this loan.

9
10

Q

Okay.

You have no remembrance of calling up the

bank and saying "Hey, send the notices now on to the Smiths"?

11

A

No, I can't say that I do.

But I certainly can

12

understand that I might have done that if they were still

13

being sent to our offices.

14

Q

And you have those records, and you're going to

15

provide them to us, the records on the notifications you

16

received from the bank with respect to this loan.

17

correct?

18

MR. HANNI:

Wait a minute.

He didn't say he received

19

any.

20

told them to send them to somebody else.

21

implies that he said he received them.

22
23

He said:

MS. WOOD:

Is that

If I did get any I would have called them and
Your question
He didn't say that.

I understand that he didn't.

But since you haven't provided any documents, with

24

respect to payment on the notes, you're going to provide those

25

documents and they will establish where the notices were sent;

Mark that.
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 was
marked for identification.)
Q

(By Ms. Wood)

Ifm handing you what has been marked

as Exhibit 10 and ask you if you can identify that document.
A
whereby —

Yes.
yes —

I believe this is —

this is the document

that we liquidated the corporation and took

title in the racquet club to —

as individuals for tax

reasons.
Q

So originally, if I understand your testimony, the

Park City Racquet Club, a corporation, owned the Park City
Racquet Club; is that correct?
A

I believe it did.

Q

And then with this document, the racquet club was

distributed in undivided one-third interests?
A

To the three shareholders.

X3

To the three shareholders?

A

Yes.

Q

Which would have been Dougan, Ayers and Becker?

A

Right.

Q

What happened to the Park City Racquet Club at that

point?
A

It was liquidated under one of those liquidation

titles when you liquidate a corporation —

30-day liquidation,

I believe.

Certified Shorthand Reporters

7 5

Q

Are there any documents that evidence that

liquidation?
A

Yes.

Q

Who has those documents?

A

I believe that I either have a copy of themf or Ifm

certain that the accountant who performed it did.
Q

And who is the accountant?

A

Ernst & Whinney.

Q

Salt Lake office?

A

No.

Q

And these were your individual accountants?

A

You mean did they do my own work as well as this?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes.

Q

And why was this done?

A

Because we were no longer able to use the

San Jose.

depreciation to offset other income for federal tax purposes.
Q

And so your accountants recommended that you do

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

I'd like to see the documents that dissolve the

this?

corporation.
A

Sure.

Q

I note on the second page of the exhibitf the

bottom paragraph on what is called Exhibit Af that it says

Certified Shorthand Reporters

7 6
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SELECTED PAGES FROM FREDERICK GEORGE BECKER II DEPOSITION
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A
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A. , a Utah corporation,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

C i v i l No. 9159

VS.

PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.,
)
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT
)
CO., a Utah partnership, et al., )
Defendants.

)

FREDERICK G. BECKER II, et al.,

)

N

°F

ILE'D"
NOV 231939

OV

. . . . . .

• • • • •

Dsputy Cerk

Third[-Party Plaintiffs,

)

V£ > •

ENOCH SMITH, JR., and
ENOCH RI CHAREi SMITH,

)
)

Third -Party Defendants.

)

DEPOSITION OF FREDERICK GEORGE BECKER II
May 9, 1988

Reported by SUSAN WILCOX KINGSBURY, CSR, RPR
Utah CSR License 06, California CSR License 2758

Certified Shorthand Reporters

1

I don't —

2

subsequent to?

3
4

I

Subsequent to the ent- —

The entire period

Is that what your question is?

Q

Yes.

A

No, I don't have any recollection of any subsequent

5

Subsequent to the consummation of this transaction and the

6

writing of these letters I don't recall any other

7

conversations or correspondence with any of the bankers in

8

connection with this loan*

9
10

Q

Okay.

You have no remembrance of calling up the

bank and saying "Heyf send the notices now on to the Smiths"?

11

A

No, I can't say that I do.

But I certainly can

12

understand that I might have done that if they were still

13

being sent to our oftices.

14

Q

And you have those records, and you're going to

15

provide them to usf the records on the notifications you

16

received from the bank with respect to this loan.

17

correct?

18

MR. HANNI:

He didn't say he received

19

any.

20

told them to send them to somebody else.

21

implies that he said he received them.

22
23

He said:

Wait a minute.

MS. WOOD:

Is that

If I did get any I would have called them and
Your question

He didn't say that.

I understand that he didn't.

But since you haven't provided any documents, with

24

respect to payment on the notesf you're going to provide those

25

documents and they will establish where the notices were sent;

CV£ZOrtQ*.«r, »*S'GfO/^i/t9»0

1

what went on, I'm sure that there may be some additional

2

things,

3

Q

So essentially you're determined not to pay on this

4

guarantee, and you're looking for reasons why you don't have

5

to; is that correct?

6

A

7

MR. HANNI:

8

Q

9

No.
That's exactly right.

(By Ms. Wood)

Mr. Dougan, when did you first

become aware that the racquet club note was in default?

10

A

When I received the notice of default.

11

Q

By "the notice of default," you mean the notice

12

that the bank sent out prior to instituting foreclosure

13

proceedings on the deed of trust?

14

A

Correct.

15

Q

Do you remember approximately when that was?

16

A

Well, I guess that would have been year-end '85.

17
18
19
20
21

Is that correct?
MR. HANNI:

Or year-end '86.
I don't know.

There

is a copy of it around someplace.
Q

(By Ms. Wood)

What did you do when you received

that notice of default?

22

A

I talked with Becker.

23

Q

What did you say?

24

A

Just made —

25

Don't speculate on it.

Didn't say anything.

aware of the fact that I had received it.

Just made him

ADDENDUM XV
NOTICE OF DEFAULT
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N.A.
E'Jrot I n t e r s t a t e Bank of U
toan Recovery
P . 0 \ Box 30057
Salt Lakja City, Utah 84142-0180

Recorded:
Entry No.:

l-e
«.ary 14, 1986
2^6485

NOTICE OF DEFAULT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVES:
That FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A., (formerly Walker Bank and Trust
Conrpctny}, I s Trustee under a Trust Deed dated
fv^mh^ n
19 78
,
CDODCUtod b y

Vnck

City

K.ic<pu*i Clul> t

;i

l i i n h Corpor.-t t ! on

. as Trustor(s) to secure certain
obligations In favor of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH. N.A., as taneficiary,
recorded
fw,.mii..r 1?
, 19 78 , as Entry No. 1S16S7
In Book
M.174
at Page r,iuriir,
of the Official Records of the County Recorder
mr County, Utah, describing land therein as:
of
/MW'ffli '

SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE "A"

Said obligations Include a note for the principal sura of 3 800,000.00
.
The beneficial Interest under such Deed of Trust and the obligations secured
thereby are now owned and held by FIHST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH. N- A.
.
A breach of and default in the obligations for which ouch Deed of Trust Is
secured has occured In that payment has not be*n made for the following:
Mort>;.i»;c payments due December lf 1985 through February lf 1986, plua late
cli«ir>;w.s <*nd lorcclosurc costs lo dace.
TOTAL AMDUNT DUE 3

27.902.17

By reason of such default, the Trustee under said Deed of Trust, does hereby
declare all sums secured thereby immediately due and payable and has elected and
does elect to causa the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
secured thereby. Dated this 10th day of February , 19 86 .
TRUSTEE:

FIRST INTERSTATE BASK OF UTAH, N.A.

r'^^

BY: ^
DONN CLARKIN
Assistant Vice President
(801) 264-5766
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
19 86 , personally appeared before ne.
Or\ t h i s IQth
day Of F e b r u a r y
Donn Clarkln, who being by me duly sworn did say for hloself, that, the said Donn
Clarkln is Assistant Vice President of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK 0? UTAH, H.A.. as
Trustee, with full auttorlty of resolution of Its Board of Directors end said
Donn Clarkin acknowledged to me that oa^d corporation executed the saoo as such
Trustee.

My Camvlssicn Expires

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in S a l t Lake City, Utah

!

ADDENDUM XVI
AFFIDAVIT OF J. LYNN DOUGAN

A56

Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327
Mack J. Taylor, #4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Becker and Dougan
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,

)

N.A., a Utah Corporation,

)

Plaintiff,

)

-vsPARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.,
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT
CO., a Utah partnership,
FREDERICK G. BECKER, III,
MARGARET M. BECKER, VICTOR R.
AYERS, MARION P. AYERS, J. LYNN
DOUGAN, DIANA LADY DOUGAN, and
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a banking corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FREDERICK G. BECKER, III,
MARGARET M. BECKER, J. LYNN
DOUGAN and DIANA LADY DOUGAN,

)
)
)

Third-Party Plaintiffs,
-vsENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH
RICHARD SMITH,

)

Civil No. 9159

)

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

}
)

-1 -

AFFIDAVIT OF
J. LYNN DOUGAN

Third-Party Defendants.

ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH
RICHARD SMITH,
Third-Party Defendants,
vs.
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff.

J. Lynn Dougan, having first been duly sworn on his
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That he is a defendant in the present lawsuit, and

makes this affidavit based on his own personal knowledge.
2.

He received the statutory notice of default

pertaining to the Racquet Club note shortly after the date of
postmark, February 21, 1986. A true and correct copy of the
notice of default with envelope is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.

He obtained a title report on the Racquet Club

property, effective March 20, 1986, from Summit County Title
Company.

A true and correct copy of the title report is attached

hereto as Exhibit B.
4.

J. Lynn Dougan and Fredrick G. Becker III were

willing and able to cure the default on the Racquet Club note in
the first months of 1986, and would have done so if they had

ii'Jo
D6

-2-

received timely notice of the default from First Interstate Bank
of Utah, if the collateral for the Racquet Club had not been
substantially impaired by the blanket mortgages and bankruptcy
proceedings disclosed in Summit County Title Company's letter
report, and if their subrogation and indemnity rights against
Park Meadows Development and its partners Enoch Smith, Dick
Smith, and Vic Ayers had not been substantially destroyed by the
acts of First Interstate Bank of Utah.
5.

The Racquet Club property had a fair market value in

excess of the unpaid balance of the Racquet Club note in the
first months of 1986.
DATED this

day of November, 1988.

J. LYNN DOUGAN

WASHINGTON
DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA

)
: SS.
)

On the

day of

, 1988 personally

appeared before me J. LYNN DOUGAN, the signer of the foregoing
Affidavit, who duly acknowledged to me that he signed the same
and that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of his

1 .i U ^
D6
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information, knowledge and belief.

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

day of November,

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of J.
Lynn Dougan was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Brent v. Manning
Mary Anne Q. Wood
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Kent H. Murdock
Enid Greene
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant First Security Bank
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David R. Olsen
SUITER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Victor R. Ayers
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1680

1 .uU
D6

-4-

Hardin A. Whitney
Jeffrey Robinson
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901

D6-AFFIDll/7/88bc

D6

1 -U-fi-

rven i^^v-w* ^^*~^*

i n o t I n t e r s t a t e Bank of U ^t N.A.
c a n Recovery
.0'. E^xx 30057
a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84142-O180

[

Recorded:
Entry N o . :

I-

uary 14, 1986

24,485

NOTICE OF DEFAULT
CTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN:
That FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N . A . , ( f o r m e r l y Walker Dank and Trust
JorrTpuny), i s T r u s t e e under a T r u s t Deed d a t e d
rv>^mh^ n
, 19_2S
t
DOOCUtod b y

l'.trk

City

k.iCfpifl

Club.

:i t ' l n h C(>ri>or.i( t o n

, as Trustor(s) to secure certain
obligations in favor of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A., as taneflciary,
recorded
tw,-mlj.-r l?
, 19 7H , as Entry No. 1S16S7
in Boole
M,I?6
at Page r,"n-r, V>
of the Official Records of the County Recorder
3f
f County, Utah, describing land therein as:
l/lUIIfflL'

SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE "AM

Said obligations include a note for the principal sura of 3 800,000,00
.
The beneficial interest under such Deed of Trust and the obligation secured
thereby are now owned and held by FIKST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH. N, A.
A broach of and default in the obligations for which ouch Deed of Trust is
secured has occured in that payment has not be«i made for the following:
. Mort>;.i>;c pnyments due December 1, 1985 through February 1, 1986f plus late
charges and foreclosure costs to date.
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE 3

27.902,17

By reason of such default, the Trustee under said Deed of Trust, does hereby
declare ail annas secured thereby Immediately due and payable and has elected and
does elect to cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obllcttlora
secured thereby. Dated this 10th
day of February , 19 86 .
TRUSTEE:

FIRST INTERSTATE BANX OF UTAH, N.A.

BY:^
f\$4*«lDONN CIARKIN
Assistant Vice President
(801) 264-5766
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
, 19 86
personally appeared before me,
On this lQth
day of February
Dcnn Clarlcin, who being by ca duly sworn did say for himself, that, the said Dann
Clarkin is Assistant Vice President of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK 0? UTAH, N.A., as
Trustee, with full authority of resolution of its Board of Directors and said
Dcnn Clarkln acknowledged to me that oa^d corporation executed the saao as such
Trustee.

My CcnrrUoslcn Expires

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah

i v U U*
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First Interstate Bank
of Utah, N.A.
Loan Recovery
Sail lake City, UT 84142-0180

.MP** !
Diana Lady Dougan
7. Dougan & Associates
1220 South 1300 East, Suite #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

UMIMI,.IM.HUMMIIM,MIU

First Interstate Bank
of Utah, N.A.
Loan Recovery
Salt Lake City. UT 84142-0180

A

J. Lynn Dougan
7. Dougan & Associates
2120 South 1300 East, Suite #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

v
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ADDENDUM XVII
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
APRIL 19, 1989

A64

UKlblNAI.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1
2

,.<£.# v*^V
/ /}(s>

3
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF
4 UTAH, N.A.,

Civil No, 9159
Plaintiff,

5
6

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
OF PROCEEDINGS
(MOTIONS)

vs.

7 PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.
aka PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT
8 CO., a Utah Partnership,
et al,
9
Defendants.
10

r**^
*" i i'$:§

a,i e r k j ' ^ r t C u 4
BY.
°^Jty C/cV1

11
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
12
3EF0RE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
13
April 19, 1989
14
15
16 For the Plaintiff:
17
18
19
For the Defendants
20 Dougans, Beckers:
21
22

MARY ANNE WOOD
RICHIE HADDOCK
Attorneys at Law
HOLME; ROBERTS & OWEN
50 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
GLENN C. HANNI
VICTORIA K. KIDMAN
Attorneys at Law
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

23
24
25

ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR
License No. 220
240 East 400 South, #A337
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

•<£€

1
2

THE COURT:

This is the time set for hearing the

3

respective motions in the matter of First Interstate Bank

4

of Utah versus Park Meadows Investment Company, et al,

5

case number 9159.

6
7
8
9
10
11

Counsel, state your appearances for the record, if
you will, please.
MS. WOOD:

Mary Ann Wood and Richie Haddock of Holme,

Roberts & Owen on behalf of First Interstate Bank of Utah,
Plaintiff.
MR. HANNI:

Glenn C. Hanni and Vickie Kidman on behalf

12 of the Defendants Beckers and Dougans.
13

THE COURT:

Very well, counsel.

Let me state for the

14 record this matter is being heard in Salt Lake as an
15 accommodation to counsel and the Court, based upon the
16 difficulty we've had in trying to schedule the matter for
17 hearing, and I understand that this is an agreeable time
18 and location to here these respective motions.
19

MR. HANNI:

It is.

20

THE COURT:

M s . Wood?

21

MS. WOOD:

22

THE COURT:

Mr. Hanni?

That's correct, your Honor.
Very well.

I will further state for the

23 record that I have received and reviewed the various memo24 randa filed both in support of and in opposition to the
25 [respective motions, and accordingly will ask you to focus

1 your arguments on your best points.
2

Mr. Hanni, you were first with your filing, so you may

3 proceed with your motion.
4

MS. WOOD:

Your Honor, if we could, your Honor, there

5 is one preliminary matter.

Last week, a week before hearing,

6 Defendants Dougan and Becker filed an affidavit of Lynn
7 Dougan which we believe should be stricken from the record.
8 The affidavit on its face lacks foundation for the allega9 tion.; in the

affidavit.

Also, your Honor, it was filed two

10 and a half months rafter the original motion was filed, a
11 month and a half after the reply brief was filed, and merely
12 a week before this hearing was scheduled, your Honor.
13

Under those circumstances, I -- although I do not think

14 it is dispositive of the Court f s ruling in this case, we
15 believe that to keep the record straight that that affidavit
16 should be stricken.
17

THE COURT:

Do you wish to respond?

18

MR. HANNI:

There was a footnote in the very last

19 brief that the bank filed that said when we made our argument
20 that our statement in our brief that the bank had prepared
21 the promissory note and the guaranty, there was a footnote
22 in the bank's brief that said there's no record citation to
23 that, so we filed a record citation showing from the
24 jdeposition of Linda Frank, who is an assistant vice-president
25 of the bank, that the note and the guaranty were prepared by

1 the bank in fact, and we -- just to supplement that, we
2 filed an affidavit from Dougan to say he didn't prepare them
3
4

MS. WOOD:
says.

Your Honor, that is not what the affidavit

The affidavit says he has personal knowledge that

5 Walker Bank prepared the documents and Linda Frank's affidavili
6 does not state -- I mean, Linda Frank's deposition does not
7 state that Walker Bank prepared the documents in question.
8

As I say, we don't think it's a big issue, but there is

9 no foundation for hiss statement in his affidavit that to his
10 personal knowledge, Walker Bank prepared those documents.
11 There were other parties involved in the negotiations and
12 we frankly don't know who prepared the note in question.
13 We don't think that it is dispositive of this motion, but we
14 do not think that the affidavit shows foundation for the
15 allegations made and it was not filed in a timely manner.
16 They certainly had adequate time to provide record citation
17 for that particular representation in their brief.
18

THE COURT:

Counsel, I have been receiving, over the

19 course of these several months, memoranda in support of and
20 in opposition to the various motions dating all the way from
21 February the 3rd to this morning, this morning being the
22 time I received your, Ms. Wood, supplemental memorandum in
23 [opposition.
24

accordingly, this matter being heard today, I am not

25 (persuaded that it's of such moment that the affidavit you're

1 referring to needs to or should be stricken.

Your request

2 is denied.
3

Mr. Hanni, you may proceed.

4

MR. HANNI:

If it please the Court, I am -- first of

5 all would like to make a motion that all of the depositions
6 in this case be opened and an order entered publishing
7 them.
8

THE COURT:

Is there objection to the motion to

9 publish the depositions, counsel?
10

MS. WOOD:

11

THE COURT:

Very well.

12

MR. HANNI:

Your Honor, I, having appeared before you

No, your Honor.

13 many times, am fully aware of the fact that you f ve read
14 all those briefs, so I do not intend to get into a detailed
15 discussion of all the cases, nor of all the facts.

I would

16 like to zero in on just a few fundamental facts and then tell
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the Court basically whet our position is.
As your Honor knows, Park City Racquet Club was the
original maker of the note that is involved in this lawsuit
when it borrowed $800,000 from Walker Bank in 1978, and at
the same time, on the same day Beckers and Dougans signed
the guaranty which is physically a part of the note.
Another fact that is admitted and is not in dispute
is that in May of 1982 the Racquet Club Corporation conveyed
its interest in the Racquet Club property to its three

1 shareholders and officers and directors, Dougan, Becker
2 and Ayers, and as a part of that, Dougan, Becker and Ayers
3 assumed the obligation of the Racquet Club note and thereby
4

stepped into the shoes of Park City Racquet Club as a

5 maker of that note, so basically what we've got here, your
6
7

Honor, is a promissory note and we've got a guarantor.
Now, a guarantor, as we know, undertakes, if the maker

8

of the note doesn't perform, to pay the note according to its

9

tenor, according to its terms.

10

Now, what are the terms of this note?

11 $800,000.

Two, it's an installment note.

One, it's for
Three, it calls

12 for interest at 11 percent; and four, it says this note can
13 not be accelerated by the holder without giving 15 days
14 written notice of the intent to accelerate.
15

Now, that's the kind of a obligation that Beckers and

16 Dougans guaranteed.

That's what they said they would pay

17 if the maker didn't do it.

We take the position in this case

18 that the bank had an obligation, and there are three basic
19 points.

One is it's undisputed that notice v/as not given

20 to the Racquet Club, Park City Racquet Club Corporation,
21 who is the initial maker.

It is undisputed that the

22 alleged notice that they were going to accelerate was not
23 given to Dougan and Becker who were makers of that note, and
24 in that connection, your Honor, we ought to pause just for
25 a moment and observe that the bank, as part of its argument

1 in this case, has said not only is Dougan and Becker liable
2 to us because they 1 re guarantors, but they're liable to us
3 because they acquired title in May of 1982 to the Racquet
4 Club itself and because as a part of that, they assumed the
5 obligation of the Racquet Club note and agreed to pay it,
6 which is true, and they say that they are obligated to the
7 bank independent, based on that assumption, from their
8 obligation as guarantors, and we admit that.

There's no

9 question about it.
10

But having said that, they step into the shoes of

11 the maker and as such, they had an absolute right to be given
12 notice as a condition precedent to the bank exercising its
13 right of acceleration.
14 dispute.
15

It's without question.

It's not in

They did not get that notice.

Now, we have a third point, and the third point is that

16 the note and the guaranty should be construed together, and
17 if they are construed together, then the bank was obligated
18 to give Dougans and Beckers notice, their 15 days notice,
19 before they accelerated in their capacity as guarantors, and
20 it is without dispute that they did not do that.
21

Now, how does the bank try to get around that undis-

22 puted fact?

The only way it tries to get around it is to

23 point to the deposition testimony of Lynn Dougan and that
24 deposition testimony is quoted verbatim in our brief, and
25 in that testimony Dougan was asked the question, well, after

1 you sold to Park Meadows, did you tell the bank to send the
2 payment notices to Park Meadows?
3
4

And Dougan said yes, they assumed -- Park Meadows and
all of its partners assumed the Racquet Club note and they

5 were responsible for those payments from that time on, and if
6

you read that testimony, there isn't any question but what

7

Dougan was talking about the payment notices, the notices

8

that the mortgage company sends for their monthly install-

9 ments.

He was not, your Honor, talking about another

10 notice that is given in a different paragraph that's
11 referred to in a different paragraph of the note, which is
12 the 15-day acceleration notice.

There isn ! t any doubt.

13 He did not say to the bank, "All notices, any notice of
14 acceleration should be sent to Park Meadows, not to us."
15 He was talking about the monthly payments.
16

Now, the only other way now that the bank tries to

17 get around their admitted failure to give notice is to point
18 to the fact that the Racquet Club was dissolved in May of
19 1982 and they did that belatedly.

I got it at 5:30 last

20 night, and your Honor got it this morning, and the clear
21 import of the letter of counsel is that the bank's counsel
22 didn't know anything about that, the Racquet Club dissolution,
23 until they got the documents from us yesterday, and that
24 just isn't so.
25

I'm going to file a short reply to that thing I was

8

1 served with last night and that your Honor got this
2 morning, because in Becker's deposition that was taken in
3 May of 1988, almost a year ago, he was specifically asked
4 what happened to the Racquet Club, and he said, "It was
5 dissolved."
6

And he was asked, "Have you got the dissolution

7 papers?"
8

And he said, "Yes."

9

Those papers, your Honor, are a matter of record.

10 They're up there at the Capitol and counsel could have
11 gotten them.

They're a matter of public record and all that

12 counsel had to do was ask for them.

This point wasn't even

13 raised in their first brief and if they v/ere going to raise
14 it, they certainly should have raised it at that time, not
15 belatedly 5:30 in the evening before we're going to argue
16 today, but the thing I'd like to focus on, your Honor, is that)
17 the Utah Supreme Court in three different cases, Stallion
18 Music and in Williamson -- two cases -- Supreme Court, Court
19 of Appeals in Stacey Properties has talked about this
20 acceleration clause, and the Supreme Court as well as the
21 Court of Appeals in those three cases point out the fact
22 that acceleration is kind of like a forfeiture.
23 a favorite of the law.

It's not

It's something that will be enforced

24 but if you're going to expect it to be enforced, you've got
25 to follow it very strictly, and if you tried to -- if you

1

fail to follow that, what the instrument itself says, you

2

don't effectively accelerate, and that f s exactly what

3 happened in this case.
4

First of all, the people that were entitled

to notice,

5

the Racquet Club itself, the maker, original maker, Dougan

6

and Becker as makers when they assumed it, and Dougan and

7

Becker in their third capacity as guarantors

8

never did get notice.

9

Park Meadows.

10
11

admittedly

The only one that got the notice was

Now, your Honor, if you look at what the Supreme
Court says in those cases and what the Court of Appeals

12 very recently said in Stacey Properties, they say accelera13 tion is like a forfeiture.

it's not a favorite of the law,

14 and if you're going to rely on an acceleration, you're going
15 to have to do it strictly and if you don't do it, you fail.
16 Now, that's point one.
17

The next thing that we have to look at here, your

18 Honor, is that the deed from the Racquet Club to Dougan,
19 Becker and Ayers where they assumed that obligation and
20 agreed to pay it was executed in May of 1982.

It was

21 recorded May 20th, 1982, up in the Summit County.

The bank

22 knew that Dougan and Becker had acquired title to the Racquet
23 Club and that's in 1982.

Because they consented to that --

24 and I want to call your Honor's attention to that fact becausd
25 Exhibit 7, attached to the bank's brief, is the consent and

10

1 I specifically call that to your Honor's attention because
2 it clearly says -- this is a document signed by the bank,
3 Surety Life and First Federal -- clearly says that the
4 bank consents to J. Lynn Dougan and Frederick G. Becker the
5 Second for them to exchange their interest in the Racquet
6 Club for some other things with Park Meadows Development
7 Company, so they actually
8

knew that this happened.

Another thing, your Honor, Title 16, Chapter 10 of the

9 Utah Code specifically provides that if you're going to
10 dissolve a corporation on a voluntary basis, the directors
11 and the officers, you've got to make provision to see to it
12 that all the debts of the corporation are paid or adequately
13 provided for.

Section 16-10-82 of the Code specifically

14 says it's a statutory mandate that if you're going to
15 voluntarily dissolve, you're going to give notice to all
16 your creditors that that's what you're doing so that they
17 can be sure you don't get your dissolution until you've
18 either paid all the debts or made adequate provision therefor,,
19 and that's exactly why Dougan and Becker assumed the obliga20 tion, to make adequate provision for the Racquet Club note
21
22

and that's why they stepped into the shoes of the maker, and
I just say, your Honor, if the bank is going to rely on the

23 fact that they assumed and that they're liable to the bank
24 on this note because of that assumption, independent of the
25 guaranty, then they certainly are entitled, they're not just

11

1

saddled with all of the obligations, they're entitled to

2

all of the rights, and one of the rights of the maker is to

3

receive that 15 days notice before anybody can accelerate.

4

Your Honor, we've got another point here that we ought

5

to talk about.

6

this case.

1

obligated to do it, and if it didn't do it, the result is to

8

discharge the guarantor.

9

I think what I've said is dispositive of

The bank admittedly did not give notice.

It was

Now, the case, your Honor, that deals with that

10 problem, and I think it's a controlling case in Utah, it's
11

a Court of Appeals decision, it's the American Bonding case

12 which we have cited in our brief.

That was a case where a

13 fellow by the name of Nelson and his wife Maureen were -14 Nelson was in a business and he required a surety company to
15 put up

a series of bonds for him on various construction

16 jobs that he was getting, and he and his wife signed as
17

indemnitors and said to the surety company, "Look, if you get

18 called on any claims on any of these bonds, we'll indemnify
19 you against any loss," and the significant part of that
20 case, your Honor, is this.

There were two provisions in it.

21 One said that the indemnitors, Nelson and his wife, waived
22 all notices of any kind, including the default of the maker
23 of the note or the fact that there had been any claims made
24 against the bank.

I didn't mean maker of the note.

I mean

25 waived notice of the fact that claims had been made against

12

1 the bond.

Now, that's right in the indemnity agreement, and

2 generally speaking, that's the end of the story if you've
3 got that kind of a specific provision in the instrument
4

itself-

But in that same instrument there was a provision

5 that the indemnitors, if there was a claim made against the
6 bond, they had a right to require the surety to litigate that
7 before they'd be called on to pay.
8

Now, the court, the trial court said here you've got

9 two provisions that are in irreconcilable conflict.

One

10 says on the one hand chat you waived that kind of notice if
11 there's a claim against the bond.

The other one says that

12 if there is a claim, you've got a right to require the surety
13 to litigate it.
14

Now, how are you going to require, be able to exercise

15 that right unless you're given adequate notice?

The trial

16 court said -- and actually, in that case, your Honor, it's
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

a pretty strong case, there was actual notice went out to the
indemnitors, but it just wasn't adequate, wasn't adequate
to put them on notice that claims had actually been made
against the bond .so that Mrs, Nelson could intelligently
exercise her right to decide whether she'd require that
surety to litigate or not, so the court, trial court, held
the fai.lu:,"n to give that notice -- and that's American
Bonding again -- was fatal and that Mrs. Nelson was discharged as a result of the failure to give notice.

JJ-

1

Now, that's exactly the kind of situation that we've

2 got here, your Honor.

It was a condition precedent to the

3 bank's right to accelerate that note that it give a 15-day
4

notice, give them that much time to cure and bring up the

5 installments that were in arrears as a condition to
6 exercising the right to accelerate.
7

Now, when you take what the Supreme Court said in

8 Williamson and in Stallion Music, and when you take what the
9 Court of Appeals said in Stacey Properties about how we
10 view the acceleration clause as being not something that is
11 a favorite in the law, and if you take what the Court of
12 Appeals said in American Bonding where it said if you don't
13 give notice to these indemnitors and the indemnitor's sort
14 of like a guarantor or a surety, you're called on to pay if
15 somebody else has to pay, and if you don't give that kind of
16 a notice, it results in a discharge.
17

Now, that's where we are, your Honor, and if we go one

18 step further, now, we do have the note that clearly
19 provides for the 15-day notice as a condition to acceleration,
20 You do have the guaranty which is a physical part of the
21 note.

The guaranty itself refers to the note.

In our brief

22 we've cited two or three cases where if you've got two
23 different instruments that are executed at the same time and
24 that refer to each other, that you construe them together.
25 You don't even need to reach that point, however, your Honor,

14

1 because the first two points, there isn't any doubt about
2 them.

The record is also clear here that the bank prepared

3 these, the note and the guaranty, and the general rules of
4

construction are that if there's any ambiguity, why, you

5

construe it against the one that prepared them.

The bank

6 has not come forward with anything in this record that says
7

they didn't prepare them.

8

in a footnote is that we didn't give a record citation when

The only thing the bank has said

9 we made the statement in our brief that the bank did pay -10 or did prepare them, so what we are urging your Honor to do
11 is construe these two together and so you've got three
12 different bases for finding that the bank did not perform the
13 condition precedent; one, didn't give notice to the Racquet
14 Club itself, the original maker; two, it didn't give notice
15 to Becker and Dougan when they assumed the obligations of
16 the note; and three, didn't give notice to Becker and Dougan
17 in their capacity as guarantors as they were required to do
18 if you construe the note and the guaranty together.
19
20
21
22

Now, we submit, your Honor, based on that that the
bank's acceleration was absolutely and totally in violation
of what the Supreme Court has said you have to do if you're
going to exercise your right to accelerate, and the

result

23 of that, if you don't meet the condition precedent as
24 American Bonding teaches us, is that discharges the guarantor
25

from any and all liability, and we submit, your Honor, that

15

1

the motion for summary judgment should be granted.

2

Thank you.

3

THE COURT:

4

Ms. Wood?

5

MS. WOOD:

All right, Mr. Hanni, thank you.

Thank you.

Your Honor, Defendants Dougan

6

and Becker move for summary judgment alleging, and as Mr.

7

Hanni has argued, that First Interstate Bank of Utah failed t

8

properly accelerate the Racquet Club note because it failed

9

to give notice to the proper parties.

10

In response, First Interstate Bank of Utah has itself

11

moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration of this

12

Court, based on the undisputed facts and the clear note of

13

the clear law that the note was properly accelerated.

14

Although there are facts clearly in dispute between

15

the parties, the facts required to grant the motion which

16

First Interstate Bank of Utah has brought are undisputed

17

and this Court can properly conclude as a matter of law that

18

First Interstate Bank of Utah properly accelerated the

19

Racquet Club note.

20

In any event, the factual disputes between the parties

21

preclude the relief of which Defendants Dougan and Becker

22

seek today.

23

and there's been enough paper filed in this case to fell a

24

Lree of some considerable size, so I'll try not to duplicate

It's clear your Honor has read the documents

25 what we have obviously exhaustively argued in our briefs,

16

1

but I would like to emphasize some of the undisputed facts

2

and the law we think which is critical and which mandates

3

the relief which First Interstate Bank of Utah seeks.

4

5
6

It's clear that in December 1978 Park City Racquet
Club, Inc., a corporation, obtained an $800,000 loan from
I Walker Bank and executed a note, a copy of which is attached

7

to several of the pleadings and I assume your Honor has

8

before you; if not, I have a copy of it.

The note was

9 secured by a deed of trust on the Park City Racquet Club.
10 The note was personally guaranteed by six individuals:
11 Frederick Becker, Margaret Becker, Victor Ayers, Marion P.
12 Ayers, J. Lynn Dougan and Diane Dougan.
13

Two paragraphs of the note and the attached guaranty

14 we think are critical to the Court's resolution of this
15 issue.

The first -- the paragraphs are not numbered, but I

16 call your attention, your Honor, and I will come back to it
17 later in argument, to the second full paragraph on page 2
18 of the note which sets forth the obligation of "irst
19
20
21
22

Interstate Bank of Utah to provide 15 days notice to the
undersigned or the maker of the note prior to accelerating
the note.

I should also point out in that paragraph that

at the bottom of that paragraph it says that, "As used herein,

23 (written notice shall be effective as of the time the same is
24 deposited in the United States Mail addressed to the last
25

[known address of the undersigned, or at the time of actual

17

1 receipt thereof, if earlier.
2

I then call your Honor's attention to the first full

3 paragraph on page 3 in which the makers, sureties, guarantors J
4

and endorsers waive demand, notice of protest, notice of

5 dishonor and notice of nonpayment.
6

I call your attention

to the fact that the note is signed by the Park City Racquet

7 Club Corporation by its president, and then following that
8

signature is the guaranty which states, "For good and

9 valuable consideration the receipt and sufficiency of
10 which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and
11

severally guarantee payment of the promissory note

12 by the deed of trust and further guarantee

secured

payment of the

13 entire indebtedness evidenced thereby and the deed of trust
14 securing the same."
15

I should point out an inaccuracy in Mr. Hanni's

16 representation of this guaranty.

This is not a suretyship.

17 This is not an obligation to perform according to the terms
18 of the note.

It's an obligation to perform if there is a

19

default.

20

They are guarantees and six separate individuals, different

21

and distinct from the Park City Racquet Club Corporation

22

signed the guaranty.

23

They are not indemnitors.

They are not sureties.

On May 19th, 1982, the Park City Racquet Club

24

transferred undivided one-third itnerests in the Racquet

25

Club to Becker, Dougan and Ayers and the transfer was made

18

1

subject to a loan in favor of Walker Bank and Trust Company.

2

Mr. Hanni, once again, called your Honor's attention to

3 Exhibit 7 of our brief stating that it shows that the bank
4

approved of this transfer.

5

is a consent to exchange dealing with yet another assumption

6

of this obligation.

7

been unable to locate any written agreement by the bank to

8

the transfer of the Racquet Club from the corporation to the

9

individual shareholders, but the transfer was made and the

10
11

This is not the case.

Exhibit 7

In fact, as Mr. Hanni knows, we have

shareholders assumed the obligation.
Then later in August of 1982 Becker and Dougan

12 exchanged their interests in the Racquet Club for certain
13

lots in Park Meadows Development and to a partnership

14 called Park Meadows Development and it is alleged by these
15 parties and not disputed for purposes of this motion that
16

Park Meadows Development assumed the obligations of the

17

Racquet Club note.

18

By letter dated January 24th, 1986, and a copy of that

19

letter is attached to Mr. Hanni f s brief as well as ours and

20

I have a copy of it, First Interstate Bank of Utah notified

21

Enoch Richard Smith, a partner of Park Meadows Development,

22

that the note was in default and that unless the defaults

23 were cured within 15 days, that First Interstate Bank of
24 Utah would take all legal action available to them, which
25

included acceleration of the note.

i q

1

The parties do not dispute, and I quote from Mr,

2

Hanni's brief in this regard, that it is certainly the

3 position of Dougans and Beckers that Park Meadows Development
4

was in place of the maker and had the rights and duties of

5 J a maker and that the reference to Park Meadows Development
as a holder was an inadvertent clerical error,
7 I

It is undisputed, your Honor, that the maker of the

8 I note at the time of the default was Park Meadows Development
9 land that First Interstate Bank of Utah gave notice to that
10 individual who was standing in the shoes of the maker.
On February 10th, 1986, 17 days after notifying Park
12 Meadows Development of its default, First Interstate Bank of
13 Utah executed a statutory notice of default which formally
14 accelerated the obligations on the Park Meadows -- on the
15 Park City Racquet Club note and that particular notice of
16 default went out to all interested parties, including all
17 of the guarantors here.
18

It is undisputed, your Honor, that under state law

19 and the citation to the statutory reference in that regard
20 is contained in our brief and I won't belabor your Honor
21 with it, but that for a period of 90 days thereafter of the
22 statutory notice of default, any of these parties would
23 have had the opportunity to come in, pay the amount that was
24 then due, and to reinstate the note according to the terms.
25 Nobody came forward and offered to reinstate the Park City

20

1 Racquet Club note.
Under these facts, the sole issue before this Court

2
3 is

whether First Interstate Bank of Utah properly gave

4 notice to the parties entitled to notice prior to the
5 acceleration of the note.

The inescapable conclusion is

6 that they did so.
7

Let me call your attention back to the Park City

8 Racquet Club note, your Honor, and in paragraph 2 on page 2 it|
9 specifically provides that notice is to be given to the
10 undersigned when a default has occurred and without belaboring
11 this argumnent by reading the entire terms, it also says that
12 without further notice, the holder can then exercise the
13 rights available to him under the note, including the right
14 to accelerate, so the only obligation which First Interstate
15 Bank of Utah had at the time it accelerated this note was
16 to give notice to the maker.

It is undisputed that the

17 maker at the time of the default was Park Meadows Development,
18 not Park City Racquet Club, not Defendants Dougan and
19 Becker, although they from time to time had assumed the
20 obligations and stood in that position and could still be
21 liable for the obligations under the Park City Racquet Club
22 note.
23

THE COURT:

Well, you're not suggesting, are you, that

24 Park Meadows Development was the original signatory on the
25 note, are you?

21

1

M S . WOOD:

No.

I'm saying because by virtue of the

2 assignment they stood in the shoes of the maker and, your
3 Honor, this is -- that is simple hornbook contract law that
4

when there is an assignment of an obligation, an assignment

5

of all the unperformed obligations and an assignment of all

6

the rights and by accepting the -- assuming the Park City

7

Racquet Club note and accepting an assignment from Dougan

8

and Becker, they stood in the shoes of the maker.

9

There is no question, although Defendants Dougan and

10 Becker have raised questions throughout this brief, as to
1
11 who Undersigned is with respect to the note, and I invite

12 your Honor to read the note.

It uses the word

13 in virtually every paragraph of the note.

"undersigned"

"The undersigned

14 promises and agrees to pay."
15

"The undersigned shall have the opportunity to prepay.

16

In the last paragraph of the note, the -- immediately

17 following the last paragraph of the note, the undersigned
18 is clearly the Park City Racquet Club, a corporation.
19 individual guarantors do not sign under the note.

The

Instead,

20 they sign under the guaranty and it states in the guaranty,
21

"For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and

22 sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned
23 jointly and severally guarantee payment of the promissory
24 note," and then the individuri signatures of the guarantors
25 follow the guaranty, but there is no

question that the

22L

1

undersigned throughout the note refers to the maker of the

2

note.

3

Despite that fact, Defendants Dougan and Becker argue

4

that there is an ambiguity and that somehow the undersigned

5

refers not to the maker of the note when used in the note,

6

but refers to the guarantors themselves.

7

ever, your Honor, that a guaranty obligation is separate

8

and apart from the obligation under a note.

9

parties executed the notes, they had different rights and

10 obligations.
11

It is clear, how-

Different

The guarantor, the guarantors on the other

hand, took on themselves separate obligations.

They were

12 not entitled to the rights and duties of the maker at the
13 time the note was executed.
14

You have two separate groups of people:

Park City

15 Racquet Club, who was the maker of the note, the individual
16 guarantors who guaranteed the obligation.
17 the face of the document.
18 maker?

That's clear on

So the question is, who was the

Who stood in the shoes of the maker on the day that

19 the default occurred?
20
21

Defendants Dougan and Becker assert quite vociferously,
and we do not dispute for purposes of this motion, that the

22 Park City Racquet Club note was assumed on two different
23 occasions.

It was assumed first by Defendants Dougan and

24 Becker themselves, and then it was assigned to and assumed
25 by Park Meadows Development.

Consequently, as Dougans and

23

1

Beckers concede and as I read in their brief, the maker of

2

the note, the individual staying in the position of the

3

maker of the note the date of default was not Park City

4

Racquet Club, was not Defendants Dougan and Becker them-

5

selves, but was Park Meadows Development.

6

According to the Restatement of Contracts, Section

7

323, unless the language or the circumstances indicate,

8

to the contrary, an assignment for security, an assignment

9

of all the contract, or of all rights under the contract,

10

or an assignment of the same in general terms is an

11

assignment of the assignor's rights and a delegation of

12

his unperformed duties under the contract.

13

When Park City Racquet Club assigned the note to

14 Dougans and Beckers, the Dougans and Beckers became the
15 maker and if the world had stopped on that date, there is
16 no question that if the bank had received adequate notice,
17 which there f s a question of whether or not they did, they
18 would bo obligated to provide notice to Dougans and
19 Beckers.
20
21
22

However, the world did not freeze at that moment.
Dougans and Beckers in turn assigned the Park City Racquet
Club note to Park Meadows Development and at that time,

23 according to the restatement, they assigned all of their right)
24 under the contract, which included the right to receive noticj
25

As a result, once a party to a contract has notice

24

1 that his counterpart has assigned its rights, that party
2 must perform its obligations only to the counterpart assignee
3 First Interstate Bank of Utah would itself have been in
4 difficulty if instead of giving notice to the party it had
5 notice had become the maker, Park Meadows Development, it
6 had instead had given that notice to Park City Racquet Club
7 Corporation or to the Dougans and Beckers.
8

The argument which Mr. Hanni has made today would

9 multiply the obligations of an obligor under a contract
10 simply by virtue of an assignment and the law is quite clear
11 and we have cited cases to that effect in our brief, that
12 you can not by virtue of assignment multiply the obligations
13 of an obligor under the contract.
14

Let me just take an example which will show the

15 illogic of Mr. Hanni f s position.

If instead of there

16 having been three assignments and assumptions there had
17 been ten in this case, then their logic would be that the
18 bank would have an obligation to give notice of default to
19 eleven former obligors under the note rather than simply to
20 the last one.

That is clearly not the law.

By virtue of

21 the assignment which Defendants Dougan and Becker themselves
22 were the impetus for, they can not require the bank to give
23 notice more than once.

The bank is only obligated to give

24 notice to the person standing in the shoes of the maker at
25 the date the default occurred and that is exactly what

-25-

1 happened.
2

Now, unfortunately, one of the things that happens

3 when you assume an obligation is that you nev^r really get
4

rid of it.

You can assign your rights under a contract and

5 your unperformed duties, but if the party to whom you assign
6

them, in the absence of a novation, does not perform, then

7 you are still required to step up to the plate and perform an<p
8

that is the position which Dougans and Beckers are in and

9

that, once again, is simply hornbook contract law dealing

10 with the nature of an assumption and with the nature of
11 assignments.
12

Dougans and Beckers, when they took the assumption*

13 from the corporation, promised to pay the bank the obligation^
14 Now they assigned the unperformed obligations and their
15 rights under the contract to Park Meadows Development, but
16 when Park Meadows Development did not perform, then, unfor17 tunately, Dougans and Beckers are still separately liable
18 on their assumption agreement in addition to their guaranty,
19 but that's not dispositive of this motion today.
20

The significant thing for purposes of this motion today

21 is that the bank provided notice, the written notice required
22 by the note to the maker, the person who stood in the shoes of\
23 the maher,
24

on the date that the default occurred.

Now, let's then turn to the issue of whether these

25 parties, Dougan and Becker, were entitled not as makers of

26

1 the note but as guarantors of the note, to notice.

It's

2 hornbook law that a guaranty is a contract and that obliga3 tions of the guarantor are to be interpreted according to
4 the terms of the contract, the guaranty itself.

Notice of

5 the maker's default is not required unless?; the terms of the
6 guaranty require that notice.
7

Let f s turn again to the terms of the guaranty which

8 are contain J on page 3 of the note and the guaranty.

"For

9 good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency
10 of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and
11 severally guarantee payment of the promissory note secured
12 by the deed of trust and further guarantee payment of the
13 entire indebtedness evidenced thereby and the deed of trust
14 securing the same."
15

Nowhere in that unconditional guaranty do Dougans and

16 Beckers reserve for themselves the right to receive notice
17 of the maker's default.

In the absence of a contract term

18 entitling them to notice, they, the bank, was not required
19 to give them notice as guarantors.
20

To the extent that the note Itself addresses the

21 (question of notice to the guarantors, it likewise does not
22 prequire notice because the first paragraph on the last page
23 pf the note says, "The makers, sureties, guarantors and
24 Endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment,
25 protest, demand, notice of protest, notice of dishonor and
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1 notice of nonpayment."
2

Now, all

of those terms prior to notice of nonpayment

3 have very special meanings within the law that do not
4 include this notice of right to cure or notice of default,
5 but if notice of nonpayment means anything, it means notice
6 that your obligor has not paid under the obligation and that'f
7 precisely what happened in this case.
8

The individuals to whom the Racquet Club and Dougans

9 and Beckers assigned their rights and obligations did not pay,
1,
10 The ban -|Mve them notice and an opportunity to cure as

11 required by the contract.

The guarantors themselves, within

12 the four corners of their guaranty, were not entitled to
13 the notice which they seek.
14

Now, the argument of Mr. Hanni is that these two

15 documents have to be read together, and since the note
16 required notice to the maker, then the guaranty must be read
17 to require notice to the guarantor.
18

THE COURT:

By two documents, you're referring, are

19 jyon not, to the guaranty and the note?
20

MS. WOOD:

That's right, that these two obligations

21 [evidenced by separate parties have to be read together, and
22 rche only way to read them together is to say well, the
23 [Language of the guaranty must be precisely the same as the
24 (language of the note.
25

That would be ridiculous.

It might be an argument that would make some sense if
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1 'che language of the note specifically required notice to the
2 guarantor and then the guaranty itself was silent on the
3 issue, but instead, you have a notice required to the maker
4 under the note and no notice required to the guarantor of
5 the maker's default.
6

There is absolutely no reason to read these documents

7 together to require the terms of the guaranty to be
8 identical to the terms of the note.

In fact, the law is

9 quite clear that an obligation of guaranty is entirely
10 separate than the obligation of the note, and although Mr.
11 Hanni has cited hundreds of cases in his brief to say that
12 you have to read two instruments together if it makes sense,
13 none of those cases fit this.

There f s not a single case that

14 he cites that says you have to read the terms of the guaranty
15 identical to the terms of the note.
16

It would make no sense.

Then you might as well have

17 the guarantors become makers of the note, and it's clear
18 that they undertake very separnfce•and very different
19 obligations and these guarantors were not undertaking the
20 principal obligation to pay this note; they were simply
21 undertaking the obligation to perform in the event of a
22 default.
23

Moreover, the cases which he cites with regard to

24 reading two instruments together always say when they're
25 executed as part of the same transaction and involve the same
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1 parties.

Here it's quite clear on the face of the document

2 you have separate parties.
3 corporation.
4

You have a note executed by a

You have a guaranty executed by six separate

individuals, some of whom were not principals in the

5 corporation, so all of that case law is simply inappropriate
6 for this argument.
7

Now, the note is clear on its face.

8 notice only to the undersigned, the maker.
9 clear on its face.

It requires
T h e guaranty is

It only requires -- it does not require

10 notice at all of the maker's default.

So all of the

11 presumptions which Mr. Hanni attempts to imply in this case
12 are completely irrelevant and that's why we don't think it
13 makes any difference, for purposes of this motion, who
14 drafted this particular document.

Presumptions are only

15 relevant if there's an ambiguity and these documents are
16 clear on their face.

They are not susceptible of an

17 ambiguous interpretation that would give the guarantors
18 right to notice on the one hand and take it away from them
19 [on the other hand, and that is why, in part, why the
20 ^American Bonding case is such an inappropriate analogy here.
21

Moreover, I should point out that our analysis of

22 |Ame.-;.can Bonding -- I- won't take the time with the Court
23 tocVy, but on page 2 6 at footnote 14 there's an exhaustive
24 [treatment of that case and why it does not fit.
25

Moreover, I should point out that the American Bonding

30

1 case was an indemnity case and not a guaranty case and that
2 the ambiguity was within the same document, not within
3 separate documents, and it simply does not control the
4 resolution of this case as Mr. Hanni would have you believe.
5

Now, let me just for a minute turn to an issue which

6 was not argued, but the Dougans and Beckers have from time
7 to time asserted in their briefs that the notice was also
8 inadequate, not only because it went to the wrong party but
9 because it didn't provide for 15 days notice.
10

Your Honor, the language of the note that we already

II pointed out specifically says, and I quote it, that as used
12 herein, written notice shall be effective as of the time the
13 same is deposited in the United States Mail.

A copy of the

14 notice which is attached to Mr. Hanni.'s brief is dated
15 January 24th and asks for cure before -- let's see,
16 February 7th.

If you count mailing, the date of mailing as

17 one of the days, because it's deemed to be given on the date
18 it's mailed, from January 24th to February 7th is exactly
19 15 days.

Mr. Hanni argues that you can't count the date of

20 hailing and so it's at the most, 14 days.

We think that that

21 is a hypertechnical, illogical and totally unimportant
22
23

(argument.
In point of fact, 15 days of notice, according to the

24 terms of the note, was given.

The important factor is that

25 no attempt was made to accelerate the note until 17 days in
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1 any event, so it's clear that an appropriate period for cure
2 was given to the maker of the note.
3

Moreover, it is also clear that the acceleration

4 occurred by virtue of a notice of default that went to all
5 of the obligors, including the guarantors here, and that
6 nobody ever stepped up to the plate and offered to pay the
7 obligation.
8

Now, this would be a different case if the bank had

9 waved somebody off who came up with the $26,000 that was in
10 default and said, "Here f s the money," and the bank said,
11 "Wait a minute, you're too late.

We've accelerated."

That's

12 not what happened here.
13

The bank waited for months and the statutory —

under

14 our law, the statutory notice of default v/ould require them
15 to wait an additional 90 days after giving notice of the
16 acceleration before they could in fact sell the property
17 and at that time for a period of 90 days any of these
18
19
20
21
22

guarantors that come here and complain about one

day could

have come in and attempted to cure the default, but they
did not and so as a result, whether you're counting 14 days,
whether you're counting 15 days, whether you're counting 17
days, they had an adequate opportunity to cure and they

23 did not do so.
24
25

Finally, Defendants Dougan and Becker assort that
because of this

hypertechnical failure, this one day that

1 they allege failure to give notice, that they are excused
2 from their entire obligation which they undertook under
3 an $800,000 note.
4

That simply is not the law, your Honor,

and we have cited law in our brief that shows that if there

5 is a problem with the notice, that the only relief that the
6 guarantors would be entitled to is relief based on any harm
7 which they have incurred*
8

As a result of their failure at any time to come

9 forward and offer to make up the payment that was in
10 default at the time the note was

accelerated,

it would be

II exceedingly difficult for them to establish that they had
12 been harmed in any respect by any alleged defect in the
13 notice which was given by First Interstate Bank of Utah.
14

Consequently, your Honor, First Interstate Bank of

15 Utah gave the party who was entitled to the notice of
16 default, the person standing in the shoes of the maker at
17 the time of the default, Park Meadows Development, a 15-day
18 notice.

In fact, they did not accelerate for 17 days after

19 giving that notice.
20

The guarantors clearly, unambiguously, on the face of

21 their guaranty obligation were not entitled to notice of the
22 maker's default prior to the acceleration, but even if your
23 Honor were completely unpersuaded by any of my arguments and
24 (were completely unwilling to award First Interstate Bank of
25 ,Utah summary judgment at this tine, summary judgment can

not
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1 be awarded to Defendants Dougan and Beckers because of one
2 very important factual dispute between the parties and that
3 involves the deposition testimony that was attached to our
4

brief of Lynn Dougan in which Mr. Dougan states that he

5 walked away from the Racquet Club obligation and that he
6

said to send the notices to First Interstate Bank of Utah,

7

Mr. Hanni says it is absolutely clear from that

8

testimony that what they meant was coupons, that we were

9

not giving up our right to receive notice of default.
First of all, they didn f t have a right to receive

10

11 notice of default either under the terms of the guaranty or
12 under the terms of the note, but if they did, that testimony
13 of Mr. Dougan raises a factual question about what notices
14 he

told the bank to send elsewhere and waiver by definition

15 is a question of fact and that will have to await determina16 tion by trial.

That particular factual inquiry, however,

17 your Honor, does not prevent First Interstate Bank of Utah
18 from being entitled to summary judgment at this time.
19

It is undisputed we gave notice.

20 notice that we gave are undisputed.
21
22

are undisputed.

The dates of the

The terms of the note

The individual who received the notice stood

in the shoes of the maker at the date of default, and we

23 are entitled

to summary judgment stating that we properly

24 accelerated the Park City Racquet Club Note.
25

Thank you.
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1

THE COURT:

2

Mr. Hanni?

3

MR. HANNI:

All right.

Thank you, Ms. Wood.

If it please the Court, the position here

4

the bank is taking is this:

5

that if they give notice to the person who is then primarily

6

obligated to pay the note

7

that that's all they've got to do.

3
9

They are taking the position

that they're going to accelerate,

Now, your Honor, that's perfectly fine if they only
want to look at that person,

if they only want to look to

10 Park Meadows, and that's exactly the v/ay this bank conducted
H

itself over a period of years.

The exchange was in 1982

12 where Dougan and Becker exchanged the Racquet Club to Park
13 Meadows for some lots, and if your Honor will remember, on
14 our last motions in here we talked about the fact that the
15 bank did a workout agreement with everybody.

The bank put a

16 big blanket mortgage for several millions of dollars on the
17 Racquet Club.

They did a lot of things and that created a

18 fact issue as to whether or not anybody could step up to the
19 plate and pay anything off.
20
21

Dougan and Becker, if your Honor will recall, ordered
a title report and they see all these blanket mortgages on

22 the Racquet Club.

They see that the bank has put them into

23 involuntary bankruptcy.

They see lots of things that told

24 them they couldn't step up to bat and pay off the obliga25 tion.

Those are fact issues and your Honor's already ruled
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1 about that.
2

Now we're talking about a different thing today.

We

3 are not talking about whether Dougan and Becker had the
4 financial condition to step up to bat or whether the title
5 of the Racquet Club was such that it would have deterred
6 anybody from trying to step up to bat.
7

It isn't a question of curing the default.

It's a

8 question of whether the bank performed a condition precedent
9 to its right to accelerate that note.
10

Now, if you follow the bank's argument here, the bank

11 is saying to your Honor, "We've got the Racquet Club, we've
12 got Dougan and Becker who have assumed this indebtedness,
13 and we got Park Meadows.

Now, all we got to do is give notic^

14 to Park Meadows who is then the primary person that's liable,
15 and if we do that, then we have effectively and legally
16 accelerated that note."
17

But, your Honor -- and they're absolutely right if

18 they want to just look to Park Meadows, but if they want to
19 keep Dougan and Becker on the string as being the immediate
20 predecessor in interest and if they wanted to keep the
21

Racquet Club Corporation on the string and liable as the

22 initial maker, then they've got to accord those people who
23

are parties to that note the rights that that note gives them

24 They can't say, "You're saddled with all of the obligations
25 but you're deprived of all of the rights," and they haven't
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1

cited one case that says that.

And we say to your Honor that Dougan and Becker, when

2
3
4
5
6

they assumed that note and stepped into the shoes of the
maker, they had a right to say to themselves, "Nobody,
nobody can accelerate that note and hold us on it v/ithout
giving us 15 days notice," and that didn f t happen.
Now, the Racquet Club itself can say the same thing.

7
8
9
10
11

Dougan and Becker as guarantors, in their capacity as
guarantors, could say, "The note that we guaranteed
requires that 15 days notice be given to everybody up the
line that you intend to hold liable on that note."
Now, your Honor, there are numerous transactions that

12
13
14

Not one.

occurred.

People buy homes, they buy all kinds of property,

and they sign an initial note and a mortgage.

That initial

1
15 note says if you re going to accelerate, you've got to give

16 so much notice as a condition precedent to doing it.
17 they sell to somebody else.

Then

Yes, they expect that somebody

18 else to take care of the obligation.

That somebody else

19 is the primary obligor, and the one upstream is the
20 secondary.

Stands kind of like a guarantor or a surety or

21 whatever you want to call them, and then if that person sells
22 to another one, then you got another primary obligor and
23 you got another one on downstream if that person in turn
24 sells.

And the holder of that note can look at all of them

f
25 and he can say, "If the one that s primarily liable doesn't
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1 pay, everybody in between, you're still liable to me as the
2 holder."
3
4

But each of those holders have certain rights.

They

don't just have obligations, and that's exactly the position

5 the bank is taking here, that all they got is obligations,
6 no rights at all, and I'd just say to your Honor, when
7 somebody steps into the shoes of a maker, which Becker and
8 Dougan did in this case by assuming that Racquet Club note,
9 they got all the rights of that maker if the bank as the
10 holder wants to accelerate and wants to hold them liable
11 on that note and that's the point that we make.
12

Yes, as to Park Meadows they gave notice.

But, your

13 Honor, I want to call your attention to the fact that their
14 notice wasn't even adequate to Park Meadows.
15
16
17
18

trying to argue here is they send the note -- or they date
their notice January 24, 1986, and that notice says you're
delinquent three installments, you owe us $27,000.

21
22

You get

it into our office no later than February 7th.

19
20

What they're

Now, the bank admits in their brief, your Honor,
that in computing, time you got to, if you're going to count
[day one, the day of the act, then you can not count the last
day.

You can't count both day one and the last day.

You

23 just don't compute time that way, whether it be construing
24
25

la statute or contract or whatever, and I'd like to just read
k/hat they said on page 10 of their initial brief.

They say,
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1 "We devoted a long time developing two propositions:

One,

2 a creditor must comply with the express terms of an accele3 ration clause to accelerate a debt; and two, in computing
4 a time period, a Court includes either the first or the last
5 day of the applicable time period, but not both.
6
7

First

Interstate does not disagree with either proposition."
Nov, if you exclude January 24, which is the way you

8 normally do, if that was the day the notice was mailed,
9 there's nothing that says it was mailed on that day in this
10 record.

It's dated that day and we're assuming for purposes

11 of the argument that it got into the mail that day.

But

12 there's nothing here from the bank that tells us that.
13

But assuming it did, you would exclude that day and if

14 you include February 7, that's 14 days.

That is not the 15-

15 day notice to cure, and that -- so we say if all else fails,
16 they haven't even legally accelerated the note as to Park
17 Meadows, and on that ground, your Honor, the guarantors
18 should be discharged.
19
20
21
22

Now, they make one other argument here, your Honor.
They say that the note itself -- and I'd like to just read
the -- I'd just like to read the language.
that there was a waiver of nonpayment.

They are saying

Now, let's keep

23 in mind, your Honor, what we're talking about here:
24 payment.
25

non-

Quite often somebody that owes a note will get

behind on a payment and the holder will send out a notice and
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1 say, "Hey, you haven't made your payment."

Yes, they're

2 waiving that sort of a notice, your Honor, because you
3 wouldn't want a guarantor to be able to say if a maker of a
4 note got behind and missed an installment or two and the
5 bank says they don't want to accelerate; all they're doing
6 is saying hey, you're behind on your payments, can you please
7 bring them up?
8

Now, that's the kind of waiver they're talking about

9 in that particular portion of the note.

They are not talking

10 about the waiver of the 15-day notice as a condition
11 precedent to the right of acceleration.
12

One other thing that counsel argues here is that you

13 shouldn't be construing the guaranty and the note together.
14 I'd just like to point out, your Honor, under Stacey
15 Properties, which is our latest Court of Appeals case, that
16 one involved a promissory note and —

with an acceleration

17 clause in it and it involved a separate letter agreement.
18 The note provided for a certain notice if you're going to
19 accelerate.

The letter agreement said you have -- the obligoij-

20 on the note, you have the right to offset if certain
21 conditions occur.

The Court of Appeals said, "We're going

22 to construe these together," and that's the Stacey
23 Properties case, and they found in that case that the
24 obligor on that obligation had a right to offset and that he
25 had exercised his right to offset, so the holder of the note
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1 on the other hand was unable to accelerate because theirs
2 was no default.

He'd exercised the right given in the

3 letter agreement to work an offset.
4

We submit, your Honor, we've labored this long and

5 hard and I think that we have adequately on the undisputed
6

facts demonstrated that if they want to hold these people

7

liable upstream from Park Meadows, they've got to comply

8 with those, the terms of the note.
9

They didn't comply with the condition precedent.

We're

10 not dealing here with the question today about whether or not
11 anybody stepped up to bat to cure the default.

That's a

12 fact issue if we have to try this case to a jury as to why
13 that didn't happen, but the real narrow focus is, did they
14 give notice as they were legally obligated to do before
15 they got accelerated, and the answer is no, without question
16 they did not, and even as to Park Meadows they only gave
17 14 days notice.

They did not give 15.

18

We submit the motion should be granted.

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. WOOD:

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Hanni.

Your Honor, I'm prepared for a brief

21 rebuttal, but if you choose to cut me off -22

THE COURT:

You may rebut briefly, Ms. Wood, I suppose,

23 given the fact that you both have motions pending here, but
24 at some point we v/ill have to make a determination as to
25 who's going to have the last word.
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1

MS. WOOD:

Your Honor, I'm willing to take two

2 minutes, if I can, of the last word.
3

THE COURT:

4

MS. WOOD:

Very well.
Okay.

5 make a couple of points.

Your Honor, I really only want to
One of them, the suretyship

6 argument which Mr. Hanni has made is simply not the law.
7 It's true, a ho.te, this note could be assigned and assumed
8 many times.

There is not an obligation to give any

9 individual notice under the terms of the Racquet Club note
10 or under the law except the person standing in the shoes of
11 the maker at the date of default, absent a contract provision
12 to inquire notice.
13

The Dougans and Beckers, when they transferred their

14 obligation to Park Meadows Development, could have extracted
15 a promise from Park Meadows Development to give them notice
16 of the default.

They could have gone to the bank and said

17 ;wefre doing this, we still want notice of default.

They

18 could have asked for notice of default to be included in
19 their guaranty.

They did not do so.

The law does not imply

20 that requirement under these circumstances, and they have
21 Icited absolutely no case law to the contrary.
22

Second of all, with regard to the 15 days or 14 days,

23 bnce again, we think that's a nonissue because

acceleration

24 did not occur until 17 days and the only thing that this
25 provision of the note says you have to give notice 15 days

6.1

1 before you do anything, and then you otherwise don't have
2 to give notice, but it is an unremarkable proposition that
3 the law generally does not count the first day or the last
4 day.

That does not change the fact that these parties by

5 contract changed that particular provision and they provided
6 that notice was deemed to be given on the date it was mailed,
7 so 15 days in fact was given.
8

Your Honor, finally, the waiver arguments with regard

9 to the Dougans only create factual issues which preclude Mr.
10 Hanni getting the relief which he seeks, but does not
11 preclude First Interstate Bank of Utah from being given
12 summary judgment on the issue that they properly accelerated
13 this note by giving notice to the person standing in the
14 shoes of the maker at the date of default.
15

Thank you.

16

THE COURT

All right.

17

MR. HANNI

We'll submit it, your Honor.

18

THE COURT

Thank you.

Thank you, Ms. Wood.

So it's clear on the record,

19 Mr. Hanni, I received what I deemed to have been a courtesy
20 copy of your reply memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff f s|
21 motion for partial summary judgment.

However, while it

22 appears to be a photocopy of your signature, there is no
23 courtesy copy stamp on the document.

I presume that it is

24 indeed a courtesy copy.
25

MR. HANNI:

I hope so, your Honor.

It should have had
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1 the stamp on it.

The one we filed was not a bound one, so

2 I'm sure this has to be a courtesy copy.

Should have had

3 the stamp, however.
4

THE COURT:

In the event that this is indeed intended

5 as your original, we will see to it that it gets to the
6 Clerk's office.
7
8

As I stated at the outset, counsel, I have had
considerable time to review the respective briefs in this

9 matter and I will say that in my view, this is somewhat of
10 a complex issue, or at least it has been made that way,
11 and I will furthermore say that while I appreciate counsels 1
12 observations that the matter is in several particulars
13 undisputed, if that is the case, why are we all here?
14

Obviously, there is a serious contested dispute and I

15 will commend counsel for what I think to have been both a
16 very scholarly briefing of the issues, and presentation.
17 Nevertheless, it is my view that the circumstances in this
18 case dictate that I determine that the Dougans and Beckers
19 were entitled to notice and that they did not receive notice
20 in any of their respective capacities vis-a-vis the bank.
21

I must, in making that ruling, rely upon and will

22 therefore rely upon the authorities cited in the moving
23 party's briefs.
24

I am persuaded that the motion for summary judgment

25 filed on behalf of the Defendants Dougans and Beckers is well
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1 taken and is therefore granted.
2

Furthermore, however, it is my observation that the

3 notice that was sent is not in strict compliance with the
4 bank f s documentation incident to the need to send and in
5 the particulars in how the notice is sent.
6

While it may be true, for purposes of argument, that

7 that determination is hypertechnical, I am persuaded that
8 in a matter of this magnitude, the bank must, being the
9 drafter of the document upon which all of the parties here
10 must rely, is expected at a minimum to comply with the
11 terms of its own documents, particularly when it relates to
12 something as serious as an acceleration of an obligation of
13 this type.
14

The motion of Dougans and Beckers, therefore, is

15 granted.
16

The Plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary

17 judgment is denied.
18

Mr. Hanni, you prepare the appropriate order and

19 submit it to this Court for execution.
20

Court will be in recess.

21

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)

22

•
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*
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2
3 STATE OF UTAH
4 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss
)

5
6
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ADDENDUM XVIII
ORDER DECEMBER 8, 1988

Alll

NO..

FILED
GLENN C. HANNI #A1327
MARK J. TAYLOR #4455
c„
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants- -.
0:-;Beckers and Dougans
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

• :00,0
r*T ^ounry

ZlA

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.,
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT
CO., a Utah partnership,
MARGARET M. BECKER, VICTOR R.
AYERS, MARION P. AYERS,
J. LYNN DOUGAN, DIANA LADY
DOUGAN, and FIRST SECURITY
BANK OF UTAH, N.A., a banking
corporation with its
principal place of business
in Utah,

ORDER

Civil No. 9159
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
FREDERICK G. BECKER II,
MARGARET M. BECKER, J. LYNN
DOUGAN and DIANA LADY DOUGAN,
Third Party Plaintiffs
vs.
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH,
Third Party Defendants

1 "V",

ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH
RICHARD SMITH,
Third Party Defendants
vs.
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff.

On November 28, 1988, plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick.

Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, Mary Anne Q.

Wood and Richie D. Haddock of the firm of Holme Roberts & Owen.
Defendants Dougans and Beckers were represented by Glenn C. Hanni
and Mark J. Taylor of the firm of Strong & Hanni.

Defendants Park

Meadows Investment and Third-Party Defendants were represented by
Jeffrey Robinson of the firm of Moyle & Draper.
was not present in person nor by counsel.

Defendant Vic Ayers

The court having heard

arguments of counsel and having considered the records and files
of this case, and it appearing to the court that material issues
of fact exist in this case,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is

hereby denied.
Dated this

_ # ^ T d a y of
BY THE

hbo

, 1988.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed postage prepaid this Qc\

day of

November, 1988, to:
Mary Anne Q. Wood
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN
Suite 900
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Hardin A. Whitney
Jeff Robinson
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901
Attorneys for Defendant Park Meadows
Investment Co., a/k/a Park Meadows
Development Co.,
J. Michael Kelly
Kent H. Murdock
Enid Greene
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0358
Attorneys for Defendant
First Security Bank of Utah
David R. Olson
Charles P. Sampson
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
174 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
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ADDENDUM XIX
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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No.

FILED
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539
Richie D. Haddock #4585
50 South Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 521-580CT'

!»<V 1.6 1989
Clerk of Summit County
Deputy C M
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A., )
a Utah Corporation,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., a/k/a
PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT CO.,
a Utah partnership, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, et al.,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)

ENOCH SMITH, JR., and
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH,

)
)

Third-Party Defendants.

ENOCH SMITH, JR., and
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A.,
Third-Party Defendant

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Civil No. 9159
Judge J. Dennis
Frederick

NOTICE IS hereby given pursuant to Rule 3 of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, that Plaintiff First
Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., hereby appeals to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah from the Order Denying Plaintiffs7
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered on December 22,
1988, and the Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's
Complaint rendered by the Honorable J, Dennis Frederick of the
Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, State of
Utah, and entered on May 5, 1989. A copy of the December 22,
1988, Order and a copy of the May 5, 1989, Judgment are hereto
attached.
DATED this /£,

day of May, 1988.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, via the
United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal this ll/^h

day of May, 1989, to

the following:
Hardin A. Whitney, Esq.
Moyle & Draper, P.C.
Attorneys for Park Meadows Investment and
Third-Party Defendants
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901
Kent H. Murdock, Esq.
Enid Greene, Esq.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
Attorneys for First Security Bank
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Victor Ayers
50 Thayne Canyon Drive
Park City, Utah 84060
David R. Olsen, Esq.
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson
Attorneys for Victor R. Ayers
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1680
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
Mark J. Taylor, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Attorneys for Becker and Dougan
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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